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Abstract
Light-duty vehicles account for 43% of petroleum consumption and 23% of green-
house gas emissions in the United States. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standards are the primary policy tool addressing petroleum consumption in the U.S.,
and are set to tighten substantially through 2025. In this dissertation, I address
several interconnected questions on the technical, policy, and market aspects of fuel
consumption reduction.
I begin by quantifying historic improvements in fuel efficiency technologies since
the 1970s. First, I develop a linear regression model of acceleration performance
conditional on power, weight, powertrain, and body characteristics, showing that
vehicles today accelerate 20-30% faster than vehicles with similar specifications in
the 1970s. Second, I find that growing use of alternative materials and a switch to
more weight-efficient vehicle architectures since 1975 have cut the weight of today’s
new cars by approximately 790 kg (46%). Integrating these results with model-level
specification data, I estimate that the average fuel economy of new cars could have
tripled from 1975–2009, if not for changes in performance, size, and features over
this period. The pace of improvements was not uniform, averaging 5% annually from
1975–1990, but only 2% annually since then. I conclude that the 2025 standards
can be met through improvements in efficiency technology, if we can return to 1980s
rates of improvement, and growth in acceleration performance and feature content is
curtailed.
I next test the hypotheses that higher fuel prices and more stringent CAFE stan-
dards cause automotive firms to deploy efficiency technologies more rapidly. I find
some evidence that higher fuel prices cause more rapid changes in technology, but lit-
tle to no evidence that tighter CAFE standards increase rates of technology change. I
conclude that standards alone, without continued high gasoline prices, may not drive
technology improvements at rates needed to meet the 2025 CAFE standards.
Finally, I discuss the political economy of state and federal fuel economy standards.
I develop a simple model of automotive manufacturers’ responses to alternative sys-
tems of fuel economy regulation, using it to demonstrate the importance of several
3
factors determining industry support for nationwide fuel economy regulations.
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Tradeoffs, and Fuel Economy
Regulations in U.S. Automobiles
Cars and light trucks in the United States account for nearly half (43%) of the coun-
try’s petroleum consumption and one-quarter (23%) of its greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions (EIA, 2011; EPA, 2013a; Kromer and Heywood, 2007). Falling petroluem
demand and rising domestic production have reduced our reliance on petroleum im-
ports in recent years, but imports still account for almost half (46%) of U.S. petroleum
supply (EIA, 2013). In addition, the U.S. transportation sector remains heavily de-
pendent on petroleum and is consequently sensitive to fluctuations in the global price
of oil. For these reasons, mitigating petroleum dependence and GHG emissions are
seen as important policy goals. This is exemplified, for example, by the opening text
of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, which articulated the follow-
ing purposes: To move the United States toward greater energy independence and
security, to increase the production of clean renewable fuels, to protect consumers,
to increase the efficiency of products, buildings, and vehicles, to promote research on
and deploy greenhouse gas capture and storage options, and to improve the energy
performance of the Federal Government, and for other purposes.
Broadly speaking, there are three principal strategies that can reduce GHG emis-
17
sions and petroleum consumption from personal transportation. First, we can reduce
the distance that vehicles are driven. Second, we can consume less energy per unit of
distance traveled. Thirdly, we can reduce the petroleum or GHG intensity of our fuel
mix. In the U.S., most policy efforts, particularly at the national level, are focused
on reducing per-mile energy consumption. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA) has since 1978 required manufacturers of new automobiles to ensure that
their products meet a certain minimum level of fuel economy, on a sales-weighted
average basis.1 These Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards are to
be set administratively at the “maximum feasible” level, taking into account factors
that include “technological feasibility” and “economic practicability.”
By definition, establishing sound fuel economy policy demands a clear understand-
ing of what is technologically feasible and economically practical. This means, firstly,
having a clear idea of how much technology might improve in the future. Secondly, it
requires an understanding of what we are gaining (or, potentially, losing) by applying
those technological improvements to reducing fuel consumption. Improving certain
attributes valued by consumers — particularly acceleration performance, size, and
features that add weight — tends to increase a vehicle’s fuel consumption. As such,
new technologies can be used either to reduce fuel consumption or to offset the fuel
consumption penalties of other design changes. Understanding the relationships be-
tween efficiency technologies, fuel consumption, and these other vehicle attributes is
essential to developing standards that are technologically feasible and economically
practical.
The objective of this dissertation, in a broad sense, is to improve our under-
standing of what is technologically feasible and economically practical in the context
of automotive fuel economy in the U.S. To do this, I explore the scope of historic
fuel efficiency technology improvements in U.S. automobiles, trends in several key
1Throughout this dissertation, I will refer frequently to both fuel economy and fuel consumption.
I use fuel consumption to refer to the amount of fuel that a vehicle consumes for a specified distance
traveled, in units such as liters per 100 km or gallons per 100 miles. Fuel consumption therefore is
the inverse of fuel economy, which is commonly expressed as miles per gallon. Fuel consumption in
this sense should not be confused with the total quantity of fuel consumed by all vehicles combined;
even as average fuel consumption has fallen over the years, the total quantity of fuel consumed has
increased as the number of vehicles has grown and their collective distance traveled has increased.
18
attributes closely related to fuel consumption, and the relationships between fuel
economy policies, the adoption of efficiency technologies, and vehicle designs.
The results of this dissertation will be relevant to policymakers implementing
automotive fuel economy policy, and to those studying energy efficiency technology
and standards more broadly. If fuel efficiency technology improves at rates determined
exogenously to the policy environment, then policymakers must have a clear basis
for predicting of how much technology will improve in the future. If, as is widely
believed, technology changes more quickly in response to higher gasoline prices or
stricter fuel economy standards, then sound policymaking demands an awareness
of this fact and an estimate of the size of any such effect. Finally, policymakers
concerned about economic practicability of fuel economy standards must understand
the tradeoffs between fuel consumption and other attributes valued by consumers, as
well as the underlying trends in those attributes. This dissertation addresses all of
these issues.
1.1 Overview of Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into chapters addressing a sequence of interconnected
topics related to automotive technology, vehicle attribute tradeoffs, and fuel economy
policy. While the chapters build on and incorporate results from prior chapters, each
one is written so as to be largely self-contained, and the interested reader should be
able to approach them in a modular fashion.
Chapter 2 presents a set of linear regression models for estimating the acceleration
performance of cars and trucks based on their power, weight, and key powertrain and
body style characteristics. Key questions addressed in this chapter include:
• How can we concisely and conveniently estimate the acceleration performance
of light-duty vehicles using commonly-reported attributes?
• Do vehicles today accelerate differently than vehicles in the past, even for the
same level of power, weight, and key powertrain and body characteristics?
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• How has the distribution of acceleration performance across new vehicles changed
since the 1970s?
Chapter 3 examines changes in the weight of new cars in the U.S. since 1975, consid-
ering both weight-saving technologies and weight-increasing features and functionality
improvements. This chapter addresses the following questions:
• How was the weight of the average new car in the U.S. reduced so precipitously
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, only to rebound again in subsequent years?
• How much more would today’s cars weigh, if not for the spread of weight-efficient
architectures and materials since 1975?
• How much weight has the growth in size and the addition of safety, emissions,
and comfort and convenience features added to the average new car since 1975?
Chapter 4 quantifies the improvements in efficiency technology in new cars since
1975, employing a system-level perspective that focuses on attributes relevant to
consumers. The chapter relies on estimates of acceleration performance based on
the methods reported in Chapter 2, and on estimates of weight-saving technologies
reported in Chapter 3. The chapter addresses questions that include:
• Holding all else equal, by how much does a car’s fuel consumption increase in
response to a 1% increase in weight? A 1% reduction in fuel consumption?
• How much could the per-mile fuel consumption of new cars in the U.S. have been
reduced since 1975, if functionality (including size, acceleration performance,
and feature content) had remained unchanged over this time?
• How much of this potential has actually been realized as reductions in fuel
consumption? How much has been needed to offset the effects of changes in
acceleration, size, and feature content?
• Have these patterns been stable over time?
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Chapter 5 empirically tests the hypothesis that tighter fuel economy standards will
themselves spur faster technology change. This chapter employs model-level vehicle
specifications and firm-level regulatory compliance data from 1978–2008 to address
the following questions:
• Does the efficiency technology in a firm’s fleet of new cars change more quickly
when that firm is more tightly constrained by a CAFE standard?
• Does technology improve more quickly when gasoline prices are higher?
Chapter 6 discusses the political economy of fuel economy standards, and how it
helps to explain recent rulemaking outcomes on automotive fuel consumption and
GHG standards. The chapter presents a modeling framework to simulate the re-
sponses of automobile manufacturers to either uniform federal fuel economy stan-
dards, or “nested” standards in which a subset of states (“adopting states”) adopt
a tighter standard than the prevailing federal standard. Integrating results from the
prior chapters, I present a simple implementation of this model for a single vehicle
class, and address the following questions:
• How might firms respond to a stricter federal fuel economy standard, in terms
of adoption of new technologies, giving up improvements in acceleration perfor-
mance, and pricing of their products?
• How do firms’ optimal strategies depend on the market size in adopting states,
the relative stringency of standards in adopting states and federally, and the
cost of developing multiple variants of their products?
• What are the implications of these results for firms’ support of nationwide stan-
dardization of fuel consumption standards, and for the “leakage” of emissions
from more strictly regulated regions to more loosely regulated regions?
Chapter 7 summarizes and integrates some of the key results of the dissertation,




Analyzing Acceleration Trends in
U.S. Light-Duty Vehicles
This chapter is based on a paper jointly authored with John Heywood, published in Trans-
portation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, No. 2287,
pp. 122–131. c©National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 2012. Material in this
chapter is reproduced with permission of the Transportation Research Board. None of this
implies endorsement by TRB of a product, method, practice, or policy.
The acceleration performance of light-duty vehicles has implications for the energy usage of
those vehicles, their attractiveness to consumers, and how they are driven. Despite this im-
portance, many investigators rely on correlations from the 1970s for estimating performance.
This chapter presents a set of linear regression models for estimating acceleration times from
0–48, 0–97, and 72–105 km/h (0–30, 0–60, and 45–65 mph), based on engine power, vehicle
weight, body style, and basic powertrain characteristics of more than 1000 vehicles tested
by Consumer Reports magazine between 1975 and 2010. Importantly, the results include
estimates of fixed effects for each year, capturing technological improvements not directly
observed in the data set and making the models appropriate for estimating performance of
vehicles from many different model years. Results indicate that contemporary vehicles are
better able to transform engine power into acceleration performance than were vehicles in
the past, yielding acceleration times 20–30% faster than comparable vehicles in the 1970s.
Most of this improvement appears to have occurred before 1990, and the estimated effect is
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larger for 0–48 km/h acceleration than for higher-speed acceleration. One of the reported
models was applied to historic sales and specification data for United States vehicles, and
the results indicate that new vehicles in the U.S. today average 8.8 seconds from 0–97 km/h,
0.9 seconds (10%) faster than previously thought. Interestingly, the trends in 0–97 km/h
acceleration times are consistent with exponential decay toward an asymptote, and today’s
vehicles are within one second of the estimated asymptotic acceleration time. The models
reported in this chapter also will be applied to estimate the 0–97 km/h acceleration times
of new cars as part of the work reported in Chapter 4.
2.1 Introduction
Understanding vehicle acceleration performance is important to transportation ana-
lysts and researchers for several reasons. First, acceleration can be traded off against
other vehicle attributes, including fuel economy. All else being equal, larger improve-
ments in acceleration performance over time mean smaller improvements in fuel econ-
omy, leading to higher energy consumption. Second, the acceleration performance of
a vehicle can affect its utility to consumers, influencing purchase decisions. Finally,
acceleration capabilities may influence how aggressively vehicles end up being driven,
affecting in-use fuel consumption (Berry, 2010). The objective of this work was to de-
velop an improved method for estimating vehicle acceleration performance using other
vehicle attributes, and to quantify the annual improvements in acceleration perfor-
mance that are due to factors beyond basic ones like increased power-to-weight ratio.
The average acceleration performance of new vehicles sold in the United States has
been improving steadily since the early 1980s, while fuel consumption has changed
relatively little. Figure 2-1 shows the average 0–97 km/h (0–60 mph) acceleration
times and average fuel consumption for new cars and light trucks in the U.S. since
1975, as reported by the EPA (2010). Despite the substantial reductions in acceler-
ation times that are evident in these oft-cited numbers, this chapter will show that
the actual rate of change has been even faster, and that the estimates in Figure 2-
1 overstate acceleration times for contemporary U.S. vehicles by approximately 0.9
24
seconds, or 10%.
Figure 2-1: Average 0–97 km/h acceleration times and average unadjusted fuel con-
sumption for new U.S. automobiles, 1975–2010, as reported by EPA (2010). The
actual rate of reduction in acceleration times has been faster than shown here.
Acceleration performance is commonly reported as the time needed to accelerate
between two speeds at wide-open throttle. Three common acceleration metrics are
investigated in this chapter:
• Z48: Time to accelerate from 0–48 km/h (0–30 mph)
• Z97: Time to accelerate from 0–97 km/h (0–60 mph)
• P72105: Time to accelerate from 72–105 km/h (45–65 mph); P denotes “passing
acceleration.”
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These measures are reported by Consumer Reports magazine based on their own
testing, and are the same measures that were previously investigated for a more lim-
ited sample of vehicles by Santini and Anderson (1993). Despite the importance of
acceleration performance, a key challenge to incorporating it into analytical work is
that comprehensive databases containing standardized acceleration measurements are
difficult or impossible to find, especially for the investigator who also requires reliable
data on other vehicle attributes, sales volumes, and the like. For these investigators,
detailed simulation of vehicle performance may be neither necessary nor practical.
Instead, a convenient means to estimate vehicle acceleration performance based on
other characteristics is desirable. Therefore, many authors rely on a correlation orig-
inally published in 1976 for estimating a vehicle’s acceleration performance based on
its power-to-weight ratio (Malliaris et al., 1976). This correlation continues to be
used in academic papers (Knittel, 2011), reports (Greene, 2001; Bandivadekar et al.,
2008), and government data like those summarized in Figure 2-1 (EPA, 2010). These
government data are themselves used as the basis for analyses of acceleration trends
(Lutsey and Sperling, 2005; An and DeCicco, 2007). One objective of this work was
to develop an improved method for estimating acceleration performance, which would
be more applicable to modern vehicles and more robust over time. A second objective
was to quantify the changes in acceleration that are not captured by the power to
weight variable that forms the basis of so many estimates.
Malliaris et al. (1976) estimated a model of 0–97 km/h acceleration time using
the following form, where P is engine peak power, IWT is the inertia weight, and F







They noted the importance of many factors other than the power to weight ra-
tio for determining acceleration performance, such as drivetrain characteristics and
the engine’s torque curve. However, they argued, the power to weight ratio “is over-
whelmingly influential and allows by itself and adequate description of the acceleration
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performance.” They estimated different values of the parameters F and f for vehicles
with manual transmissions and for those with automatics, using acceleration times
reported in the automotive enthusiast literature (e.g. Car & Driver magazine) for
model years 1974 and 1975.
Young (1991) updated the analysis of Malliaris, Hsia, and Gould, using similar
sources of performance data for model years 1989-1990. She investigated several
functional forms, including linear forms, and considered including engine displace-
ment and axle ratio as additional explanatory variables. Young concluded that the
best model was one with the same form as that advanced by Malliaris, Hsia, and
Gould (Equation 2.1), though she recommended eliminating the distinction between
automatic and manual transmissions.
Santini and Anderson (1993) made several improvements upon the methods of
earlier investigators. First, they noted that the earlier functional forms placed un-
necessary constraints on parameter values, by requiring that the exponent for power
be the negative of the exponent for weight. They adopted a more general functional
form, noting that the model shown in Equation 2.1 is a highly restricted form of their
model, where CWTi is the curb weight of vehicle i, Di is its engine displacement, Ai
is a surrogate for its frontal area, Ci is a dummy variable indicating that vehicle i is
a car, Vi is a dummy variable indicating that it is a van, and Xi is a vector of dummy
variables denoting various engine technology packages included on vehicle i:
ln(ACCi) = β0 + β1ln(Pi) + β2ln(CWTi) + β3ln(Di) + β4ln(Ai) + β5Ciln(Ai)
+ β6Viln(Ai) + βXXi + i (2.2)
Santini and Anderson also argued that relying on the automotive enthusiast lit-
erature could be problematic because of inconsistency in the testing methods used.
Instead, they used performance testing data reported by a single publication, Con-
sumer Reports, for 107 vehicles from model years 1986–1988.
Santini and Anderson found that in addition to power and weight, important de-
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terminants of acceleration performance included engine displacement, transmission
type, body type, and frontal area. They found that generally, the inclusion of spe-
cific engine technologies did not significantly affect acceleration performance after
controlling for the major attributes listed above.
This chapter reports work that builds on Santini and Anderson’s approach by
employing a much broader data set spanning 1975–2010, while estimating fixed ef-
fects for year. These changes have two important consequences. First, they make the
model more appropriate for estimating acceleration performance over multiple years.
Second, the fixed effects can be interpreted as quantifying improvements in how ef-
fectively a vehicle transforms engine power into the acceleration of the vehicle’s mass.
The results indicate that for a given level of engine power and vehicle mass (and
controlling for various powertrain and body characteristics) a contemporary vehicle
delivers approximately 20-30% faster acceleration than a comparable new vehicle in
1977. The results also indicate that most of these gains occurred prior to 1990.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the
form of the linear regression model used to estimate the various measures of acceler-
ation. Section 2.3 describes the data set that was used to fit the model. Section 2.4
contains the results of the model estimation, and discussion of the estimated param-
eter values. Section 2.5 discusses concerns over bias in the sample of vehicles selected
for acceleration testing and applies the model in order to examine trends in the 0–97
km/h acceleration performance of U.S. vehicles since 1978. Section 2.6 summarizes
some conclusions that can be drawn from the work.
2.2 Methodology
In this work, several model specifications were investigated, all of which use a gen-
eral form similar to that advanced by Santini and Anderson (1993). In its most
unrestricted form, the model used in this work is:
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ln(ACCit) = β0 + β1ln(Pit) + β2ln(WTit) + β3ln(Dit) + β4[ln(Pit)]
2 + β5[ln(WTit)]
2
+ β6ln(Pit)ln(WTit) + β7ln(Pit)ln(Dit) + β8TSpdit
+ βTX
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it + it (2.3)
In the above model, ACC is an acceleration metric, P is engine peak power, WT
is vehicle weight (both curb weight and inertia weight were investigated), D is engine
displacement, and TSpd is the number of transmission speeds (defined as zero for
continuously variable transmissions). XT is a set of dummy variables for transmission
type, XE a set of dummy variables for engine type, XD a set of dummy variables
for drive type, and XB a set of dummy variables for body style. βT , βE, βD, and
βB are vectors of fixed effects capturing the average effects of dummy variables X
T ,
XE, XD, XB, respectively. The term XY is a set of dummy variables equal to
1 for year t and 0 for all other years. Thus, βY represents a vector of fixed effects
estimating acceleration performance in each year relative to a base year, similar to
the approach employed by Knittel (2011) in estimating technological progress for
U.S. automobiles. Additional terms capture interaction effects of power with weight,
displacement, transmission type, and engine type. The last term, , is an error
term representing random variation due to factors not captured by the independent
variables. The subscript i is an index for each vehicle model observation, while t
denotes the model year of the vehicle.
Several restricted versions of the above model were also estimated, and results are
also reported for a simplified model that includes only engine power and weight.
2.3 Data
The database used in the present work includes approximately 1,500 vehicles that
were offered for sale in the U.S. between 1975 and 2010 and were tested by Consumer
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Reports. Personal communications with testing directors at both Consumer Reports
and Edmunds.com suggested that inconsistency in testing methods, as noted by San-
tini and Anderson (1993), continues to be an issue today, especially among enthusiast
publications which compete to report the most aggressive performance numbers. As
such, this work relies on testing by a single publication to eliminate the effects of
this testing variation. The database includes a variety of engineering attributes and
performance metrics, including:
• Curb weight
• Engine peak power, displacement, and type (naturally aspirated gasoline, tur-
bodiesel, etc.)
• Transmission type and number of speeds
• Drive type (rear-, front-, four- or all-wheel drive)
• Body style (sedan, SUV, etc.)
• Acceleration performance from 0–48, 0–97, and 72–105 km/h (0–30, 0–60, and
45–65 mph)
The Consumer Reports database is not a random sample of vehicles offered in
the U.S. Instead, its membership is determined by the decisions of Consumer Re-
ports ’ staff. Nevertheless, the average weight and power of the Consumer Reports
sample tracks reasonably well with the averages for all new vehicles sold in the U.S.,
as shown in Figure 2-2. Figure 2-2 does suggest that before 1990, Consumer Reports
was somewhat biased toward testing lighter, less powerful vehicles. Personal commu-
nication with Consumer Reports ’ testing director indicated that Consumer Reports
tends to test vehicles and configurations that they expect will be high-volume sellers,
and which have recently undergone a redesign or refresh. The bias toward recently
redesigned models may contribute to the lower average weight and power in the Con-
sumer Reports sample in the earlier years. When power and weight were declining
quickly, overall market averages would have lagged changes among vehicles that had
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been redesigned more recently. The issue of bias in the tested sample is discussed
further in Section 2.5.
Figure 2-2: Inertia weight and engine power trends since 1975. Shown are simple
averages for the vehicles tested by Consumer Reports (CR), which were used in fitting
the model reported in this paper. Also shown are sales-weighted averages for new U.S.
light-duty vehicles as reported by EPA (2010).
In light of its large size, the database was divided into a calibration set and a
holdback set. The holdback set was used to evaluate the robustness of different
model specifications to changes in the data and to assess the ability of each model
specification to make out-of-sample predictions. Twenty percent of the observations
were randomly assigned to the holdback set, while the remaining 80 percent of the
observations were used to fit the models.
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2.4 Results
Multiple model specifications were estimated, but in the interest of brevity, only one
specification is reported in detail here. Other specifications distinguished between
automatic transmissions and automated manuals (no significant difference), between
all- and four-wheel drive (no significant difference), or included a dummy variable for
convertibles (convertibles were slightly faster than standard cars from 0–48 and 0–97
km/h). Parameter estimates were generally stable across the different specifications.
In all cases, the additional variables improved the model’s adjusted r-squared by less
than 0.001. A model specification using inertia weight instead of curb weight returned
marginally worse (by 0.003–0.006) adjusted r-squared values. All model specifications
performed well at predicting acceleration performance in the holdback data set.
Regression results are presented in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 for one of the investi-
gated specifications. Table 2.1 lists the parameter estimates and standard errors for
the engineering and design attributes, including power, weight, and powertrain and
body characteristics. Table 2.2 summarizes the estimated fixed effects for year, which
represent the expected difference between the log of acceleration time in each year
and its value in a base year, all else being equal. The base year was defined as 1977,
the first year for which all three acceleration metrics were available.
Table 2.1 includes estimates for the square of the power term, which in all three
cases indicate that the sensitivity of acceleration to engine power decreases as power
increases. For example, a 1% increase in power in a 75 kW (100 hp) vehicle is
expected to produce a 0.70% reduction in 0–97 km/h acceleration time, whereas a
1% increase in power on a 300 kW (400 hp) vehicle is expected to produce just a
0.58% reduction in the 0–97 km/h time. Also investigated, but not reported here,
were model specifications that included squared weight terms, and terms for power
interacted with weight, displacement, and engine type and transmission type. With
the exception of the squared term for power, none of these proved to be significant
or to improve model fit. The estimated coefficients for power, weight, displacement,
and manual transmissions are similar to those estimated by Santini and Anderson
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(1993). The coefficients estimated here suggest that 0–48 km/h acceleration is a little
more sensitive to peak power and less sensitive to curb weight and displacement than
was indicated by the results of Santini and Anderson. They also indicate that the
0–97 km/h and 72–105 km/h acceleration times are less sensitive to peak power, curb
weight, and displacement than indicated by their results.
2.4.1 Effects of Body Style
Light trucks are estimated to deliver marginally slower acceleration than cars at low
speeds, and significantly slower acceleration at higher speeds. This is consistent with
trucks suffering larger aerodynamic losses due to their higher drag coefficients and
larger frontal areas. While the aerodynamic losses may not be important at low
speeds, they can become considerably more important at higher speeds.
The estimated coefficients for different body types are smaller than those found
by Santini and Anderson (1993). In most cases, but not all, they are directionally the
same. Santini and Anderson (1993) estimated the effect of vehicle body type using a
dummy for vehicle type interacted with the logarithm of frontal area in m2, as shown
here for vans:
BodyStyleEffect = βln(FrontalArea)V an (2.4)
The data set used in this work did not include frontal area, so effects were esti-
mated for vehicle type dummy variables without including frontal area:
BodyStyleEffect = β′V an (2.5)
Thus, the coefficient estimates from this work are more appropriately compared
with the logarithm of the frontal area from Santini and Anderson’s results, appro-
priately interacted with their dummy variables for body type. For model year 2008,
the logarithm of the frontal area in m2 ranged from 0.8–1.2 for cars, from 1.0–1.6 for
pickups and SUVs, and from 1.2–1.8 for vans. Based on these ranges, the combined
effects of size and body type from Santini and Anderson’s work suggest the following:
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• Pickups and SUVs have similar 0–48 km/h acceleration to cars, while vans have
slightly faster acceleration times,
• Vans do slightly worse, and SUVs and pickups do considerably worse than cars
accelerating from 0–97 km/h, and
• SUVs, vans, and pickups all have considerably worse acceleration than cars from
72–105 km/h.
In contrast, the results of this work suggest that SUVs, pickups, and vans all have
somewhat slower acceleration than cars, with the effect less pronounced for SUVs. In
addition, the magnitudes of the estimates reported here are smaller than the combined
size and body type effects reported by Santini and Anderson.
2.4.2 Effects of Drivetrain Characteristics
The parameter estimates reported in Table 2.1 indicate that a manual transmis-
sion delivers approximately 8% faster acceleration from 0–48 km/h and 4–5% faster
acceleration from 0–97 km/h and 72–105 km/h than an automatic transmission. In-
terpreting the coefficients for continuously variable transmissions (CVTs) demands
caution, because CVTs were defined as having zero speeds. Thus, the effects for CVTs
must be compared against the combined effects of transmission type and number of
transmission speeds for automatic or manual transmissions. For example, although
the coefficient for CVTs is estimated at -0.185 according to the results for 0–97 km/h
acceleration in Table 2.1, the expected 0–97 km/h acceleration time for a vehicle
with a CVT would only be about 3% faster than an identical vehicle equipped with
a 5-speed automatic transmission:
ln(Z97CV T )− ln(Z97auto−5) = βCV T − βTSpdTSpd = −0.185− (−0.031) · 5 = −0.03
(2.6)
The results indicate that turbocharged and supercharged gasoline vehicles accel-
erate faster than naturally aspirated engines, all else being equal. However, caution is
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again required because a boosted engine typically has a smaller displacement than a
naturally aspirated engine delivering the same peak power. Because the models inves-
tigated here separately control for displacement, boosting and downsizing an engine
while maintaining peak power incurs two offsetting effects on predicted acceleration:
a decrease in acceleration time due to boosting and an increase due to smaller dis-
placement. For example, consider a vehicle with an engine that has been downsized
by 30% and turbocharged so as to maintain the original peak power. Assuming that
vehicle weight remains unchanged, the results in Table 2.1 predict 1%, 2%, and 4%
net reductions in the acceleration times from 0–48 km/h, 0–97 km/h, and 72–105
km/h, respectively.
The results indicate that hybrid electric powertrains do not deliver significantly
different acceleration performance than conventionally powered vehicles with the same
peak power. (Consumer Reports lists combined system power for hybrids.) Hybrid
designations were made by Consumer Reports, and this analysis did not distinguish
between different types of hybrids. There were 20 hybrids in the data set: 8 Toyota
and Lexus, 3 Ford and Mercury, 1 Nissan, 5 Honda, and 3 GM (2007 Vue Greenline,
2009 Malibu, 2008 Tahoe).
Naturally aspirated diesels, which are not found in the data set after 1982, deliv-
ered significantly slower acceleration than similar gasoline vehicles. Turbodiesels are
estimated to deliver similar to slightly faster performance than conventional gasoline
vehicles.
Rear-wheel and front-wheel drive vehicles are estimated to deliver similar accel-
eration performance, with rear-drive vehicles delivering slightly faster passing accel-
eration. Four- and all-wheel drive vehicles deliver faster acceleration up to 48 km/h,
which may be due to reduced wheel spin in high-powered vehicles. However, this
advantage is reversed at higher speeds, consistent with increased driveline losses and
the reduced importance of wheel slip as a limiting factor at higher speeds.
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2.4.3 Effects of Time
The fixed effects estimated for each year can be interpreted as measuring how much
more effectively a vehicle transforms engine power into acceleration for a vehicle of
a given mass, controlling for various vehicle characteristics. Knittel (2011) used year
fixed effects in a similar way, interpreting them as a measure of vehicle technological
improvements in a broad sense. In the current context, these improvements may
include better aerodynamics, reduced tire rolling resistance, and increased efficiency of
powertrain components downstream of the engine. Such improvements would reduce
the engine power devoted to overcoming losses, freeing up more power to accelerate
the vehicle. Another possibility is that improvements in tire technology have reduced
wheel slip, a hypothesis that is consistent with the result (discussed below) that 0–
48 km/h acceleration has shown larger relative improvements than 0–97 km/h and
72–105 km/h acceleration. Regardless of the particular sources of the improvements,
it does appear that engineers today can obtain higher performance per unit of power
(and weight, etc.) than they could in the past.
For small values, the year fixed effects are approximately equal to a percentage
change in acceleration time. For example, a year fixed effect of -0.01 indicates that
a vehicle is expected to deliver approximately a 1% faster acceleration time than a
comparable vehicle in the base year. For larger values, nonlinearities become signif-
icant, but the fixed effects can be transformed into a ratio of expected acceleration
time for a vehicle relative to a comparable vehicle in the base year. Assuming all
independent variables other than the year fixed effect to be equal in year t and in
some base year, and normalizing the fixed effect to be zero in the base year, one can
subtract Equation 2.3 for the base year from Equation 2.3 for year t to obtain:
ln(ACCt)− ln(ACCBase) = βY,t − βY,Base = βY,t (2.7)
Where βY,t is the fixed effect for year t. Equation 2.7 can be rearranged to yield
the ratio of the expected acceleration time for a given vehicle in year t to the expected





The estimated fixed effects of year were approximately the same in all model
specifications, but varied between the different measures of acceleration, as shown in
Figure 2-3.The figure plots expected acceleration times in each year relative to a base
year of 1977, using the fixed effects from Table 2.2. Several features visible in the
figure are worthy of attention.
First, the expected acceleration performance of a vehicle, conditioned on engine
power, vehicle weight, and various other attributes, is considerably faster today than
it was in the 1970s. As discussed previously, this can be interpreted as technological
progress that has improved the ability of vehicles to squeeze more useful performance
from a given level of power.
Second, the rate of change in acceleration performance, conditioned on other at-
tributes, has not been uniform. Rapid improvements through the 1980s were followed
by more gradual changes since 1990. This is generally consistent with findings that
the overall rate of technical improvement in U.S. light-duty vehicles was most rapid
in the early 1980s and has slowed down in more recent years (Knittel, 2011).
Third, the estimates suggest that 0–97 and 72–105 km/h acceleration may have
deteriorated between the late 1970s and early 1980s, while lower-speed acceleration
performance (i.e. 0–48 km/h) did not. However, the statistical significance of the year
fixed effects through 1985 is marginal at best, so it is difficult to conclude with any
confidence that acceleration performance (conditioned on other attributes) actually
deteriorated during this time.
Finally, the relative improvements in the 0–48 km/h acceleration have been larger
than those in the 0–97 and 72–105 km/h acceleration. It is not possible to say from
the available data why this is the case, but several plausible explanations could be
investigated if a richer data set were available. First, the difference may be due to
improvements in throttle response, which would improve acceleration“off the line.”
This would have a larger relative effect on the 0–48 km/h acceleration than on the
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higher speed acceleration measures. Second, improvements in tire technology that
reduce wheel slip would be expected to have a larger effect at lower speeds, where
wheel slip is more likely to be a limiting factor. Finally, market forces might have
driven a greater emphasis on acceleration performance at lower speeds than at higher
speeds. These demands could be met, for example, by altering gear ratios to favor low-
speed performance. However, changing the ratios in lower gears would not necessarily
improve acceleration at higher speeds, and could even compel tradeoffs that reduce
performance at higher speeds.
Figure 2-3: Ratio of expected acceleration time for a vehicle in each year to that
of a comparable vehicle (i.e. same power, weight, transmission type, etc.) in 1977.
Relative reductions in 0–48 km/h acceleration times have been greater than those in
0–97 km/h and 72–105 km/h acceleration times.
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2.4.4 Alternative Model Specifications
Practitioners who wish to estimate acceleration performance of vehicles may not have
access to all of the variables included in the model specification reported above. For
example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reports vehicle weight according
to inertia weight class, rather than curb weight, so users of of EPA data may wish to
have a model of acceleration performance that relies on inertia weight. Other users
may have access only to basic data including weight, power, and model year. For the
convenience of such readers, two more sets of models are reported here: one in which
inertia weight replaces curb weight in the models reported earlier; and another which
relies only on weight, power, and model year. Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 summarize
the results of regressions that use inertia weight in place of curb weight. Table 2.5
and Table 2.6 summarize the results of the regressions that use only power, curb
weight, model year, and class (car vs. light truck). The simplest models (using only
power, weight, and class) should not be used to infer the effects of power and weight
on acceleration performance, due to the risk of omitted variable bias. For the same
reason, considerable caution is warranted if the simple specification is used to make
out-of-sample predictions.
2.5 Applying the Model to New Data Sets
The predictive ability of each model specification was assessed using the holdback data
set. The prediction errors were generally similar across different model specifications,
and increased slightly as the adjusted r-squared values fell. Applying the models
to the holdback data suggested that there were no surprises associated with making
predictions from any of the model specifications. Any of the specifications, including
those reported here, appear to be appropriate for predicting acceleration performance.
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2.5.1 Representativeness of the Consumer Reports Sample
The sample of vehicles tested by Consumer Reports is not randomly selected from
the population of vehicles available on the market, raising concerns about possible
bias in the estimates of the regression coefficients, and the applicability of the models
to vehicles outside the sample. To address these concerns, propensity scores were
estimated for the likelihood of a vehicle being included in Consumer Reports ’ testing
program, conditional on a variety of vehicle characteristics. The estimated propen-
sity scores were then incorporated into the regression analyses using two approaches
outlined by Schafer and Kang (2008).
Propensity scores were estimated using a logit model of the probability of a vehi-
cle being included in the Consumer Reports ’ testing program. The model included
as predictor variables vehicle class, power, weight, powertrain characteristics, manu-
facturer, model year, and various interactions among these. There was good overlap
between the propensity scores in the population and those in the Consumer Reports
sample.
Next, dummy variables were defined for the deciles of propensity scores, and were
included as additional regressors in the models. The dummy variables were generally
insignificant, and the estimates of the coefficients and year fixed effects remained
essentially unchanged relative to the models without the propensity scores.
In an alternative approach, the regressions were weighted by the inverses of the
propensity scores. The rationale for this approach is that it can weight each observa-
tion in the sample by the number of vehicles that it represents in the full population.
This procedure led to increases in the estimated sensitivity of acceleration times to
power and to weight, and to slight changes in the coefficient estimates for powertrain
types, body types, and other vehicle characteristics. The weighting did not change
the general trends or levels of the year fixed effects, but did increase their volatility
from year to year.
Finally, both the weighted and unweighted regression models were applied to the
holdback data set. In all cases, the weighted model returned larger average errors than
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the unweighted model (including when errors were averaged by the inverse propensity
score). Based on these findings, it is recommended that the coefficient estimates from
the unweighted regression model be used, even for making out-of-sample predictions.
2.5.2 Implications of Results for Estimates of U.S. Vehicle
Performance
The results of this work suggest that the acceleration performance of new U.S. vehicles
has been improving more quickly than previously thought. Figure 2-4 shows the sales-
weighted average 0–97 km/h acceleration times calculated by applying these results to
a comprehensive database of vehicle attributes and sales volumes spanning 1978–2009,
as well as the average acceleration calculated by applying the more typical method
of Malliaris et al. (1976). Also shown are the average acceleration values reported by
EPA (2010) for 1975-2010. The latter agree very closely with the results obtained
using the method of Malliaris et al. (1976), suggesting that there are only small
discrepancies between the database used here and that used by EPA. Between 2006
and 2009, the average acceleration calculated using the Malliaris et al. (1976) method
was approximately 1 second, or 11%, greater than the average of 8.8 seconds calculated
using the model reported in this work. Between 1982 and 2009, the estimated average
0–97 km/h acceleration time of new U.S. vehicles decreased from 16.6 seconds to 8.8
seconds. Over the same period, the average 0–48 km/h acceleration time decreased
from 5.5 seconds to 3.2 seconds, and the average 72–105 km/h passing acceleration
time fell from 10.9 seconds to 5.6 seconds.
Reductions in 0–97 km/h acceleration times occurred within high-performance
and low-performance vehicles alike. Figure 2-5 shows how 0–97 km/h acceleration
times have changed since 1978 for the median vehicle as well as for vehicles at the
fastest (5thpercentile) and slowest (95thpercentile) ends of the market.
Two features of Figure 2-5 are especially striking. First, 95% of vehicles sold
today achieve a level of acceleration performance that beats the average from 1992,
and would have put them in the top 5% in 1985. To put this more concretely, consider
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Figure 2-4: Sales-weighted average 0–97 km/h acceleration times calculated by ap-
plying method of Malliaris et al. (1976) and the model reportid tn this chapter to
vehicle attributes and sales data for 1978–2009. Also shown are the averages reported
by EPA (2010) for 1975–2010.
two cars that have been owned by the author: the 1987 Mazda RX–7 and the 2007
Honda Fit. The former is a venerable sports car, which was faster from 0–97 km/h
than 94% of its contemporaries. The latter is the archetype of the modern economy
car, and is slower from 0–97 km/h than 97% of vehicles sold in 2007. Yet, the actual
acceleration times of these vehicles are nearly the same: 10.5 seconds for the Mazda,
versus 11.2 seconds for the Honda. 1
Second, the chart shows that although acceleration times have been getting faster,
the rate of change has been declining. In fact, the chart appears to suggest that
1This is hardly unique. The 1985 RX–7, Nissan 300ZX, and Toyota Supra all had 0–97 km/h
times of 11.0 seconds. The 2009 Fit, along with the 2009 Toyota Yaris and 2008 Nissan Versa, all
had 0–97 km/h times between 10.9 and 11.1 seconds.
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Figure 2-5: Median, 5thpercentile, and 95thpercentile times for acceleration from 0–
97 km/h, as estimated using the model reported here, for 1978–2009. Also shown are
curves fitted for the years 1982–2009. Reductions in 0–97 km/h acceleration times
have been observed across the whole market, and trends are consistent with decay
toward an asymptote.
acceleration performance may be asymptoting. A model of exponential decay toward
an asymptote captures both the asymptotic acceleration level and the rate of approach
toward that level:
Z97t = ae
b(t−1980) + c (2.9)
Parameter c in Equation 2.9 represents the estimated asymptotic performance
level, while parameter b captures the average rate at which acceleration performance
has been approaching this level, and parameter a is a constant. These parameters
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were estimated using least-squares estimation for the years 1982–2009, and the curves
fitted in this manner for the median, 5thpercentile, and 95thpercentile performance
levels have been added to Figure 2-5. The fitted parameters suggested, firstly, that the
rate of decay, b, is fairly stable regardless of whether vehicles are high-performance,
low-performance, or in the middle of the pack. In addition, the estimated asymp-
totic performance levels ranged from 6.1 seconds for vehicles in the 5thpercentile to
10.1 seconds for vehicles in the 95thpercentile. It is interesting to note that even
high-performance vehicles are today within one second of their estimated asymptotic
values. This is, of course, far from proof that reductions in acceleration times are
going to stop any time soon, but it at least suggests that Americans’ thirst for power
in their cars may in fact be quenchable.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, models were fitted for estimating the acceleration performance of
light-duty automobiles, based on testing conducted by Consumer Reports between
1975 and 2010. A flexible functional form was adopted and various specifications
were estimated, which controlled for vehicle attributes including powertrain charac-
teristics and body type. Power and weight were extremely important in determining
acceleration performance, consistent with findings by previous investigators. Other
attributes including displacement, powertrain characteristics, and body type have
smaller but still significant effects on acceleration performance. Judging by their
performance on a holdback data set, the primary model specifications reported here
appear to be valid for making predictions of acceleration performance. These es-
timation methods will be applied in Chapter 4 to support work characterizing the
tradeoffs between acceleration performance and fuel consumption, and quantifying
improvements in efficiency technology since 1975.
The change in the relationship between acceleration performance and observed
attributes was also estimated. All else being equal, new vehicles today achieve ap-
proximately 20–30% faster acceleration times than 1970s-vintage vehicles with the
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same observed attributes. This improvement occurred mainly in the 1980s, and was
larger for lower-speed acceleration than for higher-speed acceleration. Prior to 1990,
performance improvements were driven both by increases in power and by improve-
ments in how effectively that power is used to accelerate a vehicle. Since 1990, how-
ever, most of the performance improvements appear to be attributable to changes in
power, weight, and other variables that are tracked directly in the Consumer Reports
data.
The acceleration performance of vehicles sold in the U.S. today is even faster than
is indicated by commonly reported numbers. New vehicles sold in the U.S. between
2006 and 2009 have an estimated average 0–97 km/h acceleration time of 8.8 sec-
onds, about 0.9 seconds faster than the averages reported by U.S. EPA. Interestingly,
however, the changes in 0–97 km/h acceleration performance since 1982 fit very well
with a model of exponential decay toward an asymptote. This pattern holds up for
vehicles from all performance segments, all of which appear at present to be within
one second of their respective asymptotic values. This suggests that further work may
be warranted to investigate whether consumers’ appetites for higher performance are
indeed becoming satiated.
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Table 2.1: Regression Results for Logs of Acceleration Times. P is in kW, CWT is
in kg, D is in Liters, and Continuously Variables Transmissions (CVTs) are Defined
as Having Zero Speeds. Significance: + = 0.1 * = 0.05 ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001
Variable ln(Z48) ln(Z97) ln(P72105)
Intercept, β0 1.236 *** 2.070 *** 2.609 ***
(0.370) (0.298) (0.365)
ln(P ) -0.815 *** -1.088 *** -1.386 ***
(0.139) (0.112) (0.138)
[ln(P )]2 0.046 ** 0.044 *** 0.074 ***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
ln(CWT ) 0.483 *** 0.665 *** 0.620 ***
(0.037) (0.031) (0.037)
ln(D) -0.171 *** -0.121 *** -0.101 ***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.020)
TSpd -0.035 *** -0.031 *** -0.022 ***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Transmission Types
Manual -0.081 *** -0.045 *** -0.052 ***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
CVT -0.109 *** -0.185 *** -0.168 ***
(0.032) (0.026) (0.032)
Engine Types
Turbocharged Gasoline -0.071 *** -0.066 *** -0.081 ***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Supercharged Gasoline -0.041 -0.059 * -0.073 *
(0.034) (0.028) (0.034)
Diesel 0.122 *** 0.116 *** 0.158 ***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.027)
Turbodiesel 0.029 -0.029 -0.086 **
(0.029) (0.024) (0.030)
Hybrid Electric -0.023 -0.023 -0.036
(0.026) (0.022) (0.026)
Drive Types
Rear-Wheel Drive -0.011 0.005 0.023 **
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
All / 4-Wheel Drive -0.024 * 0.019 + 0.031 **
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Body Styles
Wagon 0.029 ** 0.019 * 0.022 *
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
SUV 0.019 0.019 + 0.038 **
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Van 0.024 + 0.042 *** 0.063 ***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
Pickup 0.026 0.031 * 0.056 ***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.016)
Adjusted R2 0.8782 0.9408 0.9180
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Table 2.2: Estimated Fixed Effects of Year on Logs of Acceleration Times, Normalized
to Zero in 1977. Note that 0–48 km/h acceleration data were not available for 1975–
1976.
Year ln(Z48) ln(Z97) ln(P72105)
1975 0.02 0.00
1976 0.01 0.03
1977 0.00 0.00 0.00
1978 0.00 0.02 -0.01
1979 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02
1980 -0.07 0.00 -0.01
1981 -0.08 0.01 0.02
1982 -0.04 0.07 0.07
1983 -0.11 -0.02 -0.04
1984 -0.14 -0.02 -0.03
1985 -0.14 -0.03 -0.07
1986 -0.21 -0.08 -0.10
1987 -0.16 -0.06 -0.09
1988 -0.18 -0.06 -0.08
1989 -0.18 -0.09 -0.15
1990 -0.24 -0.15 -0.20
1991 -0.30 -0.15 -0.14
1992 -0.30 -0.17 -0.17
1993 -0.31 -0.17 -0.18
1994 -0.31 -0.18 -0.18
1995 -0.31 -0.15 -0.16
1996 -0.31 -0.17 -0.17
1997 -0.33 -0.17 -0.18
1998 -0.30 -0.15 -0.17
1999 -0.30 -0.15 -0.18
2000 -0.36 -0.19 -0.20
2001 -0.39 -0.21 -0.22
2002 -0.37 -0.19 -0.20
2003 -0.38 -0.20 -0.22
2004 -0.39 -0.20 -0.21
2005 -0.38 -0.20 -0.20
2006 -0.37 -0.20 -0.22
2007 -0.35 -0.20 -0.22
2008 -0.34 -0.18 -0.20
2009 -0.37 -0.20 -0.23
2010 -0.36 -0.19 -0.23
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Table 2.3: Regression Results for Logs of Acceleration Times. P is in kW, IWT is in
kg, D is in Liters, and Continuously Variables Transmissions (CVTs) are Defined as
Having Zero Speeds. Significance: + = 0.1 * = 0.05 ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001
Variable ln(Z48) ln(Z97) ln(P72105)
Intercept, β0 1.513 *** 2.382 *** 2.801 ***
(0.382) (0.317) (0.378)
ln(P ) -0.711 *** -0.958 *** -1.274 ***
(0.142) (0.117) (0.140)
[ln(P )]2 0.037 * 0.032 ** 0.064 ***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
ln(IWT ) 0.395 *** 0.561 *** 0.540 ***
(0.038) (0.032) (0.037)
ln(D) -0.132 *** -0.070 *** -0.059 **
(0.020) (0.017) (0.020)
TSpd -0.033 *** -0.030 *** -0.021 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Transmission Types
Manual -0.091 *** -0.056 *** -0.061 ***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
CVT -0.106 ** -0.185 *** -0.170 ***
(0.033) (0.028) (0.033)
Engine Types
Turbocharged Gasoline -0.062 *** -0.055 *** -0.071 ***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Supercharged Gasoline -0.028 -0.041 -0.057
(0.035) (0.030) (0.035)
Diesel 0.129 *** 0.124 *** 0.164 ***
(0.027) (0.023) (0.027)
Turbodiesel 0.069 * 0.024 -0.040
(0.030) (0.025) (0.030)
Hybrid Electric 0.001 0.009 -0.006
(0.027) (0.023) (0.027)
Drive Types
Rear-Wheel Drive -0.010 0.007 0.025 **
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
All / 4-Wheel Drive -0.019 0.025 * 0.036 **
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Body Styles
Wagon 0.034 ** 0.025 ** 0.028 **
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
SUV 0.033 * 0.036 ** 0.052 ***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014)
Van 0.046 ** 0.069 *** 0.086 ***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
Pickup 0.036 * 0.043 ** 0.065 ***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Adjusted R2 0.8727 0.9344 0.9138
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Table 2.4: Estimated Fixed Effects of Year on Logs of Acceleration Times, When
Using Inertia Weight. Normalized to Zero in 1977. Note that 0–48 km/h acceleration
data were not available for 1975–1976.
Year ln(Z48) ln(Z97) ln(P72105)
1975 0.03 0.01
1976 0.02 0.03
1977 0.00 0.00 0.00
1978 -0.01 0.02 -0.01
1979 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02
1980 -0.07 0.01 0.00
1981 -0.08 0.01 0.03
1982 -0.04 0.07 0.08
1983 -0.11 -0.01 -0.04
1984 -0.14 -0.02 -0.03
1985 -0.15 -0.03 -0.07
1986 -0.21 -0.08 -0.11
1987 -0.16 -0.06 -0.09
1988 -0.18 -0.05 -0.07
1989 -0.18 -0.09 -0.14
1990 -0.24 -0.15 -0.20
1991 -0.29 -0.14 -0.13
1992 -0.30 -0.16 -0.17
1993 -0.32 -0.17 -0.18
1994 -0.32 -0.18 -0.19
1995 -0.31 -0.16 -0.16
1996 -0.31 -0.17 -0.17
1997 -0.33 -0.17 -0.18
1998 -0.30 -0.14 -0.17
1999 -0.30 -0.15 -0.17
2000 -0.36 -0.19 -0.20
2001 -0.38 -0.21 -0.21
2002 -0.37 -0.19 -0.20
2003 -0.38 -0.20 -0.22
2004 -0.39 -0.20 -0.21
2005 -0.38 -0.20 -0.20
2006 -0.36 -0.19 -0.21
2007 -0.35 -0.19 -0.21
2008 -0.34 -0.18 -0.20
2009 -0.37 -0.20 -0.23
2010 -0.36 -0.19 -0.23
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Table 2.5: Regression Results for Logs of Acceleration Times, Using Power, Weight,
Year, and Class Only. P is in kW, CWT is in kg. Significance: + = 0.1 * = 0.05 **
= 0.01 *** = 0.001
Variable ln(Z48) ln(Z97) ln(P72105)
Intercept, β0 0.364 * 1.222 *** 0.978 ***
(0.151) (0.118) (0.141)
ln(P ) -0.579 *** -0.799 *** –0.775 ***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.016)
ln(CWT ) 0.536 *** 0.686 *** 0.645 ***
(0.027) (0.021) (0.026)
Light Truck -0.013 0.026 *** 0.054 **
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Adjusted R2 0.8442 0.9286 0.9036
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Table 2.6: Estimated Fixed Effects of Year on Logs of Acceleration Times, When
Using Power, Weight, Year, and Class Only. Normalized to Zero in 1977. Note that
0–48 km/h acceleration data were not available for 1975–1976.
Year ln(Z48) ln(Z97) ln(P72105)
1975 0.00 -0.02
1976 0.00 0.02
1977 0.00 0.00 0.00
1978 0.01 0.03 0.01
1979 -0.04 0.00 0.00
1980 -0.07 0.01 0.02
1981 -0.06 0.01 0.04
1982 -0.01 0.08 0.09
1983 -0.13 -0.04 -0.06
1984 -0.08 0.01 0.00
1985 -0.14 -0.04 -0.09
1986 -0.16 -0.06 -0.10
1987 -0.10 -0.04 -0.09
1988 -0.10 -0.02 -0.05
1989 -0.15 -0.09 -0.16
1990 -0.18 -0.13 -0.20
1991 -0.24 -0.13 -0.14
1992 -0.23 -0.13 -0.16
1993 -0.23 -0.14 -0.17
1994 -0.25 -0.15 -0.18
1995 -0.21 -0.11 -0.14
1996 -0.23 -0.13 -0.16
1997 -0.24 -0.13 -0.16
1998 -0.21 -0.11 -0.16
1999 -0.19 -0.10 -0.15
2000 -0.26 -0.14 -0.18
2001 -0.28 -0.16 -0.19
2002 -0.28 -0.15 -0.18
2003 -0.28 -0.16 -0.20
2004 -0.30 -0.16 -0.20
2005 -0.29 -0.17 -0.20
2006 -0.28 -0.17 -0.21
2007 -0.25 -0.16 -0.20
2008 -0.24 -0.15 -0.20
2009 -0.27 -0.17 -0.22




Analyzing Weight Trends in U.S.
Passenger Cars
This chapter is based on a paper jointly authored with Stephen Zoepf and John Heywood.
Reproduced by permission from a paper accepted for publication in a forthcoming issue of
the International Journal of Vehicle Design c©Inderscience Publishers.
After a precipitous drop from 1976–1982, the weight of U.S. passenger cars has grown
steadily. This chapter examines multiple conflicting influences on vehicle weight in two
categories: technological changes that reduce vehicle weight; and improvements in func-
tionality that, ceteris paribus, add to vehicle weight. The widespread adoption of unibody
construction, lightweight materials, and smaller engines have been offset by growth in vehi-
cle size and feature content. The best estimates from the work reported here indicate that
new features and functionality would have added at least 250 kg (550 lbs) to the weight of
the average new car between 1975 and 2009, if not for offsetting improvements in technol-
ogy. Over the same period, it is estimated that alternative materials, more weight-efficient
vehicle architectures, and reduced engine sizes have taken 790 kg (1,700 lbs) out of the
weight of the average car. These observable influences do not explain the full extent of the
drop and subsequent growth in weight, suggesting that substantial non-observed technolog-
ical improvements were made from 1976–1982, and that unobserved improvements in areas




Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, something remarkable happened to the
cars sold in the United States: they shed more than 450 kg (1000 lbs) from their
average curb weight. Even more remarkably, this 25% weight reduction occurred
in only six years (and most of it in just four). The first goal of this work was to
take a retrospective look at the specific changes that permitted the dramatic weight
reductions that occurred between 1976 and 1982, decomposing the overall weight
change into constituent changes in technology and vehicle functionality.
Today, after nearly a decade of rising fuel prices and with Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards poised to jump sharply, the auto industry is once again
looking to cut dramatically the weight of new vehicles. Ford has stated a goal of
cutting 340 kg (750 lbs) off its vehicles by 2020, and announced plans to reduce the
weight of the F-150 pickup by 320 kg (700 lbs) in its 2014 redesign. Renault and PSA
Peugeot Citroen have established a goal of cutting 200 kg (440 lbs) by 2018, while
Hyundai planned in 2010 to cut its average vehicle weight by 10% (150 kg or 330
lbs) over five years. These reductions, on the order of 30–40 kg per year, amount to
approximately 2–3% of the initial vehicle weight being removed each year. Previous
assessments have suggested that plausible targets for weight reduction are on the
order of 20% over 25 years, or 30% after accounting for secondary weight savings
Cheah (2010). This amounts to about 1.2% of base vehicle weight reduced each year,
or about 15–25 kg per year. A second objective of this work, therefore, was to judge
how aggressive the 2–3% per year weight reduction goals are, in the context of what
has been achieved historically.
Following its rapid decline, the average weight of a new U.S. car remained essen-
tially unchanged until the late 1980s, at which point it began to rise steadily, a trend
that persisted until quite recently. A final objective of this work was to examine
why weight increases resumed despite continued growth in the use of weight-saving
technologies.
The general patterns described above were observed for both cars and light trucks.
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Figure 3-1: Average weights of new U.S. vehicles since 1975 (EPA, 2012)
However, cars showed a more dramatic weight decrease in the early years, while trucks
underwent a steeper increase in the later years. The focus of this work is on cars
exclusively rather than light trucks, for several reasons. First, cars showed a more
dramatic decline in weight than did trucks in the late 1970s – early 1980s, so they
provide a more interesting subject for studying how rapid weight reductions can be
realized. Second, some key data sources were more readily available for cars than for
trucks. Finally, cars have remained fairly well defined as a class of vehicles over time,
whereas the types of roles fulfilled by trucks have changed considerably over the last
35 years, in particular with the advent of the minivan, SUV, and crossover.
All else equal, a vehicle with a lower weight (and commensurate reductions in
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power to maintain constant performance) will consume less energy per kilometer
traveled. The magnitude of this reduction is significant: Cheah (2010) finds that a
10% reduction in weight results in a 6–7% reduction in fuel consumption. Changes in
curb weight are brought about by two fundamentally opposing forces. Improvements
in vehicle capability, such as higher performance, larger size or carrying capacity, and
greater levels of equipment add weight to a vehicle. Advances in materials, design and
manufacturing technologies remove weight from a vehicle. Therefore manufacturers
must carefully balance content added to vehicles against investments in weight-saving
technology during the course of product development.
This analysis incorporates estimates of the above sources of weight increase and
decrease that are observable (vehicle size, architecture, features, engine size, material
content) using a bottom-up analysis that estimated the contributions to changes in
average weight of various technologies, features, and vehicle size classes. First, the
effects of weight-saving technologies on the weight of an individual car were estimated
from model-level data and from the literature. Second, the weight-increasing effects
of adding features and changing car classes were estimated. Finally, these individual-
level estimates were aggregated into overall effects on average vehicle weight based
on the changes in market penetration of the various technologies and features.
3.2 Weight reduction: Technological improvements
Weight-reducing effects were estimated for both major architectural changes and for
the incremental replacement of traditional steel and iron with lighter and stronger
alternative materials. A broader definition of weight-reducing technology would in-
clude myriad other advances in engineering, design, and manufacturing practices that
permit materials to be used more effectively in building vehicles, but these sorts of
technologies were not represented in the data used in this work.
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3.2.1 Major architectural changes
New cars in the United States underwent large architectural shifts between 1975 and
1990 that contributed substantially to reductions in weight. In 1975, about half the
cars on the market in the U.S. used unitized body (unibody) construction, and fewer
than one in 10 were front-wheel drive. By 1990, 85% were front-wheel drive and 95%
used unibody construction. (EPA, 2012)
Unibody construction Unibody construction reduces weight by eliminating the
traditional frame and integrating its structural functions into the vehicle’s body shell.
Data compiled by Audatex North America indicate that the overwhelming majority
of cars offered in the U.S. since 1975 have used either unibody or body-on-frame
construction. In addition, a small number of cars have used space frame construction,
which employs a 3-dimensional structure of welded tubes to which non-structural
body panels are attached, primarily in low production high performance cars. A few
others have used a mixed, unibody-on-frame construction that incorporates elements
of both unibody and body-on-frame construction.
Estimates of the weight savings from unibody construction vary widely. Dupnick
and Graham (1996) suggested a weight difference of more than 450 kg (1000 lbs)
between unibody and body-on-frame cars, while a 1970s case study from Ford at-
tributed only 87 kg (192 lbs) of weight reduction to the switch from body-on-frame
to unibody (Gutherie, 1978).
In this work, the weight reduction due to switching from body-on-frame to unibody
construction was estimated by creating matched sets of unibody cars and compara-
ble body-on-frame cars using Mahalanobis matching. Size, transmission, drive, and
model year data were obtained from a database maintained by the U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). Data on construction type by model and year were
provided by Audatex North America, and were merged with the EPA database. The
matched sets of vehicles were created by matching unibody cars with body-on-frame
cars that had the same transmission type and drive type, similar interior volume
(within 5 cubic feet or 0.14m3), and were of similar vintage (within 2 model years).
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The two matched groups had identical fractions of transmissions and drive types, and
were very well balanced on model year and interior volume. The difference between
these groups indicated that the average unibody car weighs 280 kg (616 lbs) less than
a body-on-frame car with the same drive type, transmission type, and size, from the
same model year, would weigh. A similar analysis indicated that the average space
frame car weighs 156 kg (344 lbs) less than a comparable unibody car would, and
that cars using unibody-on-frame construction do not differ significantly in weight
from comparable unibody cars. These results are summarized in Table 3.1.
A potential source of bias in these estimates is the possibility that vehicles em-
ploying more advanced construction techniques may also tend to make greater use
of alternative materials. Such as bias would lead to inflated estimates of the weight
savings associated with advanced construction techniques, but data on materials com-
position were not sufficient to support an exploration of this possibility.
Table 3.1: Estimated weight effects of different construction types.
Comparison Relevant Estimated Standard
Group Difference (kg) Error (kg)
Construction
Unibody vs. Body-on-Frame Unibody cars -280 5
Space Frame vs. Unibody Space frame cars -156 19
Unibody-on-Frame vs. Unibody Unibody-on-Frame cars -39 35
Drive
FWD vs RWD FWD cars -296 6
Front-wheel drive A second major architectural change in U.S. cars is the tran-
sition from rear-wheel drive to front-wheel drive. Compared with rear-wheel drive,
front-wheel drive yields both a direct weight reduction in the drivetrain, and an indi-
rect weight reduction due to improved packaging of the drivetrain. Eliminating the
need for a tunnel running the length of the vehicle allows for greater interior space,
and so the exterior dimensions of the vehicle (and thus weight) can be reduced while
maintaining interior space.
The weight effect of front-wheel drive relative to rear-wheel drive was estimated by
matching front-wheel drive vehicles with rear-wheel drive vehicles that had the same
transmission type and construction type, similar interior volume (within 5 cubic feet
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or 0.14m3), and were of similar vintage (within 2 model years). The matched groups
had identical fractions of different construction types and transmission types, and
were very similar in average interior volume and model year. Based on the different
between these groups, it was estimated that a front-wheel drive car weighs an average
of 296 kg (653 lbs) less (standard error: 6 kg) than a rear-drive vehicle with the same
transmission type, construction type, interior volume, and model year.
Engine cylinder counts During the period of this analysis engine technology has
matured in numerous ways, allowing manufacturers to extract more performance
from a given engine mass. These changes are partly reflected in materials analysis
discussed later: newer engines more commonly use aluminum blocks and heads than
in 1975, and ancillary equipment (intake manifolds and accessories) are increasingly
manufactured from composite materials.
This analysis attempts to quantify the improved power density, less materials
changes, by assessing the mass impact of changes in engine cylinder counts as a proxy
for materials-neutral power density. Nearly all production cars during this timeframe
use 4, 6 or 8 cylinder engines—balanced configurations for which most production and
reliability issues have been resolved. A few vehicles use 3, 5, 10, 12 and 16 cylinder
engines in limited production.
Using a matching process that holds constant for vehicle model, model year, body
style and transmission type, this analysis identified an average decrease in weight of
64 kg (142 lbs) by decreasing from 8 to 6 cylinders, and an average decrease of 67 kg
(147 lbs) by decreasing from 6 to 4 cylinders.
3.2.2 Alternative (lighter / stronger) materials
Traditional low-carbon steel and iron now make up less than half the weight of a
new vehicle, as they are increasingly displaced by alternatives such as high-strength
steel, aluminum, plastics, and magnesium. Because the substitution of alternative
materials into a vehicle’s design is strongly dependent on the demands of the specific
application in question, estimating a single figure for the amount of weight saved by
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these materials is difficult. Nevertheless, it is helpful to generate some rough approx-
imations based on the properties of different materials and reports in the literature.
Cheah (2010) and Wohlecker et al. (2006) provide relationships for estimating the
weight ratios of parts made with alternative materials to those made with conven-
tional materials, for a variety of generic load cases. These provide a useful starting
point for estimating the weight reduction potential of various alternative materials.
In addition, rules of thumb and case studies of vehicle designs using alternative ma-
terials have been reported by a variety of authors. The weight-saving characteristics
assumed for key materials are summarized in Table 3.2 and more detailed discussions
of the assumptions for each material are found in the following sections.





Conventional Steel 0% 1.0
Iron 0% 1.0
High-Strength Steel 23% 1.3
Aluminum 45% 1.8
Magnesium 60% 2.5
Plastics & Composites 50% 2.0
High-strength steel Rule-of-thumb relationships like those mentioned above, when
used with typical values for materials properties, indicate that parts made from high-
strength steel (HSS) can be expected to weigh between 0 and 25% less than a con-
ventional steel part, depending on the application. Salonitis et al. (2009) estimated
a 10–30% weight reduction from using advanced high-strength steels, and Roth et al.
(1998) reported an advanced steel unibody weighing 25% less than conventional uni-
bodies. Das et al. (1997) assumed that high-strength steels could reduce weight by
50% relative to conventional steels, but the rationale for this high value was unclear.
A particular challenge in estimating a weight reduction potential for high-strength
steel is that there is such a broad range of grades available, with widely varying prop-
erties. For purposes of this work, with its focus on assessing weight reduction to date,
it was assumed that each kg of high-strength steel replaced 1.3 kg of conventional
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steel (a 23% weight reduction).
Aluminum Rules of thumb based on generic load cases suggest that substituting
aluminum for conventional steel can reduce weight by up to 70%, with a 50% re-
duction predicted in many applications. The trade press has noted that the greatest
concentration of automotive aluminum use is in engines, and that aluminum engine
blocks weigh half as much as iron blocks (Murphy, 2006). Stodolsky et al. (1995) es-
timated that in engine applications, aluminum reduced cylinder head weight by 50%
and block weight by 40%. They also reviewed a number of studies and concluded
that substituting aluminum for steel in the body reduces weight by about 40–47%,
even when “the design of the vehicle is not completely optimized for aluminum man-
ufacture.” Mayer et al. (1994) concluded that a 45% reduction in weight for the
body-in-white was possible by substituting aluminum for steel in a BMW 3-series.
Das et al. (1997) assumed that substituting aluminum for steel and cast iron delivers
a 45% weight reduction, while Carle and Blount (1999) estimated a 40% reduction in
weight relative to steel in automotive body applications. Although generic load cases
suggest that replacing steel with aluminum can reduce weight by as much as 70%,
most of the (considerable) literature on the topic suggests that a value of around 45%
is more realistic(i.e. that each kg of aluminum can replace 1.8 kg of conventional iron
or steel). The latter was the value assumed in this work.
Magnesium Magnesium still represents a very small fraction (0.3% in 2009) of
automotive materials usage, and fewer estimates of its weight reduction potential
have been reported. Based on generic load cases, it is estimated that magnesium can
reduce weight by up to 70% compared with conventional steel or iron. Luo (2002)
calculated savings as high as 80% for some wrought magnesium alloys. Das et al.
(1997) assumed that substituting magnesium for steel and cast iron would deliver
a 67% weight reduction. In this work, it was assumed that each kg of magnesium
replaced 2.5 kg of conventional steel or iron (a 60% reduction).
1Fraction of weight saved by replacing conventional steel or iron with alternative material
2kg conventional material displaced per kg alternative material
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Plastics & composites Estimating weight reduction potential for plastics and
composites is particularly difficult because of the wide range of materials included
in this category. However, some rough calculations with typical ranges of values for
materials properties indicate that weight reductions in excess of 80% could be possible,
relative to conventional steel or iron. For example, Luo (2002) estimated a weight
reduction potential of 35–70% for polycarbonate/ABS based on generic load cases.
Das et al. (1997) assume a 30–60% weight reduction from substituting composites for
steel. The American Chemistry Council (ACC, 2011) has estimated that each kg of
plastics and composites replaces 2–3 kg of other materials (a 50–67% reduction). A
report commissioned by Plastics Europe (Pilz et al., 2005) concluded that each kg of
plastic replaces an average of 1.5 kg of heavier material (a 33% reduction in weight),
but found reductions of up to 75% in some components. In the present analysis, it
was assumed that each kg of plastic or composite has displaced 2 kg of traditional
steel or iron (a 50% weight reduction).
3.2.3 Other technological improvements
In addition to major architectural changes and increased use of alternative materials,
several other sources of technological improvements may have contributed to weight
reductions in new cars. Improvements in manufacturing processes and technologies,
tighter tolerances, and the like may enable the production of parts that are more
precisely designed to use material only where it is needed.
Concurrently, improvements in engineering methods and the availability of tools
such as finite element analysis and computer-aided engineering may have enabled
the design of parts and systems that make more effective use of materials, better
optimizing component designs and interactions. There is clearly also the possibility
of synergies between these two sets of improvements. The contributions of these
tools to overall weight reduction is hard measure directly, but we will return to them
later as a possible means to explain gaps between observed weight changes and those
expected from materials substitution and architectural changes.
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3.3 Weight growth: Functionality improvements
While the use of weight-saving technologies has steadily grown, it has been offset
(and at times, more than offset) by increases in the deployment of weight-increasing
features and a shift toward heavier (larger) car classes. In this section, the weight
differences between various car classes are summarized, as are the subsystem weights
associated with a variety of emissions, safety, and comfort & convenience features.
3.3.1 Weights by car class
In this work, the effects on weight of shifts in the vehicle size mix were estimated using
data found in the U.S. EPA’s annual Fuel Economy Trends Report. Figure 3-2 shows
the average curb weight (average inertia weight minus 136 kg or 300 lbs) for each
of six classes of cars tracked by EPA (weights for large, midsize, and small wagons
tracked closely with those of the corresponding sedan classes, and are omitted from
the figure for clarity). Several features visible in the figure are worth highlighting.
First, weight decreases in the early years were much greater among the larger car
classes than among the smaller classes. Second, since about 1980, the weights of
compacts, subcompacts, and two seaters have been quite similar. Finally, the overall
spread between classes has been shrinking over time, first due to weight decreases in
the larger classes and more recently driven by weight increases in the smaller classes.
3.3.2 Feature content
One of the most readily observable changes to vehicles during the past four decades
has been the widespread addition new features. For the purposes of this analysis,
features included not only optional equipment (e.g. air conditioning) but also safety
and emissions equipment such as airbags and catalytic converters that are required
by regulation in new passenger cars.
This analysis is unable to capture all improvements in these areas—noise, vibra-
tion, and harshness (NVH), for example, has dramatically improved in new vehicles
as a result of balance shafts, sound insulating materials and active noise cancelation.
63
Figure 3-2: Average weights of new U.S. cars, by class. (EPA, 2012)
Other metrics such as reliability and body rigidity have also improved. This analysis
does not attempt to quantify such metrics.
In total, features were estimated to add a total of 109 kg (240 lbs) to the average
1975 passenger car. In 2010, the estimated contribution grows to 223 kg (62 kg safety,
25 kg emissions, 136 kg comfort/convenience; a total of 491 lbs). These estimates do
not include the contribution of secondary weight, discussed in the following section.
3.4 Secondary weight
Secondary weight represents the notion that for every unit of weight added to (or
removed from) a vehicle, the supporting systems and structures also grow (or shrink)
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so that structural integrity and braking, acceleration and handling performance can
be maintained. Typically, the secondary weight is expressed as some percentage an
initial (primary) weight change. In the work reported here, secondary weight enters as
the form of a percentage multiplier on bottom-up component analyses. In reality, the
addition or removal of secondary weight may be discontinuous, as in the case where
a discrete number of existing engines or transmissions are available for inclusion in
a particular vehicle model. Moreover, secondary weight effects may vary depending
on the subsystem in which the primary weight reduction occurs. Nevertheless, it
is not uncommon to use a single secondary weight multiplier, and this approach is
believed to be adequate for the type of analysis presented here, which relies mainly
on fleet-wide data.
Cheah (2010) reviewed more than twenty published studies of secondary weight
and identified estimates ranging from 23–129%, with a mean value of 79.6%. For
the purposes of this study the secondary weight was assumed to be 80% of the pri-
mary weight added or removed. This secondary weight coefficient was applied to the
bottom-up analyses of features and materials, in which the initial estimates of weight
change were generated from component-level data. However, the secondary weight
multiplier was not applied for mix shifting or architectural changes, since the weight
effects of these changes had already been assessed at the whole-vehicle level.
3.5 Estimating fleet-level contributions of technolo-
gies and functionality
The general approach to estimating the effects of technologies and functionalities
on average vehicle weight is captured in the question, “What would be the average
weight of vehicles from some base year, if those vehicles instead had some future
year’s combination of technologies and features?” The effects of changes in size mix,
features, major architectural technologies, and alternative materials were estimated
sequentially and added up as outlined in this section. In all cases, the changes in size
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mix, features, and technologies are measured relative to a base year of 1975.
3.5.1 Mix shifting
The first step in estimating weight changes was to account for shifts in the mix of size
classes between 1975 and each future year t up to and including 2009. Nine car classes
based on body style and interior volume are tracked by U.S. EPA and were used as
the basis of the mix shifting analysis in this work. For each year t, a weight value was
calculated to represent the average weight of cars in that year, if the average weight
within each class had been the same as in 1975 but the market share of each class





In the above expression, Wi,1975 is the average weight of cars in class i in 1975, Sit
is the market share of class i in year t, and W st is interpreted as the average weight
in year t, adjusted only for changes in shares of various car classes since 1975.
The deployment rates of other major technologies considered in this analysis also
tend to be correlated with car class. As a result, some changes in the market share of
front-wheel drive, unibody construction, and different engine sizes would be expected
to occur due to mix shifting. Therefore, the market share expected based on the





In the above expression, Sit is the market share of class i in year t, Sij,1975 is the
market share of technology j within class i in 1975, and Ssjt is interpreted as the
market share of technology j in year t, adjusted only for the changes in class mix
between 1975 and year t.
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3.5.2 Architectural changes
After accounting for changes in weight and major technologies due to mix shifting,
the next step was to estimate the aggregate weight effects of changes in major vehicle
architectures. To do this, the per-vehicle weight effect of each architectural change
(δj) was multiplied by the difference in market share of that architecture between
the year t and 1975 (where the latter share has first been adjusted for mix shifting
between 1975 and year t, as noted in the preceding section). The values obtained
were then summed over all architectural changes:





(Sjt − Ssjt) · δj
The above expression, W s,at is interpreted as the average weight in year t, after ad-
justing for changes in both mix and the prevalence of major architectures between
1975 and year t. Specifically, this approach was used to estimate the weight effects
of the front-wheel drive and unibody transitions, as well as shifts in the prevalence
of 4-, 6-, and 8-cylinder engines. As discussed in section 3.4, the weight differences
associated with these architectural changes were estimated using vehicle-level data,
and do not require further adjustment to account for secondary weight effects.
3.5.3 Safety, comfort, & convenience features
The next step was to estimate the weight effects of growth in the adoption of safety,
comfort, and convenience features. Since the weights of the features were estimated
based on teardown data for the associated components or subsystems, the secondary
weight multiplier was included to estimate the effect of these features on overall vehicle
weight:
W s,a,ft = W
s,a
t + (1 + σ)
∑
k
(Skt − Sk,1975) · δk
In the above expression, Skt is the take rate of feature k in year t, Sk,1975 is the
take rate of the feature in 1975, δk is the weight associated with the feature based on
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teardown analysis, σ is the secondary weight factor, and W s,a,ft is interpreted as the
average weight in year t, based on adjusting average weight in 1975 for changes in
mix, major architectural changes, and features.
The component-level masses used in these analyses of feature mass are limited in
their ability to embody technological improvements in the features themselves. The
study of safety features referenced, (DOT, 2004) incorporates at best two point values
for the mass of a given feature, while comfort and convenience feature weights are
based on a single teardown of four MY2009 production vehicles.
3.5.4 Alternative materials
The final step in estimating weight changes was to incorporate the effects of changes
in alternative materials usage between 1975 and each future year. This was done by
answering the question: “By how much would the weight of the average car change if
the materials mix from 1975 were replaced with the materials mix from some future
year t?” This question was addressed in several steps, premised on an assumption
that all materials substitution occurs among the materials in set C, which comprises
conventional steel and iron, high-strength steel (HSS), aluminum, magnesium, and
plastics.
The first step was to ask, “What would be the weight of iron and steel in a car if
all of the steel, iron, high-strength steel (HSS), aluminum, magnesium, and plastics
in it were replaced by only conventional steel and iron?” This estimate was made
using the following expression:






In the above expression, Wm,a,ft is the average weight adjusted for changes in size
mix, major architectures, and features, as explained in the preceding sections; fl,1975
is the weight fraction of material l in 1975; Pl is that material’s weight reduction
potential (i.e. the weight of conventional material replaced per unit weight of material
used, equal to 1 for conventional steel and iron and greater than 1 for weight-saving
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alternative materials); and set C includes those materials assumed to be subject to
substitution. Other materials, such as glass, zinc, and fluids, were explicitly excluded
at this stage.
The second step was to ask, “How would the resulting weight estimate change if
the conventional steel and iron were replaced with HSS, aluminum, magnesium, and
plastics in the proportions used in year t?” The new weight using these proportions







Third, the weight of miscellaneous materials (the set D, including glass, zinc, fluids,
etc), was assumed to be unaffected by the materials substitution, and was added to















t −W s,a,ft )(1 + σ)
The above weight, Wt, constitutes an estimate of the average car weight in year
t, obtained by starting from the average weight in 1975 and adjusting for changes
in size mix, major architectures, feature content, and materials composition between
1975 and year t. The logic for estimating the weight effects of alternative materials
is summarized in Figure 3-3.
3.6 Examining weight trends since 1975
By combining all estimates of weight-reducing technologies and weight-increasing
functionality improvements as shown in Figure 3-3, an estimate was developed for
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Figure 3-3: Representation of modeling logic for weight-reducing materials.
the net change in weight year over year. The results of these individual contributions
are reported here, and in section 3.7 they are aggregated up and compared with actual
net changes in average passenger car weight.
3.6.1 Sources of weight increase
All else equal, adding functionality to a vehicle in the form of greater size or feature
content will generally tend to increase weight. As will be shown in this section,
changes in the size mix have added approximately 50–100 kg (110–220 lbs) to the
average new car in recent years. The addition of new safety, comfort, and convenience
features (and associated secondary weight increases) has added approximately 200 kg
(440 lbs) to the average new car since 1975.
Figure 3-4 shows the mix of car classes, weighted by sales, reported by EPA
(2012). In the late 1970s, there were noticeable shifts from the compact segment to
subcompacts, and to a lesser degree from large sedans to midsize. Over the subsequent
years, these trends were gradually reversed. More recently, subcompacts have once
again regained share from compacts, as have midsize cars from large cars.
Figure 3-5 shows the estimated weight effects of safety, emissions, and comfort &
convenience features for the average new car since 1975, including secondary weight ef-
fects. Comfort and convenience features have added more weight than either safety or
emissions features, with the most significant contributions coming from near-universal
application of air conditioning and automatic transmissions. Greater detail, including
the market shares and weight effects of each specific feature considered, can be found
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in Zoepf (2011).
Figure 3-4: Historical sales mix of passenger cars by class.
The estimated cumulative weight effects of additional features and mix shifting
are summarized in Figure 3-6. There was little change in the weight of features
between 1975 and 1980, but since 1980 the weight of features has steadily increased,
and was estimated to account for approximately 200 kg (440 lbs) of additional vehicle
weight in 2009, compared with 1975. The effect of mix shifting since 1975 peaked at
an increase of 106 kg (233 lbs) in 2005, before falling back to +54 kg (120 lbs) by
2009 as the longstanding trend toward larger cars was reversed. The results in Figure
3-6 indicate that if not for the effects of weight-saving technologies, mix shifting and
the adoption of new features would have increased the weight of the average car by
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Figure 3-5: Weight effects of changes in since 1975, including secondary weight.
approximately 250 kg (550 lbs) between 1975 and 2009.
3.6.2 Sources of weight reduction
Technological improvements, including greater use of front-wheel drive, unibody con-
struction, lighter and stronger materials, and a shift from 8-cylinder to 4- and 6-
cylinder engines, have all tended to reduce the average weight of new cars since 1975.
Figure 3-7 shows the fractions of cars using each construction type from 1975
through 2010. The shares in Figure 3-7 are based on data compiled by Audatex
North America, and are based on available models rather than sales. About half of
the cars offered for sale in the U.S. in 1975 used unibody construction, but this share
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Figure 3-6: Cumulative weight effects of feature changes and mix shifting.
rose steadily to more than 90% by 1990, and has changed only slightly since then.
Figure 3-8 shows the market share of front-wheel drive in U.S. cars from 1975 to
2010, as reported by EPA (2012). These values are sales-weighted. Less than 10%
of new cars employed front-wheel drive in 1975. As with unibody construction, this
share rose rapidly through 1990, but has remained fairly steady since then.
Figure 3-9 shows the sales-weighted shares of 4-, 6-, and 8-cylinder engines by
year, which together account for the overwhelming majority of all engines in U.S.
cars. Eight-cylinder engines suffered a huge loss in market share between the late
1970s and early 1980s, followed by slower declines in later years. After peaking in
the mid-1980s, the share of 4-cylinder engines declined slightly and then held steady
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before recovering as fuel prices rose after 2005.
Figure 3-7: Availability of major construction types in U.S. cars since 1975.
The materials content of cars was compiled from several related sources, primarily
various editions of the Transportation Energy Data Book (TEDB) published by Oak
Ridge National Laboratory. The scope of the materials analyses and the original
sources of the data varied from year to year, but there was substantial overlap between
the various time series. Table 3.3 summarizes the years included in each time series,
and which of these were incorporated into the time series reported in this work. In
years for which no data could be found, materials content was linearly interpolated.
The materials content data warrants additional discussion. Two potential issues
are the changing scope used over the years (U.S.-built car, domestic car, domestic
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Figure 3-8: Sales-weighted penetration of front-wheel drive in passenger cars.
Table 3.3: Sources of material content data used in this analysis.
Series Source Scope Years Available Years Used



































light vehicle), and the differing original sources of the data. Fortunately, there is
substantial overlap between the different data sets, and in general the weight fractions
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Figure 3-9: Market shares of 4-, 6- and 8-cylinder engines in new U.S. passenger cars.
of each of the key materials are very similar in the different data series. This helps
to mitigate concerns over inconsistencies in the data over time. Moreover, personal
communication with Ward’s has confirmed that the American Chemistry Council is
the original source of the Ward’s data.
An additional issue is that these data are based on domestic vehicles, and not
imports. This is a legitimate concern, but in the absence of any data on the materials
composition of imported cars, the materials composition time series reported here
were assumed to apply to all cars sold in the U.S.
Figure 3-10 charts the evolution of the materials composition of U.S. cars based
on the composite data set described above. The share of conventional iron and steel
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Figure 3-10: Materials composition of new U.S. cars since 1975.
in overall vehicle weight has shrunk by a third since 1975, with HSS, aluminum, and
plastics rising to fill in the gap. Plastics & composites account for twice as large a
share of weight as they did in 1975, while aluminum content has quadrupled and HSS
content quintupled. Although magnesium’s share has grown by a factor of 10, it still
only accounted for about 0.3% of vehicle weight in 2009. Miscellaneous materials
(rubber, glass, fluids & lubricants, etc.) have risen modestly, from 20% to 25% of
overall vehicle weight.
The estimated effects of the various technological improvements on average car
weight are summarized in Figure 3-11. Each series corresponds to the estimated
cumulative weight change relative to 1975. All of these technological changes con-
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tributed significantly to weight reduction, especially in the early years. Three distinct
phases are evident in the results show in Figure 3-11. Between 1975 and 1982, av-
erage weight dropped by 52 kg, or about 3% of the average 1975 car weight, each
year. From 1982–1990, the pace slowed considerably, to 26 kg per year, or about
2% of the average 1982 car weight.1 Since 1990, weight reductions have largely been
driven by alternative materials substitution, as the market has become saturated with
front-wheel drive and unibody cars and the shift away from 8-cylinder engines slowed
considerably. Between 1990 and 2009, annual weight reduction was 11 kg per year,
or roughly 1% of the weight of the average 1990 car. All told, the combined effects
of technology are estimated to have reduced the weight of the average new car in the
U.S. by 790 kg (1,700 lbs) versus 1975.
3.7 Estimating average weight
The effects of growing feature content, mix shifting, and weight-reducing technologies
were summed up as outlined in section 3.5 (Estimating Fleet-Level Contributions of
Technologies and Functionality). The resulting weight estimates for each year are
plotted in Figure 3-12, along with the actual average weight of new cars as reported
by U.S. EPA. The estimates developed here capture the general trends observed in
the weight of the average new car between 1975 and 2000: namely, a large and abrupt
decrease in the late 1970s–early 1980s, followed by a gradual reversal and increase.
After 2000, actual average weight continued to climb, while the estimates of this work
declined slightly, driven by growth in alternative materials. As with any change in
new vehicles, changes in the application of features or weight-saving technologies will
take several decades to fully permeate the in-use fleet, due to the dynamics of fleet
turnover.
Although the results reported here reflect the general trends in average car weight,
two key discrepancies are apparent in Figure 3-12. First, the estimates developed in
126 kg is about 2% of the weight of the average 1982 car, even though 52 kg is only 3% of the
weight of the average 1975 car, because the average 1982 car was so much lighter than the average
1975 car
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Figure 3-11: Estimated contributions of technological improvements to weight reduc-
tion in new U.S. cars, since 1975.
this work are too high in the early years. Second, the estimates continue to fall while
actual weights remained constant, and have not risen as quickly as actual weights
have in recent years. These discrepancies are highlighted by a residual term, also
plotted in Figure 3-12 and calculated as the difference between the actual average
weight and the average weight predicted by this analysis. That the predicted values
for weight would not perfectly agree with the true averages should not be surprising,
given the disparate and often highly aggregate nature of the data used to generate
the estimates. Nonetheless, patterns in the actual and estimated weight trends may
be due to a variety of causes, and deserve further discussion.
It appears that some substantial source of weight reduction has been omitted from
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the estimated values in 1976–78, which suggests that one of two things may have been
happening at that time. There may have been additional technological improvements
that served to reduce weight. Some of these were discussed in section 3.2, and might
include improvements in design, engineering, and manufacturing practices. Another
possibility is that design tradeoffs were made that sacrificed functionality in order
to save weight, but that these sacrifices were not captured in the data on feature
content or size mix. The latter explanation seems less plausible, given that there was
so little change in weight due to feature content or size reductions during this period.
Presumably, if design tradeoffs were being made to save weight, they would not be
restricted to only those attributes that happen to be excluded from our data set.
A second feature of Figure 3-12 is that the estimated weight is approximately
constant after 1988, but actual weight increased during this period. This suggests
that additional features or functionality, not captured in the data on feature content,
may have been added to cars during this period. Some possibilities were discussed
in section 3.5, and include things like NVH improvements. It is also possible that
the estimated weight reductions from technology in this latter period were too high.
However, in order to fully explain the actual change in weight during this time, the
weight savings from technology improvements (largely alternative materials during
this period) would need to be essentially zero. Even if the true weight savings from
alternative materials were lower than assumed, it is unlikely that they would be zero,
since there would be no incentive to adopt more expensive materials if they didn’t
save weight (or equivalently, increase strength per unit weight).
An additional possible explanation for the discrepancies between the actual and
predicted weights is that certain parameters assumed to be constant in this analysis
may have actually varied over time. For example, it is plausible that the secondary
weight factor might have been higher in earlier years and lower in more recent years.
Alternatively, the weight savings from front-wheel drive or unibody construction may
have declined over time. While these factors would tend to push the estimated weights
closer to the actual weights (lower in the early years, higher in the later years), none
of them on its own is adequate to resolve the discrepancies between the actual and
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estimated average weights.
Figure 3-12: Actual and estimated average weights of new U.S. cars since 1975, and
differences between these (residuals).
3.8 Conclusions
In the work reported here, a bottom-up analysis was developed to explain as fully
as possible the rapid decline and subsequent steady increase in the average weight
of new U.S. cars since 1975. The weight effects of various technologies and features
were estimated using reviews of available literature and analysis of model-level data.
Weight trends across the fleet of new cars were estimated by aggregating up these
vehicle-level data using fleet-wide penetration rates.
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The best estimates from this work indicate that new features and functionality
would have added at least 250 kg (550 lbs) to the weight of the average new car
between 1975 and 2009, if not for offsetting improvements in technology. Over the
same period, it is estimated that alternative materials, more weight-efficient vehicle
architectures, and reduced engine sizes have taken 790 kg (1,700 lbs) out of the weight
of the average car. These results will be revisited in the next chapter, as they are
central to that chapter’s work characterizing the magnitude of efficiency technology
improvements in new U.S. cars.
The switch to front-wheel drive, that from body-on-frame to unibody construc-
tion, and increased use of alternative materials all contributed significantly to historic
weight reductions, and observed changes were able to explain about 80% of the weight
reduction that occurred between 1975 and 1982. In later years, accounting for ob-
served features and technology replicated the observed weight increases of the 1990s,
but did not capture the continued weight increases since 2000.
Several explanations are possible for the observed patterns. First, there might
be substantial unobserved technology improvements that could contribute to time-
varying residuals. For example, the use of alternative materials — and especially
combinations of such materials — requires substantial capabilities in forming, join-
ing, and design that would change over time. Alternatively, time-varying engineering
emphasis on reducing weight that could have been omitted from the data set, par-
ticularly concentrated in the early years. Such a theory is generally supported by
anecdotal evidence from industry experts at the time (Lutz, 2011) who claim that
CAFE regulations and economic conditions forced radical redesigns of domestic ve-
hicles in the early 1980s. Such a shift in engineering emphasis could result in the
discontinuity of the application of technology or diminishing marginal returns in un-
observed weight-reducing technologies that are reflected in the residual error observed
here. This effect could potentially be modeled using a non-fixed secondary weight
multiplier that is higher in early years. Finally, our inability to accurately predict
weight changes during late phases of the 1975–2009 period considered could indicate
a shift in focus to improve the feature and functionality of vehicles in non-observed
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ways such as crashworthiness or reductions in NVH.
As noted at the outset, many automakers have recently announced a renewed
focus on reducing the weight of their vehicles, aiming to cut vehicle weight by 2–3%
per year. Such goals are often ambiguous: do they refer to gross weight2 reductions,
accounting for the weight-savings potential of all new lightweighting technologies? Or
so they refer to net weight reductions, accounting also for the growth in new features
and functionalities that seem to inexorably drive weight up? The results presented
in this chapter suggest that the former would be difficult enough, and the latter very
challenging indeed. Gross reductions of 30–40 kg, or 2–3%, each year fall in between
the rates of weight reduction realized in the late 1970s–early 1980s and those realized
later in the 1980s. Some of the technologies available in the 1970s and 1980s — most
notably unibody construction and front-wheel drive — are now found on almost all
new cars, limiting their potential for delivering further weight reductions. However,
additional weight reductions might still be found through greater use of alternative
materials, and if processes can be developed that make space frame construction more
practical for high-volume models. Moreover, one-third of new light truck models in
the U.S. still use body-on-frame construction and one-quarter use rear-wheel drive,
so the potential for weight reduction among light trucks may be somewhat greater
than among cars.
In light of the many unresolved questions in this area, an update to this work
within the next few years will be particularly telling. Will automakers realize their
weight reduction goals? If so, will they do so primarily through observable materials
or structural changes, or will these reductions come through more subtle design and
process changes? More importantly, however, will be whether vehicle weight actually
declines, or whether new weight-saving technologies are offset by the continued growth
in vehicle features and functionality witnessed over the past three decades.





A Broader View of Efficiency
Technology Gains in U.S. Cars
Quantitative measurements of historic improvements in fuel efficiency technology help to
illuminate the feasibility of future fuel economy standards. Past investigations have pro-
duced widely varying estimates of this rate of improvement, though all seem to indicate
that fuel consumption reductions implied by the 2025 CAFE standards cannot be met
solely through technological improvements at historic rates. In this chapter, I estimate that
holding all else equal, a 1% increase in weight increases a car’s fuel consumption by 0.69%,
and a 1% reduction in 0–97 km/h acceleration time increases fuel consumption by 0.44%.
These tradeoff parameters are combined with technological improvements documented in
the preceding two chapters to yield a new, more comprehensive measure of technological
improvements. When accounting for all of these sources of improvement, I conclude that
the per-mile fuel consumption of new cars in the U.S. could have been reduced by 5%
per year from 1975–1990, if acceleration, features, and functionality had remained at their
1975 levels. Approximately 80% of this potential was realized as actual reductions in fuel
consumption. Between 1990–2009, technological improvement averaged just 2.1% per year,
only 34% of which was realized as actual fuel consumption reductions. To meet the 2025
CAFE standards for cars without sacrificing capabilities that consumers have come to ex-
pect, technology must improve quickly enough to reduce fuel consumption by 4.3% per year
for 14 years — considerably faster than has occurred since 1990, but consistent with the
pace of improvements observed between 1975 and 1990.
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4.1 Introduction
The Federal government has recently finalized Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards for light-duty vehicles in the years 2017–2025. The standards
will increase by 3.8–4.7% annually for cars, and by 2.5–4.9% annually for trucks, dur-
ing these eight years. Combined with previously-announced increases for the years
2011–2016, the new rules are expected to yield fuel economy increases of 80% and
60% for cars and light trucks, respectively, over 14 years (EPA and NHTSA, 2010,
2012).
An important question for policymakers, researchers, and analysts is how ambi-
tious these targets — equivalent to reductions in per-mile fuel consumption1 averaging
3.4–4.3% per year for 14 years — really are, relative to historic rates of technology
improvement in light-duty vehicles. If required rates of fuel consumption decrease are
within historic rates of technology change — and provided that there are similar levels
of efficiency improvements yet to be exploited — it would suggest that the standards
can be met through business-as-usual technology improvements (Lutsey and Sperling,
2005). This might mean foregoing additional gains in other vehicle attributes such
as features or performance, but would not require giving up levels of the attributes
that consumers have already come to expect. If, on the other hand, the required fuel
consumption reductions are outside the range of historic technology improvements, it
suggests that new technologies will need to be deployed more rapidly than has been
done historically, or that other vehicle attributes will have to be “taken back” from
their current levels.
1Throughout this dissertation, and in this chapter in particular, I refer frequently to fuel consump-
tion. I use fuel consumption to refer to the amount of fuel that a vehicle consumes for a specified
distance traveled, in units such as liters per 100 km or gallons per 100 miles. Fuel consumption
therefore refers to the inverse of fuel economy, which is commonly expressed as miles per gallon.
Fuel consumption in this sense should not be confused with the total quantity of fuel consumed by
all vehicles combined; even as average fuel consumption has fallen over the years, the total quantity
of fuel consumed has increased as the number of vehicles has grown and their collective distance
traveled has increased.
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The constraint of maintaining functionality at current levels has been central to
establishing technical feasibility and economic practicability in recent rulemakings
on automotive greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards. The Final Rule setting
standards for 2017–2025 states that:
[T]hese rules should not have a significant effect on the relative avail-
ability of different size vehicles in the fleet. The agencies’ analyses used a
constraint of preserving all other aspects of vehicles’ functionality and per-
formance, and the technology cost and effectiveness estimates developed
in the analyses reflect this constraint. — EPA and NHTSA (2012)
That is to say, the feasibility of recent fuel economy standards has been built on
a premise of maintaining constant acceleration performance and other measures of
functionality.
There are two objectives to the work reported in this chapter. The first objective
is to quantify the historic rates of technology improvement in U.S. cars. Technology
improvement is measured as how much the per-mile fuel consumption of the average
new car could have been reduced over time, if not for changes in acceleration, size,
features, and other attributes valued by consumers. The second objective is to charac-
terize concisely the tradeoff between acceleration performance and fuel consumption.
This tradeoff model will be integral to the product portfolio simulations pursued in
Chapter 6.
Before proceeding, it is helpful to contrast two major views of technology improve-
ment in motor vehicles (or in any sophisticated, energy-consuming system). The first
view can be thought of as bottom-up, in that it focuses on the contributions of indi-
vidual subsystems, vehicle loads, and “widgets” that can be adopted to incrementally
improve efficiency. In contrast, there is a top-down view that focuses on the services
and attributes that are provided to the user of the vehicle. This contrast can also be
thought of as one between inputs (what goes into building the system) versus outputs
(how well the system performs).
Much work, both retrospective and prospective, employs the bottom-up view. For
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example, the modeling system underlying the CAFE rulemaking process employs this
view, evaluating the cost effectiveness of potential future technology packages. For
example, works by EPA (2013b) and Zoepf and Heywood (2012) study the deployment
of individual technologies. Kasseris (2006) developed projections of future vehicle
efficiency based on assumed values for road loads and efficiency parameters in various
subsystems — many of which were informed by their historic trends. One challenge
when working with the bottom-up view is the potential interdependence of the rates
of adoption of multiple technologies at the same time. Zoepf and Heywood (2012)
examined the rates of adoption of individual features and engine technologies, but it
is much harder to know how quickly multiple vehicle technologies can be integrated
into the production system simultaneously.
The top-down view provides a simpler perspective on these subsystem interac-
tions, by focusing on the efficiency with which the overall system delivers key services
and utility attributes. In the case of vehicles, this may mean characterizing the fuel
consumption of a vehicle for a given level of size, acceleration capability, and feature
content. An and DeCicco (2007) reviewed a number of studies from the engineering
literature which have attempted to quantify past improvements in automotive tech-
nology, or technical efficiency in their parlance, using what amounts to a top-down
perspective. They found widely varying estimates ranging from 1.0–3.8% per year
(though mostly clustered between 1.5–2.2% per year). An and DeCicco noted that:
Because the full range of features that interact both physically and eco-
nomically with fuel economy cannot be observed with publicly available
data, fully characterizing automotive technical efficiency trends is prob-
ably not possible. However, at least some portion of the trend can be
quantified using attributes that are readily observable (such as size or
mass) or calculable from public data. — An and DeCicco (2007)
Attempting to get closer to this goal, they define a performance-size-fuel economy
index, which they interpret as “represent[ing] the ratio of moving a spatial carrying
capacity a unit distance with a given performance capability per unit of fuel con-
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sumed.”
An and DeCicco (2007) emphasized the importance of shifting the focus from engi-
neering metrics like ton-miles per gallon to more consumer-centric attributes like size
and performance. Focusing on attributes that are most directly relevant to consumer
utility will provide a more complete picture of all of the technological improvements
occurring over time. Nonetheless, An and DeCicco chose to focus on power-to-weight
ratio as their measure of performance, rather than acceleration time, although the
latter is arguably more directly related to consumers’ driving experience. As shown
in Chapter 2, the relationship between acceleration performance and power-to-weight
ratio has changed over time, as newer vehicles tend to deliver faster acceleration than
do older vehicles with comparable power and weight. A second downside to An and
DeCicco’s approach is that they make a strong assumption about the relationship
between size, power-to-weight ratio, and fuel economy. Namely, their performance-
size-fuel economy index implies that for any given technology level, a proportional
increase in size or power-to-weight ratio will be met with an equal and opposite pro-
portional decrease in fuel economy. However, there is no theoretical or empirical
reason to believe that this 1:1:1 tradeoff must hold.
Knittel (2011) showed that the tradeoffs between engine power, vehicle weight,
and fuel economy are not in fact 1:1. He also concluded that the fuel economy of new
U.S. cars could have been increased by approximately 65% between 1980 and 2006, if
not for increases in weight and power. His approach was to empirically estimate the
logarithm of fuel economy as a function of the logarithms of weight (w), power (hp),
torque (tq), selected covariates (X), and a set of year fixed effects (Tt):
lnmpgit = Tt + β1 lnwit + β2 lnhpit + β3 ln tqit + X
′
itB + it (4.1)
In Equation 4.1, the β coefficients represent the tradeoffs between fuel economy
and the various independent variables, expressed as the elasticity of fuel economy
with respect to each attribute. The year fixed effects, Tt, are interpreted as the
cumulative change in technology between some base year and year t. Specifically,
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the change in technology is expressed as the change in the expected value of log fuel
economy conditional on weight, power, torque, and covariate values. Holding power,
weight, torque, and covariate values constant, the difference in expected fuel economy
between the base year 0 and some future year t would be:
lnmpgit − lnmpgi0 = Tt (4.2)
In Equation 4.2, T0 is normalized to zero. Rearranging and taking the exponential,
we see that the ratio of expected fuel economy in year t to the that in year 0, if power,




Knittel’s methodology offers both advantages and disadvantages relative to the
prior work. It is attractive because it allows the tradeoff parameters between power,
weight, and fuel consumption to be estimated as parameters of the model, rather
than assuming these values a priori. However, a shortcoming is that by focusing on
engineering attributes (power and weight) rather than consumer attributes (such as
acceleration, size, and features) his definition of technology change may not capture all
sources of improvement. Critically, since he conditions on power, his estimated effects
for technology do not capture any improvements in how effectively vehicles turn engine
power into acceleration performance.3 As shown in Chapter 2, these improvements
have been substantial. Similarly, by conditioning on weight, his specification will not
capture technology improvements that allow newer vehicles to weigh less than similar
vehicles in the past. As shown in Chapter 3, modern weight-saving technologies would
have allowed a reduction in weight of approximately 650 kg, or 40%, for the average
new car between 1975 and 2009, if not for increases in size and features over that
2For small values of Tt, e
Tt ≈ 1 + Tt, so Tt represents the fractional increase in expected fuel
economy, holding other attributes constant. However, as Tt increases, this approximation no longer
holds.
3The relationship between power and other performance metrics, like towing capability or ability
to hold speed on an uphill grade, may also have changed, though these are not investigatedi this
work
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time. The fuel consumption reductions resulting from such a change in weight are
substantial, but are not incorporated into Knittel’s estimates of technology change.
The objective of this chapter is to develop a more comprehensive estimate of how
much automotive technology has improved since 1975. The approach taken draws
heavily on the empirical approach of Knittel, while embracing the philosophy of An
and DeCicco by focusing on attributes most relevant to consumers. The method-
ological approach is described in the next section. Section 4.3 briefly describes the
data used in this chapter. Section 4.4 presents the resulting estimates of technology
change and compares them with values found in the literature, and the final section
offers some conclusions against the backdrop of the required increases in Corporate
Average Fuel Economy through 2025.
4.2 Methodology
This chapter attempts to answer the question, “How much could the per-mile fuel
consumption of new U.S. cars have been reduced between 1975 and 2009, if not for
changes in vehicle size, performance, features and functionality?” Effectively, we are
asking what would happen if we built the fleet of cars sold in 1975, using modern
materials, designs, and powertrain technologies. Actually building these vehicles is
clearly impractical, but engineering simulations offer one possible solution, as they
might enable the application of contemporary technologies to the design of a vehi-
cle with 1975-level performance, capacity, comfort, and safety specifications. While
vastly simpler than actually building a vehicle, such simulations are nevertheless
labor-intensive to develop and calibrate, and questions would likely persist over the
representativeness of the specific vehicle model or models chosen for study.
Estimation of a simplified econometric model based on observed vehicle character-
istics offers an alternative approach that is both tractable and can incorporate data
on all vehicle models. This is the approach taken by Knittel (2011). As discussed
in Section 4.1, Knittel’s models may not capture all of the sources of technology im-
provement in new vehicles. Ideally, such a model would estimate the expected level
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of fuel consumption for a vehicle, conditional on all related attributes. These related
attributes might include acceleration, towing, and handling capabilities, passenger
and cargo capacity, some measure or measures of comfort and ride quality, and the
presence of various convenience, emissions, and safety features.
In this work, detailed, model-level data on comfort, convenience, and safety fea-
tures were not available, so an alternative, two-step methodology was adopted instead.
First, technology change from a top-down perspective was estimated as the change
in expected fuel consumption since 1975, holding weight, 0–97 km/h (0–60 mph)
acceleration time, vehicle interior volume, and selected covariates constant. Next,
the resulting estimates of technology change were adjusted to account for the fuel
consumption benefits of weight-saving technologies, based on the bottom-up anal-
ysis presented in Chapter 3. The weight analysis is intended to capture the weight
reductions that would have occurred in the average new car if size, features, and func-
tionality had remained at 1975 levels. The basic empirical model for implementing
the first step was:
ln gpmit = Tt + β1 ln IWTit + β2 lnZ97it + β3 lnV OLit + X
′
itB + it (4.4)
In Equation 4.4, gpmit is the fuel consumption of car model i in year t in gallons
per mile, V OLit is its interior volume in m
3, Z97it is its 0–97 km/h acceleration time
in seconds, IWTit is its inertia weight in kg, and Xit is a vector of dummy variables
indicating whether the vehicle has a manual transmission or all-wheel or 4-wheel drive,
whether it is a two-seater or a wagon body style. Also included were terms for the
interactions of manual transmissions with year, all-wheel or 4-wheel drive with year,
and two-seater or wagon body styles with interior volume. As in Equation 4.1, Tt is
a set of year fixed effects representing the expected reduction in log fuel consumption
for cars in each year t relative to some base year, if the other attribute levels had
remained unchanged. The year fixed effects Tt will therefore be interpreted as the
improvement in technology of the average new car between the base year and year t.
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Some specifications also included dummy variables for powertrain type4 engine
specific power quintiles.5 The reason for including specific power is to control for
the possibility that more sophisticated engine technologies tend to be correlated with
heavier vehicle weight or higher performance. Specific power (the ratio of engine peak
power to displacement, often measured in kW/liter) is commonly used as a measure
of the technical sophistication of an engine (Chon and Heywood, 2000). If more so-
phisticated engines tended to be used in heavier or higher-performance vehicles, then
ignoring differences in technology could lead to biased estimates of the coefficients on
weight or acceleration performance (β1 and β2). Dummy variables for quintile were
used to introduce specific power for two reasons. First, since engine specific power
has generally increased over time, quintiles were used to provide a measure of specific
power relative to other vehicles in the same model year. Controlling for the absolute
level of specific power would bias the estimates of technological improvement down-
wards, since specific power increases over time are themselves a part of the overall
technological improvement that we want to come out in the year fixed effects. A
second reason for using dummy variables for specific power quintile is that it does not
impose any assumption on the particular form of the relationship between specific
power and fuel consumption.
The second step involves estimating the expected fuel consumption of a new car
in year t relative to year 0. This is done as in Equation 4.3, but with an additional
adjustment to account for the weight reduction that would have occurred if not for









In Equation 4.5, IWT0 is the inertia weight of an average new car in some base
year, and IWTt is the estimated inertia weight of a similar car using weight-reducing
4dummy variables were created for turbocharged gasoline, supercharged gasoline, naturally aspi-
rated diesel, turbodiesel, and hybrid electric powertrains, with naturally aspirated gasoline engines
representing the base case.
5The first quintile consists of those vehicles with the lowest one-fifth of engine specific power
values in their model year, the second quintile includes those vehicles with engine specific power
values in the second fifth in their model year, etc.
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technologies characteristic of year t.
4.3 Data
The data used to estimate the model in this chapter were obtained from the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. The data include interior volume, inertia weight,
body style, and powertrain characteristics for all cars and trucks offered for sale in
the U.S. between 1975 and 2009. However, only the data for cars were used, since the
weight analysis in Chapter 3 was performed only for cars. The 0–97 km/h acceleration
times were estimated for these cars using the methods reported in Chapter 2.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Model Estimation Results
Table 4.1 contains results of the estimation of several different specifications of the
general model provided in Equation 4.4. Multiple model specifications were explored
in order to examine the effects of including different sets of control variables on the
estimates of tradeoff parameters and technological progress. In each case, the coeffi-
cient on a continuous variable represents the partial derivative of log fuel consumption
with respect to that variable. Since logs of all continuous variables are used, each
of these coefficients represents the estimated elasticity of fuel consumption with re-
spect to the corresponding variable.6 Model 1 employs a similar specification to that
used by Knittel (2011). The remaining model specifications in Table 4.1 explore the
effects of weight, acceleration performance, size, body style, powertrain type, and
engine specific power on fuel consumption, and provide estimates of the degree of
technological improvement (the year fixed effects) for each year since 1975.
Model 1 is included to provide a baseline comparison with the results of Knittel
6For example, in Model 5, the coefficient on log of inertia weight (ln IWT ) indicates that the
elasticity of fuel consumption with respect to inertia weight is 0.686. That is to say, according to
this model, the expected change in fuel consumption resulting from a 1% increase in inertia weight
is an increase of 0.686%.
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(2011), and its specification is similar to that of Model 2 in Knittel’s work. The re-
ported effects are similar in magnitude but opposite in sign to the results of Knittel,
because Knittel used log of fuel economy (in miles per gallon) as the dependent vari-
able, while the present work uses log of fuel consumption as the dependent variable.
For Model 1, the difference in the fixed effect estimates between 1980 and 2006 is
equal to 0.503, which is very close to the results reported by Knittel (0.512 between
1980 and 2006 in Knittel’s Model 2).
Model 2 controls for acceleration time instead of power, which leads to two notable
changes. First, it increases the sensitivity of fuel consumption to weight. This is to be
expected, since increasing weight at constant power should lead to both higher fuel
consumption and slower acceleration. To hold acceleration constant while increasing
weight, an increase in power is required, which reduces fuel consumption beyond
what is expected from the weight change alone. The second notable change when
controlling for acceleration performance rather than power is that the magnitude of
the estimated technology changes (captured in the year fixed effects) increases. This
is also to be expected, given the finding in Chapter 2 that newer vehicles can extract
better acceleration performance from the same weight and power than could older
vehicles.
Model 3 represents a further shift toward controlling for attributes more closely
linked to consumer utility, introducing terms to control for all-wheel drive and for
body styles (the presumed basic body style is sedan/coupe). Not surprisingly, all-
wheel drive is associated with higher fuel consumption, but this effect has been shrink-
ing over time. Model 3 also drops the variables identifying different powertrain types.
The reasoning behind this decision is that shifts toward more inherently efficient pow-
ertrain technologies are themselves a part of the overall process of technology change,
so it is desirable to capture their contributions to overall efficiency in the year fixed
effects.
Model 4 introduces the dummy variables for specific power quintiles. The coeffi-
cients on the specific power quintile variables decrease with increasing quintiles. This
indicates that within a given year, vehicles with higher engine specific power tend
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to have lower expected fuel consumption, conditional on their other attributes. In
addition, accounting for the specific power quintiles changes the coefficient estimates
on weight and 0–97 km/h acceleration time. Since specific power is commonly used
as a proxy for the technological sophistication of the engine, this suggests that the
relative sophistication of a vehicle’s engine (compared to others in the same model
year) is correlated with weight and acceleration performance.
In Model 5, the variables for powertrain type (diesel, hybrid, etc.) are reintro-
duced, in order to check whether the coefficient estimates on other variables are robust
to their inclusion. Notably, the coefficient estimates on weight and acceleration per-
formance change when the model includes powertrain type. This suggests that weight
and acceleration also tend to be correlated with powertrain type, and that we may
obtain biased estimates of the coefficients on weight and acceleration if we omit the
variables indicating powertrain type. The estimates of technology change, reflected
in the year fixed effects, also decrease in magnitude when powertrain type is included
in the model. This latter result is consistent with the idea that growth in these
powertrains (diesels, boosted gasoline engines, and hybrids) constitutes an increase
in the technical efficiency of vehicles. Thus, when powertrain type is not explicitly
controlled for, the efficiency effects of shifts to these powertrain technologies will be
captured in the fixed effects. However, when powertrain type is controlled for, effi-
ciency gains stemming from the shifts in powertrain type will not be represented in
the estimates of technology improvement.
Models 6–8 are used to investigate the effects of size, expressed as interior volume,
on fuel consumption. Size data were missing for 1975 and 1976, so these models were
based only on the years 1977–2009. Model 6 is identical to Model 4, except that it
excludes observations from 1975–76. Excluding these years has little effect on any of
the coefficient estimates or year fixed effects (the year fixed effects are shifted toward
zero in Model 6, since the base year for this model is 1977 instead of 1975, as in Model
4).
Model 7 introduces terms for interior volume, and Model 8 also includes terms for
powertrain type. Including the size terms in Model 7 has little effect on the estimates
96
of the weight and acceleration coefficients, or on the estimated year fixed effects
(representing technology improvements). Adding in the powertrain variables creates
a change similar to that seen between Model 4 and Model 5: a larger coefficient on
weight, a smaller (in magnitude) coefficient on acceleration, and lower estimates for
the year effects. The estimated coefficients on interior volume are negative, indicating
that larger size is associated with slightly lower fuel consumption. Although much
of the effect of size on fuel economy is through its effect on weight, and weight is
controlled for separately, it is not entirely clear why larger size would be associated
with higher fuel economy. This may be a result of the preferential application of
efficiency technologies to larger cars (which also tend to be more expensive). However,
while opposite in sign to what might be expected, the effect of size is a small one and
of little practical significance.
Model 5 is the preferred specification among those investigated here, forming the
basis of the technology potential calculated in the next section and the tradeoffs
between acceleration and fuel consumption in the work reported in Chapter 6. Com-
paring Models 2–5, it is apparent that failing to account for body style, powertrain
type, or engine specific power introduces biases into the estimates of the tradeoffs
between fuel consumption, weight, and acceleration. Comparing Models 6–8 with the
other specifications indicates that including interior volume as a regressor has little
effect on the estimated tradeoffs between fuel consumption, weight, and acceleration
time, or on the estimated improvements in technology. Thus, Model 5 is preferred be-
cause it provides estimates of technology improvement across all years (unlike Models
6–8) and because it avoids the apparent bias that would be introduced by omitting
either engine specific power or powertrain type from the model specification (as in
Models 2–4). Model 5 also has the greatest explanatory power (measured as the
highest adjusted R2 value) among all of the models investigated here, although the
differences were relatively small. Finally, it should be reiterated that since Model 5
controls for powertrain type, its estimates of technology improvement omit the gains
due to the introduction of diesel and hybrid powertrains, and can thus be regarded
as slightly conservative in this respect.
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Table 4.1: Results of estimating regression models of car fuel consumption as a function of weight, size, power, acceleration
performance, and related attributes. Year fixed effects represent improvements in technology over time. Standard errors for
each estimate are listed in parentheses.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
(Intercept) −7.985∗∗∗ −7.027∗∗∗ −6.153∗∗∗ −5.637∗∗∗ −6.594∗∗∗ −5.613∗∗∗ −5.786∗∗∗ −6.824∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.034) (0.036) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.043) (0.041)
ln IWT 0.521∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
lnHP 0.289∗∗∗
(0.003)
lnZ97 −0.401∗∗∗ −0.499∗∗∗ −0.559∗∗∗ −0.438∗∗∗ −0.567∗∗∗ −0.561∗∗∗ −0.433∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Two-seater 0.038∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ −0.057 −0.038
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.035) (0.031)
Wagon 0.014∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.015) (0.013)
Manual Transmission −0.095∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Manual· (Years since 1975) 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Continued on next page
98
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
4WD/AWD 0.095∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
4WD/AWD · (Years since 1975) −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnV ol −0.087∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Two-seater · lnV ol 0.102 0.063
(0.098) (0.088)
Wagon· lnV ol −0.037∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
Naturally Aspirated Diesel −0.237∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Turbodiesel −0.293∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.296∗∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Supercharged Gasoline −0.035∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Turbo Gasoline −0.038∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Hybrid Electric −0.341∗∗∗ −0.351∗∗∗ −0.363∗∗∗ −0.358∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Specific Power Quintile 2 −0.010∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Specific Power Quintile 3 −0.027∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Specific Power Quintile 4 −0.038∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Specific Power Quintile 5 −0.065∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1976 −0.063∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
1977 −0.096∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
1978 −0.094∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
1979 −0.098∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
1980 −0.153∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
1981 −0.204∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
1982 −0.242∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.298∗∗∗ −0.263∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
1983 −0.276∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.387∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
1984 −0.300∗∗∗ −0.353∗∗∗ −0.401∗∗∗ −0.419∗∗∗ −0.369∗∗∗ −0.322∗∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
1985 −0.323∗∗∗ −0.381∗∗∗ −0.431∗∗∗ −0.451∗∗∗ −0.400∗∗∗ −0.355∗∗∗ −0.348∗∗∗ −0.294∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
1986 −0.355∗∗∗ −0.430∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗ −0.493∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗ −0.397∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗ −0.345∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
1987 −0.362∗∗∗ −0.432∗∗∗ −0.466∗∗∗ −0.492∗∗∗ −0.454∗∗∗ −0.397∗∗∗ −0.389∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
1988 −0.388∗∗∗ −0.452∗∗∗ −0.486∗∗∗ −0.513∗∗∗ −0.476∗∗∗ −0.417∗∗∗ −0.409∗∗∗ −0.369∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
1989 −0.403∗∗∗ −0.482∗∗∗ −0.520∗∗∗ −0.551∗∗∗ −0.508∗∗∗ −0.455∗∗∗ −0.447∗∗∗ −0.402∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
1990 −0.419∗∗∗ −0.523∗∗∗ −0.568∗∗∗ −0.604∗∗∗ −0.551∗∗∗ −0.508∗∗∗ −0.501∗∗∗ −0.445∗∗∗
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
1991 −0.436∗∗∗ −0.535∗∗∗ −0.582∗∗∗ −0.618∗∗∗ −0.564∗∗∗ −0.523∗∗∗ −0.516∗∗∗ −0.458∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
1992 −0.455∗∗∗ −0.563∗∗∗ −0.614∗∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗ −0.592∗∗∗ −0.557∗∗∗ −0.549∗∗∗ −0.486∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
1993 −0.469∗∗∗ −0.582∗∗∗ −0.635∗∗∗ −0.675∗∗∗ −0.613∗∗∗ −0.580∗∗∗ −0.573∗∗∗ −0.507∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
1994 −0.481∗∗∗ −0.597∗∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗ −0.693∗∗∗ −0.628∗∗∗ −0.598∗∗∗ −0.591∗∗∗ −0.522∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
1995 −0.518∗∗∗ −0.622∗∗∗ −0.677∗∗∗ −0.717∗∗∗ −0.651∗∗∗ −0.623∗∗∗ −0.615∗∗∗ −0.546∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
1996 −0.532∗∗∗ −0.641∗∗∗ −0.696∗∗∗ −0.738∗∗∗ −0.671∗∗∗ −0.643∗∗∗ −0.636∗∗∗ −0.566∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1997 −0.539∗∗∗ −0.649∗∗∗ −0.708∗∗∗ −0.751∗∗∗ −0.682∗∗∗ −0.657∗∗∗ −0.650∗∗∗ −0.577∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1998 −0.556∗∗∗ −0.655∗∗∗ −0.715∗∗∗ −0.757∗∗∗ −0.687∗∗∗ −0.663∗∗∗ −0.656∗∗∗ −0.582∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1999 −0.559∗∗∗ −0.659∗∗∗ −0.721∗∗∗ −0.765∗∗∗ −0.693∗∗∗ −0.671∗∗∗ −0.663∗∗∗ −0.587∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
2000 −0.565∗∗∗ −0.683∗∗∗ −0.748∗∗∗ −0.794∗∗∗ −0.717∗∗∗ −0.700∗∗∗ −0.692∗∗∗ −0.611∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
2001 −0.587∗∗∗ −0.710∗∗∗ −0.781∗∗∗ −0.829∗∗∗ −0.747∗∗∗ −0.735∗∗∗ −0.728∗∗∗ −0.642∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
2002 −0.594∗∗∗ −0.712∗∗∗ −0.782∗∗∗ −0.831∗∗∗ −0.750∗∗∗ −0.738∗∗∗ −0.732∗∗∗ −0.646∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
2003 −0.612∗∗∗ −0.734∗∗∗ −0.806∗∗∗ −0.859∗∗∗ −0.774∗∗∗ −0.765∗∗∗ −0.758∗∗∗ −0.669∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
2004 −0.618∗∗∗ −0.739∗∗∗ −0.815∗∗∗ −0.868∗∗∗ −0.781∗∗∗ −0.774∗∗∗ −0.767∗∗∗ −0.676∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
2005 −0.630∗∗∗ −0.753∗∗∗ −0.832∗∗∗ −0.887∗∗∗ −0.796∗∗∗ −0.793∗∗∗ −0.787∗∗∗ −0.691∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
2006 −0.656∗∗∗ −0.777∗∗∗ −0.854∗∗∗ −0.909∗∗∗ −0.819∗∗∗ −0.815∗∗∗ −0.808∗∗∗ −0.714∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
2007 −0.669∗∗∗ −0.787∗∗∗ −0.867∗∗∗ −0.922∗∗∗ −0.830∗∗∗ −0.829∗∗∗ −0.822∗∗∗ −0.725∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
2008 −0.681∗∗∗ −0.797∗∗∗ −0.878∗∗∗ −0.933∗∗∗ −0.840∗∗∗ −0.840∗∗∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −0.735∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
2009 −0.706∗∗∗ −0.832∗∗∗ −0.917∗∗∗ −0.976∗∗∗ −0.877∗∗∗ −0.883∗∗∗ −0.876∗∗∗ −0.772∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Manufacturer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.918 0.918 0.901 0.904 0.922 0.891 0.892 0.914
Adj. R2 0.918 0.917 0.901 0.903 0.922 0.891 0.892 0.914
Num. obs. 29829 29829 29829 29829 29829 27855 27841 27841
Statistical significance of t-tests on coefficient estimates: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
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4.4.2 Overall Estimates of Technology Improvement
Figure 4-1 shows the actual average fuel consumption of new U.S. cars, along with
several “potential fuel consumption” series, each representing the estimated level of
per-mile fuel consumption if a particular set of attributes had remained constant at
1975 levels. The estimated year fixed effects from Model 1 (which are very similar
to those of Knittel) are used to generate the red series in Figure 4-1. This series
represents the expected fuel consumption, given estimated technology improvements,
if power and weight had remained at 1975 levels. The estimated year fixed effects
from Model 5 represent the expected fuel consumption if acceleration, weight, and the
fraction of cars that were wagons, two-seaters, all-wheel drive, and unconventional
powertrains had all remained at 1975 levels. This scenario is represented by the
green series in Figure 4-1. The blue series in Figure 4-1 represents the expected fuel
consumption if acceleration, fraction of cars that were two-seaters, wagons and all-
wheel drive, and the content of safety, emissions, and comfort & convenience features
had remained constant since 1975.
Figure 4-1 highlights the vast improvements in automotive technical efficiency that
have been made since 1975. If power and weight had remained unchanged, per-mile
fuel consumption could have been reduced by approximately 50% between 1975 and
2009. Between 1980 and 2006, the potential reduction is estimated to be about 40%,
consistent with the results of Knittel (2011). If acceleration and weight had remained
unchanged, per-mile fuel consumption could have been reduced by nearly 60% be-
tween 1975 and 2009. In other words, improvements in the ability to turn power
into acceleration performance contributed the equivalent of a 16% fuel consumption
reduction over this period. If acceleration, features, and functionality had remained
constant, per-mile fuel consumption could have been reduced by approximately 70%
between 1975 and 2009. In other words, new weight-saving technologies cut the av-
erage new car’s inertia weight by about 35%, and thus contributed the equivalent of
a 25% reduction in per-mile fuel consumption over this period. Between 1975 and
2009, the actual fuel consumption of the average new car was reduced by 50%.
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1975 Weight & Power
1975 Weight & Acceleration
1975 Features & Functionality
Figure 4-1: Actual fuel consumption of average new U.S. car, and potential fuel
consumption if various attributes had remained at 1975 levels.
Although the improvements in technical efficiency since 1975 have been impres-
sive, they have not occurred consistently over time. Between 1975 and 1990, the
potential reduction in fuel consumption averaged 5% per year. That is to say, per-
mile fuel consumption could have been reduced by 5% annually over this period if
not for changes in acceleration, features, and functionality of new cars. Between 1990
and 2009, however, the average rate of change was just 2% per year. This result is
consistent with the findings of Knittel (2011) that technology changed more rapidly
in the 1980s than in subsequent years.
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4.4.3 Sources and Sinks for Technology Gains
So far in this chapter, we have seen that improvements in technology have come
from a number of sources: reductions in fuel consumption for a given level of power
and weight; improvements in acceleration time, even for the same level of weight
and power; and the introduction of vehicle architectures and materials that permit
vehicle weight to be reduced while maintaining functionality. In this section, the
relative contributions of each of these sources are first compared with one another
over time. Then, we look at the major “sinks” for technology: the major attribute
changes to which the efficiency improvements were applied.
Figure 4-2 shows the annual contribution of each major technology source to the
overall potential reduction in fuel consumption. The red series represents the potential
reduction in per-mile fuel consumption relative to the preceding year, that could have
been realized if power and weight had remained unchanged. This is calculated as the
year-over-year (percentage) change in the value of the red series in Figure 4-1. The
green series represents the additional fuel consumption reduction that might have been
realized each year if power had been reduced to maintain acceleration performance.
This is calculated as the difference between the year-to-year changes in the green
series in Figure 4-1, and the year-to-year changes in the red series in the same figure.
The blue series represents the additional reduction that could have been realized if
all weight-saving technologies had gone to reducing weight, rather than offsetting
increased feature content. This is calculated as the difference between the year-to-
year changes in the blue series in Figure 4-1, and the year-to-year changes in the
green series in the same figure.
The red and blue series in Figure 4-2 move together; they both are higher in the
earlier years and lower in more recent years. This is consistent with the intuition that
when automakers are seeking to make efficiency improvements, they will encounter
diminishing marginal returns in any one technology area and will seek to equalize the
marginal costs of efficiency improvement across multiple technology areas. The green
series is much more volatile than the other sources of technology improvement. The
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 6% Potential FC Reduction @ Constant Weight & Power
Improvements in Turning Power into Acceleration
Lightweighting Technologies
Figure 4-2: Contributions to potential reductions in per-mile fuel consumption from
different technology areas.
volatility likely follows from the volatility evident in Figure 2-3, which may itself be
due at least in part to the fact that the acceleration analysis reported in Chapter 2
relies on only a sample of vehicles from each year. The volatility in the green series
makes it difficult to determine whether there is any correlation between the green
series and the other series.
Having assessed the contributions to overall efficiency improvement from various
technology sources, we now turn to the question of where the efficiency improvements
have gone. To what design goals have the efficiency improvements been applied? To
address this question quantitatively, Bandivadekar et al. (2008) introduced a vari-
able that they called Emphasis on Reducing Fuel Consumption (ERFC), which they
108
defined as the ratio of the actual fuel consumption reduction realized over a certain
period, and the potential reduction that could have been realized if size and accel-
eration performance had remained constant. Adapting that concept to the present
context, ERFC is redefined here at the ratio of the actual reduction in fuel consump-
tion of the average new car over some n-year interval, and the potential reduction









In Equation 4.6, gpm denotes actual average fuel consumption, and gpmpotential
denotes potential fuel consumption as calculated according to Equation 4.5. Figure
4-3 shows the ERFC over five-year intervals from 1975–2005 and over the four-year
interval from 2005–09. Also shown are the annual average gasoline prices over the
same period. Between 1975 and 1980, ERFC exceeded 100%, indicating that per-
mile fuel consumption decreased by more than would have been expected at constant
acceleration, features, and functionality. This suggests that either (1) actual techno-
logical improvement was greater over this period than has been estimated here, or
(2) there was some pull-back in the levels of other attributes that enabled the larger
decrease in fuel consumption. In fact, there was a slight decrease in acceleration
times between 1975 and 1980, and a slight reduction in the weight associated with
average size and feature content. These two effects appear to have approximately
canceled one another out, so we can conclude that if it was a pull-back in attributes
that enabled ERFC to exceed 100% over this period, it occurred in attributes other
than acceleration performance and the features and size tracked in Chapter 3.
Between 1980 and 1985, ERFC fell to approximately 50%, and fell further in sub-
sequent years, as gasoline prices remained low. Between 1995 and 2000, ERFC was
negative, reflecting the fact that the average fuel consumption of new cars actually
increased over this period. The emphasis on reducing fuel consumption became pos-
itive again between 2000 and 2005, and increased further between 2005 and 2009, a
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Figure 4-3: Emphasis on reducing fuel consumption among new U.S. cars, 1975–2009.
The real price of unleaded gasoline is plotted on the secondary axis.
Whereas ERFC addresses the question, “How much of the potential reduction in
fuel consumption has actually been realized?” a related question is “To what ends
were improvements in technology applied?” To answer the latter question quantita-
tively, it is possible to express the changes in acceleration, size, and feature content
between two years, t1 and t2, in terms of equivalent reductions in fuel consumption.















In the above equations, TechSize/Features is the fractional reduction in per-mile
fuel consumption that could have been realized in lieu of the observed change in
weight from greater size or feature content, holding technology constant. IWTt1 is
the average inertia weight of new cars in year t1, and the ∆Wt1,t2 is the change in
weight between t1 and t2 that is attributed to either changes in the size mix or changes
in feature content, as summarized in Figure 3-6. Similarly, TechZ97 is the fractional
reduction in fuel consumption that could have been achieved in lieu of changes in
acceleration performance.
Let us consider a concrete example applying Equation 4.7 to the weight of new
features. From Figure 3-6, it is evident that the weight of features in the average
new car increased by an estimated 135 kg between 1990 and 2009. Starting from a
baseline inertia weight of 1,443 kg in 1990, this represents a 9.4% increase in weight.
Applying the estimated value of β1 = 0.686 from Model 5 in Table 4.1, we find that
with the same technology needed to maintain constant per-mile fuel consumption
while increasing weight by 9.4%, feature weight could have been maintained and
fuel consumption reduced by 6.0%. Thus, the technology required to offset the new
features added to cars from 1990–2009 is taken to be the equivalent of a 6.0% reduction
in fuel consumption.
Figure 4-4 summarizes the equivalent fuel consumption reductions that were needed
to offset chances in acceleration, feature content, and size changes in the average new
U.S. car from 1975–1990 and from 1990–2009. Between 1975 and 1990, the average
per-mile fuel consumption of new cars decreased by 43%. Over the same period, the
average acceleration time decreased by 30%, which “consumed” enough technology
to have reduced fuel consumption by 15%. Greater feature content and size had rel-
atively minor effects in this period. Comparing 1975–1990 with 1990–2009, the most
striking difference is the large decrease in the actual fuel consumption change between
the two periods. Average fuel consumption changed much less over the second period
111
than over the first, but nevertheless still constituted the largest “sink” for technology
changes over the second period. In the second period, slightly less technology was
dedicated to offsetting faster acceleration times, while offsetting the weight impacts of
new features consumed considerably more technology than in the first period (though
this was still a smaller technological burden than faster acceleration times and fuel
consumption reductions). The weight effects of increased size consumed very little
technology in either period, reflecting the fact that net size shifts were relatively small
over these periods.7
Figure 4-4: Applications of technological improvements to fuel consumption reduc-
tions and to offsetting other attribute changes in new cars over two periods.
7Throughout this chapter, but especially right here, the reader should bear in mind that the
scope of the analysis is limited to new cars. Therefore, the size shift embodied in the transition from
cars to light trucks is not reflected in the results reported here.
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An alternative view of the technology sinks is provided in Figure 4-5. In this figure,
the lower edge of the stacked areas represents the potential fuel consumption reduction
that could have been achieved if size, acceleration performance, and feature content
had remained unchanged at their 1975 levels. Each wedge represents the potential
fuel consumption reduction that could have been achieved if a certain attribute had
remained at its 1975 level. For example, the red wedge shows that at its peak,
offsetting the fuel consumption effects of greater size consumed enough technology
to have reduced fuel consumption by about 5% or less. The figure illustrates how
offsetting the fuel consumption penalties of faster acceleration has consumed a large
and continually growing amount of new efficiency technologies.
4.4.4 Comparison with Other Published Results
In this section, some of the key results reported earlier in the chapter are compared
with analogous estimates previously reported by other authors. First, estimates of
the tradeoff parameters between fuel consumption, acceleration performance, and
weight are considered. Next, the estimates of the potential per-mile fuel consumption
reduction since 1975 are compared with other authors’ estimates of this quantity.
Weight, Power, and Acceleration
The model specifications that were reported in Table 4.1 indicated that holding accel-
eration constant, a 1% increase in weight is associated with a 0.59–0.73% increase in
fuel consumption. Based on the preferred model specification (Model 5), a 1% increase
in weight is expected to cause a 0.69% increase in fuel consumption. These results
are consistent with literature, empirical, and simulation results presented by Cheah
(2010). Cheah reviewed literature estimates and found estimates ranging from a 2–
8% increase in fuel consumption for a 10% increase in weight. Her empirical analysis
found that for a weight increase of 10%, fuel consumption of cars increases by about
5.6%, though she did not simultaneously control for other vehicle attributes. Finally,
Cheah reported a set of vehicle simulation exercises, which yielded a 6.9% increase
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Figure 4-5: Cumulative applications of technological improvements toward major
attribute changes in new cars in five-year intervals. Each wedge represents the poten-
tial fuel consumption reduction that was dedicated to offsetting the fuel consumption
penalties of other attribute changes.
in fuel consumption for a 10% increase in weight, holding acceleration performance
constant.
Knittel (2011) estimated that holding power constant, a 1% increase in weight
would cause a 0.4% decrease in fuel economy. As discussed in Section 4.4.1, it is not
surprising that the sensitivity of fuel consumption to weight is higher when holding
acceleration constant (as in the present work) than when holding power constant
(as in Knittel’s work). Maintaining acceleration performance while increasing weight
requires a commensurate increase in power. Thus, the overall effect of a weight
increase on fuel consumption includes both the direct effect of greater weight, and
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the additional effect of increasing power to maintain acceleration performance.
Several papers dating from the early 1990s addressed the tradeoff between weight
and fuel consumption. Among these, typical effects of a 10% reduction in weight were
a 3% increase in fuel economy at constant power, or a 6.6% increase in fuel economy at
constant acceleration performance. Similarly, they used a value of a 0.44% increase in
fuel consumption for a 1% decrease in the 0–97 km/h acceleration time (OTA, 1991;
DeCicco and Ross, 1993; Greene and Fan, 1994).
More recently, a number of authors have used vehicle simulations to explore the
tradeoffs between fuel consumption and power or acceleration performance. Figure
4-6 illustrates the results of several such exercises for midsize U.S. cars, along with
the tradeoff calculated in this chapter. The tradeoff identified in this chapter is very
similar to that reported by Whitefoot et al. (2011). Compared with the results of
Cheah et al. (2009), the present work and the findings of Whitefoot et al. imply a
smaller fuel consumption penalty for decreasing acceleration time. The discrepancy
between the results of Cheah et al. and the others may be a result of the small
number of vehicle simulations carried out by the former. The tradeoff estimated by
Shiau et al. falls between the current results and those of Whitefoot et al. on the one
hand, and those of Cheah et al. on the other.
Powertrain Technologies
The results that were presented in Table 4.1 also contained estimates of the fuel
consumption effects of various powertrain technologies. Holding acceleration and
weight constant, a manual transmission was estimated to deliver a 12–14% reduction
in fuel consumption in the base year (1975), though this advantage has been declining
by about 0.3% per year. These results are similar to those reported by Knittel, though
slightly larger. This most likely reflects the fact that manual transmissions offer
better acceleration performance than automatics, so the fuel consumption benefit of a
manual is greater when controlling for acceleration performance than when controlling
for power. Similarly, all-wheel drive or 4-wheel drive was estimated to incur a 8–
11% fuel consumption penalty in the base year (in addition to the associated weight
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Whitefoot et al. (2011)
Cheah et al. (2009)
Shiau et al. (2009)
Figure 4-6: Tradeoff between 0–97 km/h acceleration time and combined city/highway
fuel consumption. Curves represent tradeoffs as estimated in this work and by other
authors (Whitefoot et al., 2011; Cheah et al., 2009; Shiau et al., 2009).
penalty), though this has been declining by an estimated 0.2% per year. The shrinking
fuel consumption penalties associated with automatic transmissions and all-wheel
drive can be interpreted as an indication that automobile manufacturers are making
technological improvements in these particular subsystems.
Naturally aspirated diesels delivered an estimated 18% fuel consumption reduc-
tion, and turbodiesels approximately a 25% reduction. This is within the range of
20–30% reported by EPA (2013b), and is similar to the 24% fuel consumption benefit
of dieselization reported by Bandivadekar et al. (2008).8 In contrast, the fuel con-
8Bandivadekar et al. (2008) reported that current diesel cars offer about a 16% reduction in fuel
consumption on an energy-equivalent basis, relative to a naturally aspirated gasoline car. Adjusting
for the 10% greater energy content of diesel, this is equivalent to a 24% reduction in fuel consumption
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sumption benefits estimated here for boosted gasoline engines (3–5%) are lower than
the 10% calculated by Bandivadekar et al. (2008) for current turbocharged engines.
This is most likely because boosted gasoline engines tend to have high specific power.
Being in the top quintile for engine specific power is estimated to reduce fuel consump-
tion by a further 2–4% relative to the middle quintile, so if boosted gasoline vehicles
are all in the top quintile, then a more accurate estimate of their fuel consumption
benefit would be 5–9% compared with the average new car. The estimated 30% fuel
consumption benefit of hybridization was similar to the results of Bandivadekar et al.
(2008), and within the 20–40% range reported by EPA (2013b).
Technological Improvements
In this chapter, estimates have been developed for the rate of technological improve-
ment in new U.S. cars since 1975, expressed as the potential reductions in per-mile
fuel consumption that would have been achieved if not for changes in other vehicle
attributes, namely acceleration, features, and functionality. Other investigators have
addressed this question in the past, using different time periods, different method-
ologies, and controlling for different vehicle attributes. Table 4.2 summarizes some
of these studies and compares their estimates of technology change with the results
reported in this chapter.
Each row of Table 4.2 contains a reference to a prior estimate of annual technol-
ogy improvement for new U.S. cars, expressed as the potential reduction in per-mile
fuel consumption if other attributes had remained constant. Also listed are the the
particular attributes that were controlled for in each analysis, and the years that were
considered. The last column contains the potential reduction in fuel consumption over
the period in question as estimated in this chapter. The estimates from this chapter
are intended to reflect the potential improvements holding acceleration performance,
features, and functionality (including size and comfort) constant.
Most of the estimates in Table 4.2 are lower than the estimates developed in this
chapter, reflecting the broader scope of technology improvements encompassed by
on a volumetric basis. The EPA fuel economy numbers used in this work are reported on a volumetric
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Table 4.2: Annual rates of technology improvement: comparisons between results of
this chapter and literature estimates. Each literature study provided estimates of
how much fuel consumption would have been reduced if other vehicle attributes had
remained constant over time.
Reference Controlled For Years Annual Technology Improvement
Cited Work This Work
Greene and Fan (1994) hp/wt 1975–1993 3.6% 4.6%
Greene and Fan (1994) hp/wt, wt 1975–1993 2.8% 4.6%
An and DeCicco (2007) hp/wt, size 1977–2005 3.2% 3.3%
Knittel (2011) hp, wt 1980–2006 1.9% 3.0%
Lutsey and Sperling (2005) size, wt, accel 1987–2004 0.7% 2.3%
EPA (2013b) size 1977–2009 1.8% 3.3%
EPA (2013b) wt 1975–2009 1.4% 3.4%
EPA (2013b) size, wt 1977–2009 1.4% 3.3%
the present work. The technology change estimates reported by An and DeCicco
(2007) come closest to the estimates developed here, but as discussed in Section 4.1
there are important disadvantages to An and DeCicco’s assumption of a 1:1:1 tradeoff
between fuel economy, interior volume, and power/weight ratio. When considering
different time periods, An and DeCicco’s estimates yield different results than the
present work. For example, their method yields 4.2% per year from 1977–1990 and
2.3% per year from 1990–2005. In contrast, the current work indicates a sharper
difference in the rate of technology change between these two periods: 4.9% per year
from 1977–1990 versus 1.9% per year from 1990–2005.
4.5 Conclusions
In order to assess the potential for fuel consumption reduction, it was necessary to
quantify the tradeoffs between vehicle fuel consumption, weight, and acceleration
performance. Empirical analysis of cars offered for sale in the U.S. since 1975 yielded
an estimate of a 0.69% reduction in fuel consumption for a 1% reduction in inertia
weight, which is consistent with values reported in the literature. The effect of a 1%
increase in acceleration time was sensitive to model specification, but in the preferred
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model specification was estimated to cause a 0.44% decrease in fuel consumption,
holding all else equal.
This chapter developed a broader view of technology improvements than has been
reported in previous studies of automotive technology improvement. Improvements in
the fuel efficiency technology of new cars in the U.S. since 1975 have been impressive.
The work reported in ths chapter has shown that between 1975 and 2009, per-mile
fuel consumption could have been reduced by approximately 70%, or 3.4% per year,
if not for reductions in acceleration time and the introduction of new features and
functionality to vehicles. However, this progress has not been uniform: improvements
averaged 5% per year from 1975–1990, but only 2.1% per year from 1990–2009. These
estimates of potential fuel consumption reductions are greater than estimates previ-
ously reported in the literature. This is because the present work takes a broader view
of technology improvement than have previous investigations, and captures additional
sources of improvement. These include improvements in acceleration performance for
a given level of weight and power, and weight-saving technologies that enable more
features and functionality to be added to a vehicle without increasing weight.
The ends to which technological improvements have been applied has varied over
time. In the late 1970s, all of the improvements in car efficiency technology (and
then some) were realized as reductions in per-mile fuel consumption. Since that time,
the emphasis on reducing fuel consumption declined, and was even negative for a few
years in the 1990s as the average fuel consumption of new cars actually increased. In
recent years, it has again rebounded, and between 2005 and 2009 about 75% of the
potential fuel consumption reduction was realized.
In light of the findings in this chapter, the fuel economy standards recently fi-
nalized for 2025 appear to be rather ambitious. Even if features, functionality, and
acceleration remain at today’s levels, cars will need to sustain average annual im-
provements of 4.3% per year for 14 years in order to comply with the 2025 standards.
This is much higher than has been observed in recent years, though it is within the
range of the improvements that were achieved between 1975 and 1990. If automakers
hope to further reduce acceleration times, or to increase features or functionality in
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any way that adds weight to their vehicles, they will need to improve their technol-
ogy even faster to offset these changes while still meeting the standards. Continued
reductions in acceleration times of 10–15%, consistent with the trends identified in
Chapter 2, would require an additional 0.3–0.5 percentage point increase in the rate of
technology improvement. Continued increases in feature weight of 7 kg/year, consis-
tent with the trend since 1980, would require a further 0.4 percentage point increase
in the rate of technology improvement. All told, meeting the 2025 CAFE standard
while continuing historical trends in acceleration performance and feature content will
require technology improvement of at least 5% per year, slightly exceeding the rates
observed between 1975 and 1990.
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Chapter 5
Do Automotive Fuel Economy
Standards Increase Rates of
Technology Change?
In Chapter 4, it was shown that recent rates of improvement in fuel efficiency technology
will not be adequate to meet 2025 Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards
for new cars, unless sacrifices are made in other vehicle attributes. However, a compelling
argument can be made that the presence of CAFE tighter standards may itself cause firms
to develop and deploy fuel efficiency technologies more quickly. Indeed, CAFE standards
are popularly presented as technology-forcing regulations, which will have precisely this
effect. It is not clear, however, that such regulations actually spur more advanced technol-
ogy; fuel economy gains may also come through sacrificing other vehicle attributes, such as
acceleration performance, size, or features. In this chapter I test whether binding CAFE
regulations increased the rate of technology deployment within a firm’s fleet of automobiles
between 1978 and 2008. I build on recent applications of a product characteristics frame-
work to quantify technological change in automobiles. I use fleet and firm-level regulatory
compliance data to identify changes in the rate of technology improvements when a man-
ufacturer’s fleet was more tightly constrained by a CAFE standard. In a variety of panel
regression specifications, I found little to no significant change in the the rate of technology
improvement when fleets were more tightly constrained by a CAFE standard. This was
the case for both technology improvement among the menu of cars offered for sale, and the
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sales-weighted mix of all cars sold. The failure to find a significant effect of the standards on
technology change does not preclude the possibility of such an effect, and I discuss several
limitations to my results in this chapter.
5.1 Introduction
The development and diffusion of technologies that enhance energy efficiency is a
topic of recurring public policy interest, as such technologies offer the promise of re-
ducing resource consumption and externality generation without sacrificing the utility
realized by consumers. As Jaffe and Stavins (1994) have argued, understanding the
effectiveness of different policies for stimulating the diffusion of energy-saving tech-
nologies is essential to sound policymaking in this area. To better understand these
issues, those authors identified “two inextricably linked questions: What factors influ-
ence the rate of adoption of energy-conserving technologies; and what types of public
policy can accelerate their diffusion?” In this chapter, I present an empirical anal-
ysis of the latter type: testing whether binding automotive fuel economy standards
increased the rate of technology change in U.S. cars between 1978 and 2008.
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (“CAFE”) standards are the primary policy
tool used to curtail petroleum consumption and greenhouse gas emissions from light-
duty vehicles (i.e. cars and light trucks) in the U.S. The production and use of fuels
for these vehicles accounted for nearly one half of all petroleum consumption and one
quarter of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. in 2010. CAFE standards require
that each fleet of light-duty vehicles sold in the U.S. by each manufacturer in each
year meet a minimum average level of fuel economy (sales-weighted, harmonically av-
eraged). Firms have been permitted to bank credits earned through overcompliance,
and to borrow credits against promised future overcompliance, for up to three years.1
1Recently, some additional flexibility mechanisms have been introduced to the CAFE program,
but were not in effect during the years covered in this analysis.
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CAFE standards are commonly characterized in both policy debates and in the
literature as “technology-forcing” regulations that accelerate the development and
deployment of efficiency-improving technologies; see, for example, Kleit (2004), and
NESCAUM (2008). Numerous studies have estimated the effects of CAFE using eco-
nomic models that are premised on an assumption that the regulations are technology-
forcing. To provide just two examples, Fischer et al. (2007) and Kleit (2004) both
permit the level of technology adoption to vary in response to prices or regulations.
Despite the prevalence — and acknowledged plausibility — of this premise, empir-
ical assessments of regulation-induced technological change in automobiles are scarce.
Past work has affirmed the role of CAFE standards in stimulating fuel economy
increases. Greene (1990) concluded that the standards were more important than
fuel prices in determining fuel economy levels over the first twelve years of the CAFE
program. However, this is not the same as saying that the standards spurred more
rapid changes in technology. Fuel economy gains may also have come at the expense
of other vehicle attributes, such as acceleration performance (Knittel, 2011). Or, in
the parlance of Newell et al. (1999), it is possible that CAFE standards drove changes
in the direction, but not the rate, of technological progress in automobiles.
To determine whether standards have affected the rate of technology change, it is
necessary to shift away from a focus on fuel economy (which is but one of many vehicle
attributes affected by technological change) and toward a focus on some measure of
technological change per se. One such approach relies on patent counts as a measure
of innovation (Popp, 2002). Crabb and Johnson (2010) recently applied this method
to energy-saving innovations in U.S. automobiles, concluding that automotive energy
efficiency patents are not responsive to CAFE standards. Attempting to square this
conclusion with the literature that has found an effect of CAFE, the authors speculate
that “Perhaps it is price that drives innovation, as we have shown, and regulation
encourages only the final step of adoption by automobile manufacturers.” (Crabb and
Johnson, 2010) This points to another approach to measuring technology change: one
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that uses a product characteristics space to measure the diffusion of new technologies.
Newell et al. (1999) measured the rate and direction of technological change in
air conditioners and water heaters using the product characteristics approach. They
included energy prices and policy stringency as regressors, and concluded that these
factors influenced the direction, but not the rate, of technology change in air condi-
tioners. They found no significant effects on either the rate or direction of technolog-
ical change in gas water heaters. Knittel (2011) recently employed a similar product
characteristics approach to estimate the average fleet-wide technology improvements
in new automobiles, finding that“Technological progress was most rapid during the
early 1980s, a period where CAFE standards were rapidly increasing and gasoline
prices were high.” Although this suggests that faster rates of technology change are
associated with faster rates of standard-tightening (and also higher gas prices), no
attempt was made to estimate the effect of CAFE on the rate of technological change,
nor to distinguish it from the effect of gasoline prices (Knittel, 2011).
In this chapter, I build on past investigations by extending the product charac-
teristics framework for automobiles to estimate technological changes at the level of
individual manufacturers’ car fleets. I then use these fleet-specific estimates to test
whether being constrained by a CAFE standard has been associated with higher rates
of technology change in the constrained fleet. In so doing, I exploit variation in the
gap between actual fuel economy and applicable standards, both between firms and
within the same firm over multiple years, to identify the magnitude of the technology-
forcing effect of a binding CAFE standard.
The chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section, I discuss my empirical strat-
egy and how it is informed by the structure of the CAFE program; in Section III I
discuss the data sources used; in Section IV I present results; and in the final section,
I offer some conclusions.
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5.2 Empirical strategy
Several features of the CAFE program are relevant to my empirical strategy. First,
CAFE standards are applied separately to each manufacturer’s fleets of domestic
passenger cars, imported passenger cars, and light trucks, each of which must inde-
pendently meet an applicable standard.2 Light trucks are subject to generally looser
standards, and have in the past been subdivided into numerous subcategories for com-
pliance purposes. The time-varying classification of light trucks makes it impractical
to match a group of trucks with a certain rate of technology change to the relevant
CAFE fleet, and so the present analysis focuses only on cars. As noted earlier, new
provisions have been introduced to allow credit trading between fleets, but these were
not in place for the historical period considered in this work.
A second important feature of the CAFE program is its penalty structure. Firms
that fail to meet a standard must pay a fine proportional to the number of vehicles
in the noncompliant fleet and to the number of miles per gallon (mpg) by which
that fleet missed the standard. Although there are penalties for failing to meet the
standard, there is no bonus for exceeding it (doing so can generate credits to offset
future noncompliance, but until recently these credits could not be sold and had to
be used within 3 years). As such, we would expect that the shadow value of the
CAFE standard, and therefore firms’ responses to the standard, would be different
when firms are above the standard compared with when they are below it.
Finally, it has been documented by Jacobsen (2012) that different firms behave
differently in the face of the CAFE standard. One set of firms (the Detroit Three —
GM, Ford, and Chrysler) appears to treat it as a binding constraint. Another set of
firms (mainly European) routinely violates the standard and pays the penalty, and
thus is largely unaffected by the standard (since the penalty rate is extremely low rel-
ative to the cost of technical solutions). A final set of firms (mainly Asian) routinely
2Many firms produce both a domestic car fleet and an import car fleet, each of which must meet
the applicable standard.
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exceeds the standards, and so is also unaffected by them. Thus, the shadow value of
the standard is very different for these different groups of firms, and we may expect
a different response to the standard for different classes of firms. We are especially
interested in the response of those firms that treat the standard as a binding con-
straint, as we may reasonably expect little or no response from the other sets of firms.
5.2.1 Fleet-level rates of technological change
Knittel (2011) applied a product-characteristics framework in order to estimate yearly
averages for technological progress in automobiles. Using an adaptation of this
methodology, I first generate estimates of the rate of technology change for each
fleet in each year. Whereas Knittel estimated fixed effects for each year and inter-
preted these as a measure of cumulative technological change since his base year, I
estimated fixed effects for each combination of firm-fleet-year (e.g. GM’s import car
fleet in 2002). At the same time, I relaxed Knittel’s assumption of constant coeffi-
cients on weight and power across all firms, allowing for firm-specific coefficients on
these variables. Thus, I modeled the fuel economy of model i in fleet j from firm k
in year t as:
lnmpgijkt = Tjkt + β1k lnWijkt + β2k lnPijkt + BXijkt + ijkt (5.1)
Where T is a set of fixed effects for the fleet-firm-year, W is car weight, P is engine
peak power, Dsl is a dummy variable indicating whether a car has a diesel engine,
Man is a dummy variable indicating whether it has a manual transmission, and  is
an i.i.d. random error term.3 I took the first differences in the fixed effects Tjkt in
order to obtain my dependent variable: the year-over-year change in the technology
deployed within each fleet by each firm, denoted ∆Tjkt.
3This closely resembles Knittel’s model specification #3, but with the year fixed effects replaced
by firm-fleet-year fixed effects.
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∆Tjkt = Tjk,t+1 − Tjkt (5.2)
When Equation 5.1 is estimated using an unweighted regression (ordinary least
squares), the fixed effects can be interpreted as a measure of the average technolog-
ical sophistication of the cars offered for sale in a given fleet/firm in a given year.
Alternatively, Equation 5.1 can be estimated using weighted least squares, where the
weights are equal to the sales of each observed car. In the latter case, the fixed effects
may be better interpreted as the average technological sophistication of the cars sold
by a given fleet/firm in a given year. I estimated Equation 5.1 using both unweighted
and sales-weighted least squares, and estimated the effects of CAFE on both of these
measures of technological change.
Over the years and fleets considered in this work, the mean value of the (un-
weighted) annual change in technology potential was 0.017, with a standard devi-
ation of 0.032. This means that technological improvements could have increased
fuel economy of cars offered for sale by an average of 1.7% annually, conditional
on power, weight, transmission types, and diesel share remaining unchanged. On a
sales-weighted basis, this value was 0.015, with a standard deviation of 0.040. This
indicates that the technological improvements, averaged across the mix of cars ac-
tually sold, could have increased average fuel economy by an average of 1.5% per
year, conditional on power, weight, transmission types, and diesel share remaining
unchanged.
5.2.2 Effects of CAFE on technological change
The CAFE penalty system creates an incentive structure in which penalties are pro-
portional to the amount by which a fleet falls short of the standard, but fleets that
exceed the standard are neither penalized nor rewarded. Thus, the shadow value of
the constraint can be expected to differ when a firm is above the standard compared
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with when it is below the standard. I define an independent variable which I call
shortfall as the gap between the current year’s actual fuel economy and the next
year’s required fuel economy:
Sjkt = (Stdjk,t+1 −MPGjkt) (5.3)
The shortfall therefore captures the stringency of a CAFE constraint, in that
it represents the amount by which a fleet would have to increase its fuel economy
over the coming year to be compliant with the next year’s standard. Since there is
a penalty for missing the standard but no reward for exceeding it, I also define a
binary treatment variable indicating whether or not the fleet is CAFE-constrained
(i.e. whether it has to improve its fuel economy to meet the new standard in the
coming year):
Djkt = 1{Sjkt > 0} (5.4)
I then flexibly model the effect of the shortfall and the CAFE-constrained indicator
on the rate of technology change using a set of panel regression models with fixed
effects for fleet, the general form of which is:
∆Tjkt = γPt+α0Djkt+α1Sjkt+α2SjktDjkt+µ0jk+µ1jkt+µ2jkt
2 +BXjkt+jkt (5.5)
In the above equation, Pt is the price of gasoline in year t;
4 µ0jk is a vector of
fixed effects for each fleet; µ1jk and µ2jk allow for fleet-specific time trends; Sjkt and
Djkt are as defined above; and Xjkt is a vector of covariates. I also investigated a
specification that included interactions of Sjkt and Djkt with a dummy variable for
the Detroit Three, allowing for a different response to the standard for this subset of
companies.5
4Lagged gasoline prices were also investigated, but returned an inferior fit.
5A model specification that included interaction terms between gasoline prices and shortfall was
also investigated, but it did not indicate any significant interaction effects.
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In some specifications of the model, I also included as covariates average weight,
average size (interior volume), average engine peak power, average fuel consumption
(gallons per mile), fraction of small cars (mini-compacts, subcompacts, and two-
seaters), fraction of cars with 4-wheel drive, fraction of wagons, and fraction of con-
vertibles. The rationale for including these covariates is that the composition of a
firm’s fleet may plausibly affect the ease with which new technologies can be adopted.
As discussed later, in the section on Identification, the specification in Equation
5.5 may be prone to spurious correlations between increases in CAFE standards and
faster technological improvements. These concerns are mitigated by the use of a
specification that employs fixed effects for year, as shown below:
∆Tjkt = δt +α0Djkt +α1Sjkt +α2SjktDjkt +µ0jk +µ1jkt+µ2jkt
2 + BXjkt + jkt (5.6)
In the above equation, δt is a vector of fixed effects for year, and other terms are
as defined previously. Since fuel prices were observed as annual averages, they were
omitted when year fixed effects were included.
5.2.3 Standard errors
The number of fleets in the data set was 29, meaning that conventional methods of
estimating clustered standard errors were inappropriate. I therefore used a double
bootstrapping procedure to estimate the standard errors. To do this, I first resam-
pled the fleets, with replacement. Next, from the data set created by resampling the
fleets, I resampled blocks of years, with replacement, as in block bootstrapping. I
used non-overlapping blocks with length 3 years. Finally, I estimated the parameters
of interest using the resampled data, repeating the above steps 2000 times to simulate
a distribution of parameter values.
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5.2.4 Identification
It is worth discussing briefly the ability of the panel regression specification to cor-
rectly identify the effect of the binding CAFE standard on the rate of technolog-
ical change. For the panel regression to identify the causal effects of the short-
fall S and the state of being constrained by the standard D, we need the error
terms to be independent conditional on the fixed effects and the covariates, i.e.
E[jkt|Pt, Xjkt, Sjkt, Djkt, t] = 0 for all t in the case of Equation 5.5, orE[jkt|δt, Xjkt, Sjkt, Djkt, t] =
0 for all t in the case of Equation 5.6. In other words, we need there to be no unob-
served confounders that are varying with time.
One possible reason that the panel regression may not correctly identify the causal
effects is if the standards were set at levels that the firms deemed feasible. In this case,
there could be an omitted variable, “firm’s technology plan,” that is correlated with
increases in observed technology. If firms had influenced the level of the standard,
then this technology plan variable could also be correlated with the next year’s CAFE
standard. An important point here is that the confounding effect of the technology
plan variable would have to be varying over time. Nevertheless, it is possible that
such an effect could account for some of the correlation between higher standards and
faster rates of technology improvement.
The fixed effect specification (Equation 5.6) should be more robust in such a situa-
tion. To the extent that the the stringency of regulations is shaped by the capabilities
and plans of the industry as a whole, this confounding should be soaked up in the
fixed effects. However, CAFE standards have been set, at least some of the time,
according to a “least capable manufacturer” heuristic, in which the standards are set
so as not to be overly burdensome on any single firm (NHTSA, 2006). This type
of process could indeed lead to a situation in which the size of a particular firm’s
fuel economy shortfall is correlated with its future technology improvements, without
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causing those improvements.
A further approach to dealing with this comes from the fact that after 1989, CAFE
standards for cars did not change for the remainder of the years in this analysis. The
standard for cars was constant at 27.5 mpg, which is essentially an arbitrary value.
Since we know that technology continued to improve during this period — as ev-
idenced by the continued changes in the year fixed effects from the fuel economy
regression — we can conclude that the level of the CAFE standard in these years was
not determined by the technology plans of the manufacturers. So, if we re-estimate
our model(s) using only the data from 1989 onwards, we can be more confident that
the results are not an artifact of CAFE standards being set based on manufacturer
technology plans.
5.3 Data
I used two principal data sources in this work. Data on the annual fuel economy per-
formance and applicable CAFE standards came from CAFE compliance reports held
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), which administers
the CAFE program. These were used to calculate whether a fleet was above or below
the next year’s standard, and by how much. Another database maintained by NHTSA
provided model-level data on car attributes including fuel economy, weight, engine
type and power, transmission type, drive type, and body style. I used these data to
estimate the rates of technological progress in each year (the outcome of interest) as
well as various covariates. I used data from the years 1978–2008, and omitted only
manufacturers of limited-volume, specialty vehicles.
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5.4 Results
Table 5.1 summarizes the results of the regressions for technological change in cars
offered for sale, based on Equation 5.5. These regressions include gasoline prices end
exclude year fixed effects. The bootstrapped standard errors are reported in paren-
theses. If the CAFE standard had a forcing effect on technology, we would expect
the coefficients on the shortfall variable, S, and on the shortfall–CAFE-constrained
interaction term, S ∗D, to be positive and significant. From columns 1–4 in Table 5.1
it is clear that although the coefficients on the binary (constrained/unconstrained)
and continuous treatment intensity (shortfall) variables mostly have the expected
sign, none of them are statistically significant. This remained true regardless of the
inclusion of firm-specific time trends and covariates, and of the restriction of the data
to only those years when standards were arbitrarily fixed at 27.5 MPG.
As noted earlier, we would expect the effects of a CAFE standard to be larger for
those firms (the Detroit Three) that treat the standards as a binding constraint. It is
possible that the estimated effects in columns 1–4 were dampened by the inclusion of
firms that tend to ignore their CAFE obligations. Therefore, I re-estimated the mod-
els in columns 1–4 while allowing for a different CAFE response for the Detroit firms.
These results are shown in columns 5–8, while column 9 shows the results when only
the Detroit firms were included in the data set. The coefficient on shortfall for Detroit
firms, when they are constrained by the CAFE standard, was positive and significant
in model specification 7. This is in line with predictions of technology-forcing, but
the result was not robust to different model specifications and is not compelling on
its own.
The coefficients for gasoline price in Table 5.1 are all positive, and in a few cases
are marginally significant statistically. However, the estimates are not robust to the
different specifications.
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Automobile manufacturers generally make product planning decisions several years
ahead. Therefore, it is plausible that being constrained by a CAFE standard in one
year would not be sufficient to alter the average technological sophistication of the
mix of cars offered in the next year. One approach to dealing with this is to recog-
nize that being constrained by the standard might alter the mix of products actually
sold, an effect which would show up in the sales-weighted measure of technological
sophistication. Table 5.2 shows the same set of models as before, but with the sales-
weighted technological progress as the dependent variable. The results are somewhat
different than in Table 5.1. The estimated coefficients on the shortfall variable are
significant in some specifications, though the estimates are not stable across these
different specifications and become insignificant when covariates are included.
In contrast to the results in Table 5.1, the coefficients on gasoline price are sig-
nificant in most specifications, though their specific values are sensitive to the spec-
ification. It is also apparent that the coefficient estimates are larger in magnitude
than the corresponding estimates in Table 5.1. The same is true of the coefficient
estimates for the shortfall variable. This is consistent with the view that the mix of
vehicles sold is more sensitive to standards and fuel prices than is the mix of vehicles
offered.
The results of the panel regressions that employed fixed effects for year are shown
in Table 5.3 (for the mix of vehicles offered for sale) and Table 5.4 (for the mix of
vehicles actually sold). As with the regressions that included gasoline price, none of
the coefficients on the CAFE variables had a significant effect on the rate of technol-
ogy change in cars offered for sale. Also, as before, the CAFE shortfall variable had
a larger effect on the mix of vehicles sold than on the mix of vehicles offered for sale.
In some specifications this effect was statistically significant, though this significance
vanished when covariates were included.
Since it is plausible that the mix of product offered would not respond to policy
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signals over a single year, another approach to accommodating the dynamics of the
product cycle is to estimate rates of technological change and stringency of the CAFE
constraint over periods longer than one year. Table 5.5 summarizes the results of sev-
eral regressions like those already presented. However, these results were based on
technological change and CAFE shortfall measured over three-year intervals instead
of one-year intervals. As with the earlier results, no significant effect of CAFE on the
rate of technological change is evident.
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Table 5.1: Results for year over year technological change in cars offered for sale (unweighted), without year fixed effects.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Gas Price 0.0173 0.0276 + 0.0328 + 0.0110 0.0158 0.0278 0.0338 + 0.0097 0.0106
(0.0108) (0.0165) (0.0168) (0.0838) (0.0102) (0.0177) (0.018) (0.0369) 0.0360
CAFE Constrained 0.0016 0.0008 0.0051 0.0047 -0.0082 0.0026 0.0030 -0.0069 -
(0.0084) (0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0139) (0.0141) (0.0191) (0.0406) (0.0165) -
CAFE Shortfall 0.0017 0.0025 0.0010 -0.0005 0.0008 0.0036 0.0012 0.0002 -
(0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0080) (0.0013) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0093) -
Constrained * Shortfall 0.0173 0.0053 0.0010 -0.0014 0.0028 0.0045 -0.0011 -0.0043 -
(0.0035) (0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0150) (0.0054) (0.0143) (0.0113) (0.0234) -
Detroit * CAFE Constrained - - - - 0.0087 0.0008 0.0007 0.0126 0.0064
- - - - (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.018) (0.0569) (0.0421)
Detroit * CAFE Shortfall - - - - 0.0027 -0.0033 -0.0020 -0.0033 0.0032
- - - - (0.0035) (0.0191) (0.0406) (0.0124) (0.0086)
Detroit * Constrained * Shortfall - - - - 0.0001 0.0030 0.0083 * 0.012 0.0044
- - - - (0.0143) (0.003) (0.0035) (0.2084) (0.0322)
Firms Included All All All All All All All All Detroit Only
Years Included All All All 1989 on All All All 1989 on All
Firm-Specific Time Trends No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Included No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
+ Significant at the 0.1 level * Significant at the 0.05 level
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Table 5.2: Results for year over year technological change in mix of cars sold (sales-weighted), without year fixed effects.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Gas Price 0.0253 * 0.0366 + 0.0453 * 0.0140 0.0238 * 0.0367 + 0.0469 * 0.0127 0.0414
(0.0123) (0.0189) (0.0209) (0.0385) (0.0114) (0.0201) (0.0212) (0.0389) 0.0371
CAFE Constrained -0.0010 -0.0041 0.0029 0.0080 -0.0137 -0.0044 -0.0028 -0.0012 -
(0.011) (0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0291) (0.0156) (0.0186) (0.0348) (0.0147) -
CAFE Shortfall 0.0032 + 0.0070 * 0.0051 0.0040 0.0027 0.0086 * 0.0054 0.0051 -
(0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0048) (0.0103) (0.0019) (0.0039) (0.0052) (0.0105) -
Constrained * Shortfall 0.0020 0.0035 -0.0031 -0.0020 0.0029 0.0020 -0.0069 -0.0059 -
(0.0049) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0383) (0.0074) (0.0085) (0.0105) (0.0198) -
Detroit * CAFE Constrained - - - - 0.0129 0.0048 0.0034 0.0082 -0.0006
- - - - (0.0314) (0.0201) (0.0052) (0.7689) (0.021)
Detroit * CAFE Shortfall - - - - 0.0015 -0.0052 -0.0033 -0.0049 0.0026
- - - - (0.0033) (0.0186) (0.0212) (0.0084) (0.0088)
Detroit * Constrained * Shortfall - - - - 0.0032 0.0061 0.0154 0.0167 0.0072
- - - - (0.0222) (0.0039) (0.0348) (0.9591) (0.0207)
Firms Included All All All All All All All All Detroit Only
Years Included All All All 1989 on All All All 1989 on All
Firm-Specific Time Trends No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Included No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
+ Significant at the 0.1 level * Significant at the 0.05 level
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Table 5.3: Results for year over year technological change in cars offered for sale (unweighted), including year fixed effects.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
CAFE Constrained 0.0035 0.0046 0.0068 0.0058 -0.0012 0.0081 0.0059 -0.0091 -
(0.0086) (0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0167) (0.0142) (0.0233) (0.0286) (0.0235) -
CAFE Shortfall 0.0019 0.0022 0.0030 -0.0001 0.0012 0.0038 0.0034 0.0009 -
(0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0049) (0.0085) (0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0053) (0.0092) -
Constrained * Shortfall 0.0008 0.0058 0.0042 -0.0024 0.0012 0.0042 0.0028 -0.0054 -
(0.0037) (0.0052) (0.0072) (0.0283) (0.0089) (0.0233) (0.0123) (0.0250) -
Detroit * CAFE Constrained - - - - 0.0008 -0.0017 0.002 0.0196 0.0103
- - - - (0.0202) (0.0027) (0.0056) (0.0570) (0.0555)
Detroit * CAFE Shortfall - - - - 0.0022 -0.0046 -0.0025 -0.0046 0.0118
- - - - (0.0038) (0.0233) (0.0286) (0.0119) (0.0291)
Detroit * Constrained * Shortfall - - - - 0.0019 0.0065* 0.0046 0.0109 0.0115
- - - - (0.0168) (0.0027) (0.0053) (0.0684) (0.0679)
Firms Included All All All All All All All All Detroit Only
Years Included All All All 1989 on All All All 1989 on All
Firm-Specific Time Trends No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Included No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
+ Significant at the 0.1 level * Significant at the 0.05 level
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Table 5.4: Results for year over year technological change in mix of cars sold (sales-weighted), including year fixed effects.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
CAFE Constrained 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0036 0.0078 -0.0058 0.0021 -0.0004 -0.0036 -
(0.0105) (0.0132) (0.0126) (0.1567) (0.0165) (0.0195) (0.0372) (0.0176) -
CAFE Shortfall 0.0036* 0.0066* 0.0067 0.0042 0.0032 + 0.0088 * 0.0072 0.0055 -
(0.0018) (0.0033) (0.0068) (0.0161) (0.0018) (0.0037) (0.0068) (0.0102) -
Constrained * Shortfall 0.0008 0.0041 0.0000 -0.0027 0.0011 0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0057 -
(0.0049) (0.0067) (0.0078) (0.4362) (0.0093) (0.0146) (0.0125) (0.0202) -
Detroit * CAFE Constrained - - - - 0.0042 0.0024 0.0061 0.0154 0.0063
- - - - (0.1097) (0.0057) (0.0372) (0.0875) (0.035)3
Detroit * CAFE Shortfall - - - - 0.001 -0.0065 -0.004 -0.0054 0.0118
- - - - (0.0032) (0.0195) (0.0068) (0.0100) (0.0201)
Detroit * Constrained * Shortfall - - - - 0.0031 0.0075 * 0.0091 0.0116 0.0117
- - - - (0.0738) (0.0037) (0.0125) (0.0777) (0.0270)
Firms Included All All All All All All All All Detroit Only
Years Included All All All 1989 on All All All 1989 on All
Firm-Specific Time Trends No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Included No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
+ Significant at the 0.1 level * Significant at the 0.05 level
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Table 5.5: Results for technological change in cars offered for sale (unweighted), over three-year intervals.
1 2 5 6
CAFE Constrained 0.0017 -0.0123 -0.0085 -0.0421
(0.0299) (0.0675) (0.0524) (0.0503)
CAFE Shortfall 0.0021 0.0053 0.0017 0.0045
(0.0034) (0.0167) (0.0040) (0.0503)
Constrained * Shortfall 0.0050 0.0110 0.0126 0.0187
(0.0112) (0.0675) (0.0207) (0.0503)
Detroit * CAFE Constrained - - 0.0228 0.0493
- - (0.0816) (0.0503)
Detroit * CAFE Shortfall - - 0.0072 0.0035
- - (0.0121) (0.0503)
Detroit * Constrained * Shortfall - - -0.0311 -0.0303
- - (0.0429) (0.0503)
Firms Included All All All All
Years Included All All All All
Firm-Specific Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Covariates Included No No No No
+ Significant at the 0.1 level * Significant at the 0.05 level
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5.5 Conclusions
In this work, I found little to no evidence that either the state of being constrained by
a CAFE standard in a given year, or the stringency of that constraint, has increased
the historic rates of technological change by automobile manufacturers in the U.S.
since 1978. In the few cases where significance was found, the results were not robust
to alternative model specifications. This held true when the rate of technology change
was defined in terms of (1) the year to year change in the technology of cars offered
for sale, (2) the year to year change in the sales-weighted average technology level,
and (3) the change in technology of cars offered for sale over three-year intervals.
However, these results must not be miscontrued as definitively ruling out an effect of
CAFE on technology change, and several caveats to this work are discussed below.
This work does suggest that the price of gasoline may have increased the rate
of technology change among the mix of vehicles offered for sale. When considering
the sales-weighted mix of vehicles actually sold, the evidence is more convincing, but
still mixed. Gasoline prices were associated with significant increases in the sales-
weighted rate of technological improvement, but the estimates of this effect ranged
between 1.3% and 4.7%, depending on the model specification, and were not signifi-
cant in all cases.
Although little prior empirical work has been reported on the effects of CAFE
standards on rates of technology change in automobiles, the negative results reported
here do run counter to a good deal of well-grounded microeconomic modeling. This
modeling work (for example, Kleit (2004), Fischer et al. (2007), Shiau et al. (2009),
as well as the work reported in Chapter 6 of this document) generally predicts that
when a firm has the ability to change its adoption of technology, the most profitable
response to a binding CAFE standard will involve at least some increase in the adop-
tion of technology.
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The gap between the theoretical prediction of faster technology deployment in
response to standards and the failure to find such an effect here warrants some dis-
cussion. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that the cost of accelerating
technology deployment is higher than commonly thought. It may be that although
new technologies can be added at modest cost over the long run, manufacturers are
constrained by their R&D pipelines, knowledge bases, and supply chains over the
shorter term. As Zoepf and Heywood (2012) has shown, there are limits to how
quickly new technologies have been deployed across the vehicle fleet. However, such
an explanation begs the question as to why a technology response is detected for
gasoline prices but not for CAFE constraints. One possibility is that firms respond
differently to the increase in demand for fuel economy resulting from higher fuel prices
than to the shadow cost of the fuel economy standard. However, it is not clear why
this should be the case.
A second possible explanation for the discrepancy between theory and observa-
tion is that although the results were not statistically significant, the signs of the
coefficients were in most cases consistent with a small positive effect of CAFE on the
pace of technology change. It is possible that a larger sample could reveal a signif-
icant effect of CAFE, but we are already using all of the available years and major
manufacturers for which data are available.
Thirdly, the failure of the model to show a significant effect of the standards
on technology change certainly does not preclude the possibility of such an effect,
especially if such an effect operates on multi-year timescales. During the period
covered in this analysis, manufacturers had the ability to bank and borrow credits
if they over- or under-complied with CAFE in a given year. Moreover, firms cannot
introduce new products overnight, and typically redesign vehicle models on a 4–7
year cycle that includes several years of design leadtime before product launch. These
factors would be expected to dampen the firm’s response to a CAFE shortfall in any
single year.
Finally, conclusions based on historical CAFE standards (which were last in-
creased in the 1980s) may not be applicable for predicting responses to future CAFE
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standards. This work has by necessity been entirely retrospective, and there are sev-
eral reasons that future responses to CAFE standards may differ from obsreved past
responses. First, the CAFE standards considered in this work were uniform, with each
car fleet was required to meet the same standard. Adjusting prices and production to
sell more small cars was a viable strategy for meeting the standards. Going forward,
standards are size-based, with manufacturers of smaller cars being held to tighter fuel
economy standards. To a first approximation, this is expected to remove downsizing
as a viable compliance strategy. Without the option of downsizing, firms may have to
rely more heavily on other compliance strategies, including the deployment of more
advanced technologies. Second, modern vehicles are more durable than vehicles in the
past, and there are more full-line manufacturers today than when the Big Three ruled
the U.S. market in the 1970s. These changes may increase the competitive pressures
on manufacturers to deliver attributes that consumers desire, in order to avoid losing
customers to competitors or to the used car market.
Notwithstanding the above caveats, it is still interesting that an effect of binding
CAFE standards on the historic rate of technology change was not found. Taken
with the results of Greene (1990), which found that CAFE significantly influenced
fuel economy levels, the results reported here suggest a pattern for cars similar to
that reported by Newell et al. (1999) for air conditioners: namely, that standards
affect the direction, but not the rate, of technological change. Opportunities remain




A Simple Model of Manufacturer
Responses to Nested Fuel
Consumption Standards
This chapter develops a framework for modeling automotive firms’ technology adoption
and product characteristics decisions in an environment of multiple “nested” regulatory
constraints and non-negligible costs to firms of diversifying their product portfolios.
A simple model of an automobile market is constrained by a binding minimum fuel
economy standard. Firms compete with one another, seeking to maximize their profits.
Variable costs of vehicle manufacturing are assumed to depend on the level of efficiency
technology used on the vehicle and the vehicle’s acceleration capability, and firms’ costs are
assumed to be symmetric. Consumer choices of vehicles are modeled using a nested logit
model. It is possible for a subset of the market to impose a more stringent fuel economy
standard than is required across the broader market, creating a “nested” standard. In such
a situation, manufacturers must choose whether to build to the more stringent standard
everywhere, or to build specific variants for each market. Building multiple variants is as-
sumed to increase the fixed costs of product development, manufacturing, and certification.
The model is currently implemented for firms competing in a single period, within a single
vehicle class. The results demonstrate why it may be sometimes — but only sometimes —
rational for firms to design specific variants for a nested market, but to also prefer that the
larger market harmonize its standards with those of the nested market.
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6.1 Nested Fuel Consumption Regulations in the
United States
The process for establishing fuel economy standards in the United States has become
considerably more intriguing in recent years. Once the strict purview of the fed-
eral Department of Transportation and its subsidiary, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), today fuel economy policy is also being influenced
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the California Air Re-
sources Board (CARB). Currently, by agreement, standards promulgated by all three
of these agencies are consistent with one another. However, it remains a possibil-
ity that CARB could once again break from the federal government and attempt
to establish its own standards, which would create a more strictly regulated market
“nested” in the larger federal market. Were such a situation to occur, the implications
for consumers, automobile manufacturers, and the environment could be substantial.
These outcomes would depend on the structures and relative stringency of the state
and federal regulatory regimes, the relative size of the nested state market, and the
costs to automobile manufacturers of bringing to market special variants1 of their
vehicles which are intended for the nested market only. In this chapter, I present a
framework for modeling the response of automobile manufacturers and consumers to
nested state and federal fuel economy standards. I implement this framework using
illustrative parameter values for ten firms competing in a single vehicle class. The
results demonstrate why sometimes — but only sometimes — it may be rational for
firms to design specific variants for a nested market, while preferring that the larger
market adopt the more stringent standards of the nested market.
1Throughout this chapter, I will refer to firms producing one or more variants of a vehicle model.
I use this to refer to different versions of the same basic model, which differ in their fuel consumption,
acceleration performance, or application of technology. For example, variants of the Toyota Camry
include those with the 4-cylinder, 6-cylinder, and hybrid electric powertrains.
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6.1.1 The Road to Nested Fuel Consumption Regulations
Automotive fuel economy standards have been a part of U.S. energy policy since
1978, after being mandated by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975
(EPCA). The Act assigned the authority to set CAFE standards to the Secretary
of Transportation, who has delegated it to NHTSA. Although EPCA specified a
minimum level of 27.5 mpg as the fuel economy standard for cars, NHTSA had the
legal responsibility to set higher standards if such standards were feasible. However,
standards for cars were not increased above 27.5 mpg, and legislative attempts to
raise them were unsuccessful, leaving them unchanged throughout the 1990s. Figure
6-1 shows the historic levels of the CAFE standard for cars, along with the actual
average fuel consumption of new cars.
In 2002, the state government of California passed Assembly Bill No. 1493, which
required CARB to promulgate standards for the maximum permissible levels of per-
mile greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of vehicles sold in the state. Under §209 of the
federal Clean Air Act (42 USC §7543), California has the right to set its own emissions
standards for motor vehicles, as long as those standards are at least as stringent as
any comparable federal standards, are not set arbitrarily, and are necessary to meet
“compelling and extraordinary conditions” in the state. In addition, such standards
must be consistent with the regulatory authority laid out in §202 of the Clean Air
Act (42 USC §7521), which includes a requirement that the emissions in question
“endanger public health or welfare.” Under §177 of the Clean Air Act (42 USC §7507),
other states can opt to follow California’s standards instead of the corresponding
Federal standards. By 2009, 13 states and the District of Columbia had opted into
California’s “Pavley standards,” (named after the sponsor of A.B. 1493), meaning
that approximately 40% of new vehicles sold in the U.S. would be subject to these
tighter standards (EPA, 2009b).
Even as California and a number of other states were pushing ahead with auto-
motive GHG standards, automobile manufacturers and dealers sued to block those
regulations, arguing that they were pre-empted by federal CAFE law. Specifically, 49
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Figure 6-1: Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards (expressed as fuel consump-
tion) for new cars, 1978–2025, and average fuel consumption of new U.S. cars, 1975–
2011.
USC §32919 states that “When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under
this chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or
enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy
standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard under this
chapter.” Since a large majority of automotive GHG emissions come directly from the
combustion of fuel, the argument went, regulating GHG emissions was tantamount
to regulating fuel economy and was therefore pre-empted.
The pre-emption issue was still under dispute in 2009, when the Obama adminis-
tration took office. The new administration granted California the necessary waiver
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under §209 (EPA, 2009a), while simultaneously brokering a deal between various
stakeholders that essentially tightened the federal fuel economy rules to be as strin-
gent as the California GHG standards. The terms of this deal were laid out in
commitment letters from major automobile manufacturers, their trade associations,
and CARB, as documented on the EPA’s website (EPA, 2013c). Key commitments
from the auto industry included the following:
• A stay of all pending litigation challenging California’s regulations, including
challenges claiming pre-emption of state GHG regulations under EPCA;
• A commitment not to contest EPA’s granting of a waiver to California under
§209 of the Clean Air Act;
• A commitment not to contest CAFE or GHG standards promulgated by NHTSA
or EPA, respectively, if those standards were substantially similar to those
sketched out in the May, 2009 Notice of Intent to propose rules;
• A commitment not to renew or initiate such litigation in relation to vehicles
from model years 2009-2016.
In return, the auto industry obtained the following commitments:
• EPA and NHTSA would propose national GHG and CAFE standards substan-
tially similar to those outlined in the May, 2009 Notice of Intent;
• For model years 2009–2011, California would revise its automotive GHG stan-
dards such that they would be applied to the combined fleet of vehicles sold in
California and other states adopting California’s standards pursuant to §177 of
the Clean Air Act;
• For model years 2012–2016, California would revise its standards so that any
company in compliance with the federal standards would be deemed to be in
compliance with the California standards;
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• An assurance that federal CAFE testing procedures could be used to demon-
strate compliance with California’s standards.
This agreement effectively created a ceasefire, whereby disputes over California’s
authority to regulate GHG emissions were suspended but not actually resolved. An
additional deal with broadly similar terms and covering model years 2017–2025 was
subsequently announced in 2011 (EPA, 2013c). However, the 2017–2025 rulemaking
included provisions for a mid-term review of the feasibility of the standards in for
2022–2025, citing the long lead time and associated uncertainty.2 Both California
and the automobile manufacturers reserved the right to contest final rules based on
the outcome of this mid-term review.
Nested state and federal GHG standards remain an important topic. While it is
difficult to say how the courts would have resolved the pre-emption issue, it is certainly
possible that if not for this deal, we might now be living in a world where there were
two sets of standards: a more lax federal standard and a more stringent standard with
the subset of the states following California’s standards. In addition, nested standards
could return following the outcome of the mid-term review, or upon the expiry of the
current deal in 2025. Goulder and Stavins (2011) have observed that “The coexistence
of state and federal programs is likely to continue in the context of US climate change
policy.” Referring specifically to the Pavley initiative, they concluded that given
uncertain federal and state rulemakings, “the leakage issue remains very much alive.”
6.1.2 Emissions Leakage and Nested Regulations
A critical issue in the context of nested regulations is that of emissions “leakage.”
Leakage refers to an outcome that can occur when (1) a binding federal standard
is in force, (2) a nested subset of the federal market (“adopting states”) imposes a
more stringent standard, and (3) sales of products in the adopting states are pooled
with sales in non-adopting states to determine compliance with the federal standard.
2Moreover, under 49 USC §32902(b)(3)(B), NHTSA can set CAFE standards for no more than
five years at a time, and thus is legally obligated to conduct a de novo rulemaking for the years
2022–2025.
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In such circumstances, the emission reductions required in the adopting states can
“leak” out by enabling increased sales of higher-emitting products in the non-adopting
states. In such a situation, the costs of compliance with the tighter standards would
be borne by parties in the adopting states, the costs of complying with the federal
standard would be reduced for parties in the non-adopting states, and some or all
of the emission reductions required in the adopting states would be lost to leakage.
Moreover, the overall cost of compliance will be higher than with a uniform federal
standard designed to achieve the same overall level of emission reductions (Goulder
and Stavins, 2011).
Economic analysis specifically addressing the Pavley law and federal CAFE stan-
dards suggests that leakage rates could be quite high. Goulder and Stavins (2011)
argue that as much as 100% of the Pavley emissions reductions could leak out of the
adopting states, if all regulated firms were already constrained by the federal CAFE
standard. Perhaps taken for granted by those authors, an additional necessary condi-
tion for 100% leakage is that all firms operating in the non-adopting states were also
operating in the adopting states, or that credit trading between firms be permitted.
Goulder et al. (2012) simulated the interactions between the Pavley standards and
the federal CAFE standards. They estimated that about 74% of the Pavley emissions
reductions through 2016, and 65% of emissions reductions through 2025, could leak
out to non-adopting states. They acknowledged the potential significance of credit
trading between fleets but did not incorporate it into their model. Their modeling
approach is summarized as follows:
• Seven firms each seek to maximize their own profits in Bertrand competition,
making pricing and product attribute decisions while accounting for regulatory
constraints and the effects of their decisions on costs and demand.
• Each firm offers four vehicle models: small and large cars, and small and large
trucks.
• Each firm offers two variants of each model: one in adopting states and one in
non-adopting states. There are eight variants in total.
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• Firms improve fuel economy through the adoption of more advanced technolo-
gies, which can be either “static” or “dynamic.”
• Dynamic technology changes are represented as incurring a fixed cost per model,
and are assumed to apply to all variants of a model. Each firm has four dynamic
technology decision variables: one for each of their models.
• Static technology changes are represented as increasing the variable cost of
production, and may differ between the two variants of a model. Each firm has
eight static technology decision variables: one for each of their variants.
The distinction between the static and dynamic technology variables is important,
and deserves clarification. Goulder et al. (2012) listed “improved aerodynamics and
certain improvements in engine design” as examples of dynamic innovations. They
assume that such innovations would, for zero variable cost, benefit all variants of a
model once “purchased” for the model line as a whole. This represents technologies
for which the costs are heavily concentrated in the design and engineering phases of
product development. This is plausible for something like aerodynamics: once the
body of the vehicle is desiged, all variants benefit from the resulting improvement
in efficiency. In contrast, they identified tires, low-friction lubricants, and improved
transmissions as static innovations, in the sense that applying these technologies es-
sentially increases the variable cost of vehicle production. This distinction is captured
in the objective function as the authors have presented it.
However, Goulder et al. (2012) may have conflated another important concept
with their distinction between static and dynamic technology change. They else-
where distinguished between “static substitutions of car features involving known
technologies (e.g. substituting smaller engines for larger ones),” and “dynamic tech-
nological progress (which improves the fuel economy associated with a given set of car
features).” They noted that their goal was to “contrast moving along a given tech-
nological frontier (static substitution) with moving the technological frontier itself
(dynamic technological progress).” This latter distinction is more akin to accounting
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for the tradeoffs between vehicle attributes such as fuel consumption and acceleration
performance.
6.1.3 Gaps in Assessments of Pavley/CAFE Leakage
The existing literature addressing interactions between the Pavley standards and the
federal CAFE standards has not addressed a number of factors that may affect the
outcomes resulting from nested standards.
First, work reported in the literature has not accounted for the effects of different
structures of regulations. Federal CAFE standards are now size-based, with each
firm’s fleet facing a tailored fuel economy standard based on the fleet’s particular
sales-weighted mix of vehicle sizes. Firms that sell more small vehicles generally
need to meet a higher CAFE standard. As such, if firms complied with California’s
standards by selling more small cars in the adopting states, this would drive up
both their nationwide average fuel economy and their federal CAFE requirement.
This would be expected to diminish the leakage to non-adopting states. However, if
firms already had two variants of each model in production, they could reduce prices
and increase sales of the less fuel-consuming variant in the adopting states, while
increasing volumes of the more fuel-thirsty variant in the non-adopting states. In
this case, leakage could occur easily. Thus, actual leakage will depend on the relative
stringency of the different sets of standards, as well as the differences in per-mile fuel
consumption among existing variants.
A second deficiency of existing work is that it does not address the possibility
that offering a different set of products in adopting and non-adopting states would
incur costs for the manufacturers. In their analysis of interactions between the Pavley
standards and CAFE, Goulder et al. (2012) take it as given that separate variants of
each model will be offered in adopting and non-adopting states. In reality, however,
firms would likely be able to save on engineering, testing/certification, and supply
chain/logistics costs if they standardize each model. This could reduce leakage by
creating an incentive for firms to build a single fleet of vehicles, compliant in the
adopting states, and sell it in non-adopting states as well. In this way, the tighter
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standards in the adopting states could potentially function as a de facto increase in
the federal standard.
The costs of “splitting” a model line into multiple variants for adopting and non-
adopting states is also relevant to the political economy of regulatory competition.
Goulder and Stavins (2011) noted that, “there is broad agreement that the California-
led state-level tightening of greenhouse-gas-per mile standards brought about the
subsequent tightening of federal CAFE standards. Automakers did not wish to face
different standards at the federal and state level. Hence they were willing to support
tighter federal standards so long as the state standards were removed.” Therefore,
rather than taking federal standards as exogenous, the analysis of the likely leakage
effects of a nested standard ideally would consider the effects of such a standard on
industry support for tighter standards at the federal level.
6.1.4 Political Economy of Nested Regulations
Tighter standards in a nested market can create incentives for firms to support tighter
standards across a broader market as well. Such an effect is believed to be responsible
for the auto industry’s support of the federal fuel economy and GHG program cham-
pioned by the Obama administration. As Goulder and Stavins (2011) noted, “There
is, in fact, a considerable history of California air standards having precisely this
effect on federal policy developments, because industry is reluctant to face different
standards in different parts of the country. For example, the California-led state-level
tightening of greenhouse-gas-per mile standards helped bring about the subsequent
tightening of federal CAFE standards.” Indeed, this would hardly be the first time
that California’s automotive emissions policies had driven policy at the federal level.
Vogel (1995) used the term “California Effect” to describe the process whereby
stricter environmental standards in one jurisdiction motivate industry support for
other jurisdictions to adopt those same standards. The eponymous example of this
phenomenon is found in the repeated pattern of California tightening its automotive
emission standards (historically this has been for criteria pollutants, e.g. NOx and
VOCs, rather than for GHGs). Following each such tightening, the federal government
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— with the blessing of the auto industry — has essentially adopted the California
standards nationwide.
Murphy (2004b) developed some generalized principles about conditions that tend
to lead to the California effect, or what he calls higher-commom-denominator (HCD)
outcomes. His first key variable is the type of regulation: market access regulations
as opposed to process regulations. Regulations restricting access to a market (such
as vehicle technology or performance standards) tend to increase industry support
for HCD outcomes, since firms prefer not to make different products for each market.
Jurisdictions representing larger shares of the market tend to have a greater ability
to motivate broader adoption of tighter standards, thanks to their greater “market
power” (Murphy, 2004b; Vogel and Kagan, 2004). In addition, the strength of this
effect is influenced by the degree of market concentration on the supply side; more
concentrated industries lead to more pronounced effects. The U.S. auto market can
be regarded as moderately concentrated, with a four-firm concentration ratio of ap-
proximately 65% and a Herfindahl index of approximately 1, 400 (based on numbers
of units sold in 2007–08). Finally, asset specificity matters. Firms are more likely to
support homogeneous regulations when they have high “multinational” asset speci-
ficity, meaning that the value of a their investments is dependent upon cross-border
transactions, and would lose value from different standards (Murphy, 2004b). In the
context of automobile standards, firms have established production and distribution
systems built around selling the same products in all 50 states, and would incur costs
if forced to meet different standards in different states. This is especially true in
the case of fuel consumption and GHG standards, since fuel consumption is integral
to the design and capabilities of the vehicle. Reducing fuel consumption cannot be
accomplished with any sort of “end-of-pipe” solution, the way catalytic converters
and other aftertreatment technologies can reduce criteria pollutant emissions.
Examining the political economy of regulatory competition is notoriously hard to
do quantitatively. Murphy (2004a) notes that since data are hard to obtain and it is
hard to measure transaction costs and asset specificity, this sort of analysis is usually
done on a comparative basis, rather than quantitatively. Often, a qualitative analysis
153
is only practical option. The work reported in this chapter was undertaken as a first
step toward the quantitative analysis of the political economy of nested state and
federal GHG standards, and a better understanding the emissions leakage issue.
6.1.5 Objectives of This Work
Existing analyses of nested state and federal fuel consumption / GHG standards
have given light attention to the political economy of nested standards. They have
acknowledged the political economy issues in a qualitative and ex-post fashion, as their
main focus has been on economic efficiency and the potential for emissions leakage
while taking the regulatory environment as exogenously given. However, the political
economy literature on regulatory competition suggests that we may want to treat the
regulatory environment as endogenously determined. Since the automotive industry
is fairly concentrated, engaged in selling regulated products across state lines, and
California and other adopting states represent a sizeable fraction of the U.S. vehicle
market, we would expect that the auto industry would generally prefer to deal with a
single set of standards nationwide, rather than one set of standards at the federal level
and a set of nested standards in the adopting states. Intuitively, however, there must
be limits to this logic. If standards in the adopting states become too strict, then the
lost revenues from building to those standards nationwide may come to exceed the
costs of building separate fleets of vehicles for adopting and non-adopting states.
Presumably, lawmakers in California are interested in achieving the greatest re-
ductions in GHG emissions at the most modest economic cost to their own state.
To the extent that their policies drive GHG reductions beyond their borders, they
may regard this as a positive outcome. Emissions leakage, on the other hand, will
lead to economic costs in adopting states but lesser or even no emissions reductions
nationwide. Since GHGs are global pollutants, heterogeneous standards and leakage
of GHG emissions means economic costs are borne in adopting states, for no overall
environmental benefit: a most undesirable outcome for the adopting states.
In this chapter, I develop a model of firms’ responses to nested state and federal
fuel consumption or GHG emissions standards. The goal of this work is to illustrate
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how different outcomes related to emissions leakage can depend on the relative strin-
gency of state and federal standards, the share of the federal market that is covered
by the adopting states, and the costs of developing and marketing different variants
of products in adopting and non-adopting states. Using a simple numerical example,
I will show three possible outcomes that may result:
1. De facto homogeneity: In this case, the competitive equilibrium is for firms
to build all of their vehicles, in both adopting and non-adopting states, to the
adopting states’ standard. No leakage would occur in this case.
2. De jure homogeneity: In this case, the competitive equilibrium would be for
firms to build separate variants of their vehicles for adopting and non-adopting
states, creating emissions leakage. However, because of the costs of developing
and marketing two separate variants, firms’ profits are actually lower than if the
stricter standards had been adopted nationwide. Thus, each firm can be made
better off by selling only one variant nationwide, as long as their competitors are
forced to do so as well. If firms can effectively coordinate to lobby for national
adoption of the tighter standards, then emissions leakage would be mitigated.
3. Heterogeneity: The state standards are so strict that it is worth the additional
cost to firms to develop and market two separate variants for the adopting and
non-adopting states. In this case, emissions leakage can be expected to occur.
This suggests that additional, more detailed simulations may be justified to in-
vestigate where precisely the boundaries between these outcomes fall.
6.2 Model Description
The modeling approach developed in this section builds on a number of prior studies
addressing manufacturer responses to fuel economy standards. Like Goulder et al.
(2012), I model automobile producers as oligopolists in Bertrand competition, who
determine the prices and attributes of their products to maximize profits, subject to
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regulatory constraints and expected competitor actions and consumer decisions. Fol-
lowing authors from the optimal design literature, I explicitly account for tradeoffs
between fuel consumption and other consumer-valued attributes, the costs of ad-
vanced technology adoption, and employ a random utility model of consumer choices
for vehicles (Michalek et al., 2004; Shiau et al., 2009; Whitefoot, 2011). Into this gen-
eral approach, I add a term accounting for the capital costs associated with developing
a product and bringing it into production, and assume that this cost depends on the
number of variants of the model that are available. The general modeling framework
is outlined in this section, and the functional form and parametric assumptions for a
simple implementation of the model are developed in the following section.
I assume that each firm k attempts to maximize the present value of its own profits











In Equation 6.1, pi,j,k,r,t denotes the price of variant i of model j sold by firm k
in region r in year t, q denotes the quantity of that variant sold, dk,t is a discount
factor to convert cash flows in year t into their present value for firm k, Cv is the
variable cost of producing the variant, and Cfj,k,t is the fixed cost of bringing model j to
market (including design, engineering, testing, certification, and tooling). Typically,
the fixed costs of product development would be incurred some time before the launch
of a redesigned product, and a particular generation would be kept in production for
a number of years (Hill et al., 2007).
The quantity q of a particular variant sold depends on the total market size, Q,
and the variant’s market share S. Market share in turn depends on the price p and
design attributes X of the vehicle (including fuel consumption, FC), and the prices
pr,t and design attributes Xr,t of all other vehicles available in the same region at
the same time:
qi,j,k,r,t = Qr,tS(pi,j,k,r,t, Xi,j,k,r,t,pr,t,Xr,t) (6.2)
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Market share may be represented using a discrete choice model, such as the nested
logit model, or the mixed logit model if accounting for heterogeneity in consumers’
tastes for different vehicle attributes. The variable cost of manufacturing a vehicle is
assumed to depend on the vehicle’s attributes:
Cvi,j,k,r,t = C
v(Xi,j,k,r,t) (6.3)
The fixed cost of developing and marketing a vehicle model is assumed to depend
on the characteristics of the basic model and the number of variants of model j
developed by firm k in period t:
Cfj,k,t = C
f (Xj,k,t, nj,k,t) (6.4)
Each manufacturer sets the prices and attributes of its own product so as to
maximize its own profitability, assuming its competitors will do the same. Where








In the above inequality, FC is the fuel consumption of a variant, and is one of the
attributes X. T (X) is a function that defines the target fuel economy of a variant
depending on its attributes. T may be size-based, as with the current U.S. CAFE
standards (Figure 6-2), or it may be simply a constant. Where a nested standard or
standards are in force, they impose additional constraints, as firms must satisfy the








As specified, the constraints in Inequalities 6.5 and 6.6 imply that firms are per-
mitted to bank and borrow credits between periods, so that the constraint binds over
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all periods combined. Dropping t from the summation limits would yield a set of
constraints that bind on each year individually. Under the federal CAFE law, firms
have limited opportunities for banking (up to five years) and borrowing (up to three
years) of credits, as well as for credit trading between firms. Bunch et al. (2011)
discusses the structure of these constraints in more detail.
Figure 6-2: Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards depend on size mix of vehicles
sold. Source: EPA and NHTSA (2010)
The resulting system of equations can be solved for a Nash equilibrium either by
iteratively optimizing each firm’s strategy until convergence (Michalek et al., 2004),
or by simultaneously solving the first-order conditions(Shiau et al., 2009). The former
is simple to implement while the latter is much less computationally intensive (Shiau
and Michalek, 2007).
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6.3 A Simple Implementation
In this section, I present a simple implementation of the above model for ten firms
competing in a single vehicle class, across two regions (one nested inside the other).
The objective is not to come up with definitive, quantitative answers, so much as
to demonstrate the feasibility of implementing the simulation methodology and to
illustrate several types of outcomes that may emerge from a market with nested
fuel consumption regulations. In the following sections, I outline the assumptions
employed in this modeling work.
6.3.1 Basic Structure
The single vehicle class that forms the basis of this modeling work can be thought of,
roughly, as representing non-luxury midsize cars in the U.S. Between 2004 and 2008,
there were on average ten firms competing in this segment, with total sales averaging
2.2 million units per year, making it one of the largest vehicle segments in the U.S.
Firms are assumed to be symmetric, with identical cost structure, capabilities, and
products indistinguishable apart from the variables considered in this analysis. Firms
compete in a single period, bringing their products to market at the same time and
keeping them in production for an equal number of years.
6.3.2 Product Life and Discount Rate
All revenues and production costs were discounted back to the point at which funds
are committed for product development. The discount rate used was 7.6%, based
on the average cost of capital for the automotive industry (Elter and Castedello,
2012). Each model is assumed to be in production for six years (Blonigen et al.,
2013), beginning two years after the funds are committed to product development
(Hill et al., 2007). To simplify calculations, a present worth factor of 4.35 is applied
to annual revenues and production costs to convert the six years’ worth of cash flows
into a present value at a time two years before product launch.
159
6.3.3 Total Market Size
The total potential market is assumed to be all drivers in the U.S. Fitting a linear
model to data from the U.S. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA, 2010) indicates
that there are currently about 220 million licensed drivers in the U.S., and that this
figure is increasing by 2.5 million per year. Most of these drivers, of course, do not
buy a new midsized car in any given year. Instead, they may buy another class of new
vehicle, a used car, keep their existing car, or be licensed but not own a vehicle at all.
Those who do not purchase a new midsized car in any given year are considered to
have chosen the “outside good,” which is a composite good treated as having constant
utility.
6.3.4 Vehicle Attributes and Technology
The key design attributes considered in this simulation are per-mile fuel consumption
and 0–60 mph (0–97 km/h) acceleration performance. As shown in section 4.4.3, since
1975 changes in these two variables have been the top two “sinks” for new efficiency
technologies in U.S. cars.
Manufacturers are assumed to be able to trade off between acceleration and fuel
consumption for a given level of technology. That is to say, they can decrease fuel
consumption by increasing acceleration time, or vice versa, even without changing
their use of efficiency technologies. Based on the results presented in section 4.4.1, it
was assumed that every 1% increase in 0–97 km/h acceleration time would result in
a 0.44% decrease in fuel consumption.
The change in efficiency technology on a vehicle was expressed in terms of equiv-
alent fuel consumption. This is calculated as the sum of the actual change in fuel
consumption and the fuel consumption equivalent of the change in acceleration. Both
fuel consumption and acceleration are measured relative to baseline values of 2.8 gal-
lons / 100 miles (35.7 mpg, unadjusted test cycle) and 8 seconds, respectively.3 The
changes in fuel consumption and acceleration performance from these baseline values
3These values were chosen based on typical values for the 2012 Toyota Camry, Honda Accord,
and Ford Fusion, assuming on-road fuel economy numbers are 25% below test cycle numbers.
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In Equation 6.7, Tech is a measure of the new technology added to a car, relative
to the baseline vehicle. It is expressed in terms of the percentage point increase in
fuel economy that could have been achieved using the same technology if acceleration
performance had been held constant at its baseline value.
6.3.5 Variable Costs of Production
Following the basic approach of Michalek et al. (2004) and Shiau et al. (2009), the
variable costs of production are assumed to include a cost to produce the basic vehicle,









Michalek et al. (2004) estimated a cost curve for the cost of an engine as depending
on its power, in kW:
CE = 670.51e0.0063P (6.9)
Michalek et al. then subtracted this estimated engine cost from the total pro-
duction costs reported by Delucchi and Lipman (2001). Applying this approach and
adjusting for inflation, the manufacturing cost exclusive of the engine in the work of
Delucchi and Lipman was estimated to be 40% of the manufacturer’s suggested retail
price (MSRP). Applying this same 40% factor to the $26,000 MSRP of a typical 2012
midsize car yields a figure of $10,500 for the basic vehicle manufacturing cost, CB.
The acceleration cost CA was assumed to depend on the following cost curve, which
was derived by combining the engine cost curve of Michalek et al., the acceleration
model reported in Chapter 2, and specification (weight, displacement, transmission,
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Finally, technology costs were based on a recent report by the National Petroleum
Council (NPC, 2012). Costs for midsize cars were interpolated between the NPC’s
estimates for small and large cars, and between their high-range and low-range esti-
mates. The resulting cost estimates were fitted to a second order polynomial of the
following form:
CTi,j,k,r,t = α1,tTechi,j,k,r,t + α2,tTech
2
i,j,k,r,t (6.11)
As implied by Equation 6.11, reflecting the projections in the NPC report, the
costs of technology are expected to fall over time. The assumed parameters for the
cost curve in Equation 6.11 are summarized in Table 6.1.







6.3.6 Fixed Costs of Product Redesign
The fixed costs of bringing a redesigned model to market is assumed to start at $0.9
billion for a model with a single variant, based on estimates reported by Blonigen
et al. (2013) for midsize cars. Estimating the cost of an additional variant is more
uncertain, because it is thought to depend on a wide range of factors, such as how
different the two variants are, whether an entirely new engine needs to be developed
or an existing engine can be “dropped in,” and so on. If an existing engine could
be used, then there would be some engineering, integration, and possibly testing &
certification costs. If a new engine had to be developed, the costs could run into the
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hundreds of millions of dollars — a new engine plant in the 1990s was estimated to
require between $300 million and $800 million in capital investment (Whitney et al.,
1997). In the face of such uncertainty, I explore a range of costs for creating a second
variant for the nested market, from $100-500 million.
6.3.7 Models and Variants Offered in Each Region
In this implementation, it was assumed that each firm offers a single midsize car
model. The firm decides whether to offer one variant across the entire federal market,
or one variant in the adopting states and another in the non-adopting states. If
the same variant is offered in both sets of states, the price can be set differently in
each set of states. If two variants are offered, then acceleration performance, fuel
consumption, technology, and price can all vary between the two regions. However,
in all cases, only one variant is offered in each region. In reality, firms producing
multiple variants would probably offer all variants in both regions.
6.3.8 Consumer Choice Model
Consumer choices for vehicles were assumed to be described by a nested logit model,
similar to that reported by Bunch et al. (2011). An obvious difference here is that
there are only two levels of choice in the current model: the choice between a new
midsize car and the outside good (i.e. buy/no-buy) and the choice of a specific model
of midsize car. A second key difference is that the current specification also includes
a term for the utility of (log) acceleration. Finally, since firms are assumed to be
symmetric and their products identical except for acceleration and fuel consumption
levels, there are no alternative-specific constants for the different models of car. The
observed portion of utility was assumed to be:
Vi,j,k,r,t = β1pi,j,k,r,t + β2(FCi,j,k,r,t) + β3 ln(Z97i,j,k,r,t) (6.12)
The coefficient on price in Equation 6.12 was assumed to be β1 = −0.00011, which
corresponds to an own-price elasticity of demand of -2.4 (within the midsize car nest).
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The coefficient on fuel consumption was assumed to be β2 = −0.19 when fuel
consumption is expressed in gallons per 100 miles. This corresponds to a willingness-
to-pay (WTP) of $1,750 for a 1 gallon / 100 miles reduction in fuel consumption,
which is within the range of values reviewed by Whitefoot (2011). This value is equal
to the fuel costs saved over 50,000 miles of driving at a gasoline price of $3.50 per
gallon, which is a common rule of thumb of establishing consumers’ WTP (Greene
et al., 2005, 2009).
The coefficient on ln(Z97) was assumed to be β3 = −0.62, which corresponds to
a WTP of $700 for a one-second reduction in 0–97 km/h acceleration time at a mean
acceleration time of 8 seconds. This is consistent with the WTP values reviewed in
MacKenzie (2009).
Based on the standard results for the nested logit model, the utility of buying a
car relative to not buying a car was assumed to be given by:






The average utility of buying a midsize car, relative to the outside good, was
assumed to be given by Abuy = −5.6, which yields estimated midsize sales of 1.95
million in 2012. The scale parameter, µ was assumed to be 0.4, which yields a price
elasticity of market demand of -1.00.
6.3.9 Fuel Consumption Constraint Structure
Fuel consumption constraints were assumed to be binding in this implementation of
the model. It is well known that in the case of federal CAFE standards, some firms
have historically treated the standards as binding while others have been willing to
pay the modest civil penalties ($55 per mpg per vehicle) for noncompliance (Jacobsen,
2012; Kleit, 2004). However, with EPA how enforcing a parallel set of GHG stan-
dards under the authority of the Clean Air Act, penalties for noncompliance could
theoretically reach $37,500 per vehicle, and full compliance with the new standards
is anticipated (EPA and NHTSA, 2010).
164
In the current implementation, uniform standards were assumed in both the adopt-
ing states and federally. In the context of modeling a single vehicle class, size-based
standards are essentially the same as uniform standards, since there are no other
size classes to which volume can be shifted. However, if modeling the responses of
manufacturers producing vehicles in multiple size classes, accounting for size-based
standards would be essential.
A range of federal and adopting state standards were investigated, ranging from
2.7 gallons / 100 miles (37 mpg, not binding) down to 1.9 gallons / 100 miles (52.6
mpg).
6.4 Simulation Results
Figures 6-3 – 6-7 summarize the estimated results from the imposition of a single
federal fuel consumption standard. The reductions are measured relative to an un-
constrained case. A federal fuel consumption standard of 2.7 gallons / 100 miles in
2025 would not bind under the assumptions outlined above, so this case represents
the modeled free-market outcome. Moving to the left in each figure, the standard
becomes tighter, and prices increase, sales and profits decrease, acceleration times
deteriorate, and more advanced technologies are adopted.
Each one of Figures 6-8 – 6-11 summarize the firm profitability and leakage impli-
cations of the (non-cooperative) Nash equilibria as a function of the fuel consumption
standard in the adopting states and the cost to firms of developing a separate variant
of their model for adopting and non-adopting states. The four figures correspond
to different combinations of loose and tight federal standards and larger and smaller
market shares for the adopting states.
Let us first consider Figure 6-8. The upper panel summarizes the non-cooperative
leakage outcomes when there is a loose federal standard (2.5 gal/100 miles, 40 mpg) in
force, and the adopting states represent 20% of the total market. Start by considering
an adopting state standard of 2.5 gal / 100 miles. This is the same as the federal
standard, so the national average fuel consumption ends up at this level.
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Figure 6-3: Price increases are predicted as federal fuel consumption standard is
tightened.
If the adopting states tighten their standard to 2.3 gal / 100 miles, however, then
the outcome depends on the cost to firms of creating separate product variants. If
a special variant for the adopting states can be developed for $100 million, then
the Nash equilibrium has each firm creating two variants. In this case, the national
average fuel consumption stays at 2.5 gal / 100 miles, indicating that the expected fuel
savings in the adopting states have leaked out to the non-adopting states. However,
look now at panel 2. In the Nash equilibrium, the profits per firm are actually
lower than they would be if all of the firms simply built to the tighter standard
nationwide. In the absence of cooperation, however, each firm has an incentive to
produce two variants. This is individually rational for each firm but collectively
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Figure 6-4: Sales are predicted to fall as federal fuel consumption standard is tight-
ened.
suboptimal for the industry as a whole. Thus, the automobile producers in this case
would have an incentive to lobby the federal government to adopt the tighter 2.3 gallon
/ 100 mile standard nationwide. This standardization would remove the incentive for
individual firms to create separate variants for adopting and non-adopting states, and
increases profitability for all firms. This would also mitigate the predicted leakage
effect, through what I earlier termed de jure homogeneity.
The results are different, however, if the costs of creating a separate variant are
higher. If the cost of creating an additional variant is $200 million or more, then
even in the absence of federal regulations, it would make sense for the each firm to
build a single variant that meets the tighter, adopting states standard, and simply sell
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Figure 6-5: Reduction in profits per firm under a single federal fuel consumption
standard.
this variant in all states. In this case, the adopting state standard would be followed
nationwide, no leakage would occur, and we have an example of de facto homogeneity.
Let us next consider the possible outcomes if the adopting states adopt a tighter
standard: 2.1 gallons / 100 miles. Now, if the cost of a second variant is $100
million, then the most profitable course of action for the firms — both individually
and collectively — is to split their models into two variants each. Here we have
leakage, and no incentive for the firms to support harmonization of state and federal
standards. This is the heterogeneous outcome. However, if the cost of creating two
variants is higher — $200–300 million — then it is individually rational but collectively
suboptimal for each firm to create two variants of its model. In this case the firms
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Figure 6-6: Acceleration times deteriorate under a federal fuel consumption standard
as firms trade off acceleration performance for lower fuel consumption.
again have an incentive to support federal adoption of the tighter standard, as it is
more profitable to build a single variant to the tighter standard, as long as everyone
else does so as well. Once again, the incentives are aligned for the creation of de jure
homogeneity.
Figure 6-9 shows similar results, when the adopting states are a larger share (40%)
of the national market. Several differences are notable, compared with the prior case
in which adopting states represent only 20% of the market. First, for an adopting
state standard of 2.3 gal / 100 miles, there is no incentive for firms to create a second
variant, even if they can do so for only $100 million. The smaller market share of the
non-adopting states means that the benefits to building a separate variant are smaller,
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Figure 6-7: A tighter federal fuel consumption standard is predicted to increase the
application of advanced efficiency technologies.
so we end up with de facto homogeneity regardless of the cost of developing a second
variant (within the range of costs investigated). Second, even when leakage occurs,
as when the adopting states adopted a standard of 2.1 gal / 100 miles, the national
average fuel consumption does not return all the way to the federal standard of 2.5
gal / 100 miles, indicating that leakage is only partial. Finally, the results indicate
that if the adopting states tightened their standard to 1.9 gal / 100 miles, the firms
would have an incentive to lobby for national adoption of the tighter standard (de
jure homogeneity) if the cost of developing a second variant were $200 million or
more. However, if it were less than $200 million, they would be better off in the
non-cooperative equilibrium, selling two variants each.
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6.5 Implications
The above modeling exercise, while a vastly simplified representation of the automo-
bile market, illustrates the potential for several outcomes that may result from nested
state and federal fuel consumption regulations:
1. When the states adopting a tighter fuel consumption or GHG standard consti-
tute a large share of the overall market, when the cost of developing multiple
variants is high, or when the nested standard is not too stringent, we can end
up with de facto homogeneity: manufacturers find it most profitable to simply
build to the tighter standard and sell those products everywhere, even if they
are not required to do so.
2. When the adopting states represent a smaller share of the total market or the
cost of developing a second variant is relatively low, the Nash equilibrium may
have firms producing multiple variants. However, this may actually be less
profitable than what firms could achieve if they (and their competitors) were
all forced to build to the tighter standard nationwide. This situation creates
an incentive for firms to support national adoption of the tighter standards: de
jure homogeneity.
3. When the cost of developing a second variant is not too high, and the adopting
states’ standard is relatively strict, it may be most profitable for firms to accept
the additional costs of building multiple variants. The savings from building a
single variant are not worth the loss in revenue in non-adopting states, even if
competitors are forced to build to the tighter standard as well. In this case, we
end up with heterogeneous standards in the adopting and non-adopting states,
and emissions leakage occurs.
This work suggests that in modeling the potential for emissions leakage under
nested regulations, it may be important to consider the costs to the manufacturers of
developing separate variants to sell in adopting and non-adopting states. These costs
create an incentive for firms to support national adoption of the tighter standards, or
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in some cases to build to the tighter standards everywhere even if it is not required
nationally. More detailed modeling of this market should also account for the fact that
there are also market incentives to offering multiple variants of each model: namely,
if consumer tastes for fuel consumption, acceleration performance, and purchase price
are heterogeneous, then firms should be able to capture additional market share by
creating multiple variants tailored to those heterogeneities.
From the perspective of a policymaker in an adopting state, homogeneity — either
de facto or de jure — is presumably the desired outcome when dealing with global
pollutants. It is hard to envision any reason that a policymaker would want to impose
large costs on sellers and consumers in his own state, if the intended emission reduc-
tions are simply going to leak out to non-adopting states. The first implication of the
results in this chapter for such a policymaker is that she should work in coalitions
with other states: the more the merrier. Second, she may be able to drive national
emission reductions even if her standards are not formally adopted nationwide. Fi-
nally, she must be careful not to overplay her hand: if she advances standards that
are too onerous, support for their broader adoption will evaporate, and the hard-won
emissions reductions in her own state will simply leak out to the non-adopting states.
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Figure 6-8: Firm profitability and leakage outcomes with a loose federal standard and
a smaller number of adopting states.
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Figure 6-9: Firm profitability and leakage outcomes with a loose federal standard and
a larger number of adopting states.
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Figure 6-10: Firm profitability and leakage outcomes with a tight federal standard
and a smaller number of adopting states.
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Figure 6-11: Firm profitability and leakage outcomes with a tight federal standard




In this dissertation, I have sought to improve our understanding of several important
questions pertaining to automotive fuel efficiency technology and related policies.
First, I began by exploring recent trends in automotive acceleration performance and
weight, two variables intricately related with fuel consumption. Second, I developed
an estimate of how much per-mile fuel consumption could have been decreased since
1975, if not for changes in the acceleration capabilities, features, and functionality of
new cars. Third, I tested whether fuel efficiency technologies improved more quickly
when firms are more tightly constrained by fuel economy standards, or when gasoline
prices are higher. Finally, I presented a theoretical model of the incentives of firms
when faced with “nested” state and federal fuel consumption regulations.
Understanding vehicle acceleration performance is critical to evaluating trends
in efficiency technology, because there is a significant tradeoff between acceleration
performance and fuel consumption. Apart from actual reductions in per-mile fuel
consumption, the largest “sink” for new efficiency technologies since 1975 has been in
offsetting the fuel economy penalties of acceleration improvements. I have presented a
set of linear regression models that will enable analysts and researchers to conveniently
estimate vehicle acceleration times using commonly-reported attributes such as power,
weight, model year, and in some cases, selected body and powertrain characteristics.
These models represent a significant improvement upon the correlations used by many
analysts to date, which are based on much more limited data from the 1970s. I
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have shown that even after accounting for changes in weight, power, engine and
transmission characteristics, today’s new cars accelerate 20–30% faster than did new
cars in 1975. One of the models was applied to historic vehicle sales and specification
data, and the results revealed that there have been consistent reductions in 0–97 km/h
acceleration times for new vehicles in the U.S. since 1982. Acceleration times have
been reduced across all segments of the market, including the fastest and the slowest
vehicles. A car with acceleration performance among the fastest 5% of the market
in the mid-1980s would have been in the slowest 5% of the market by 2009. These
changes have occurred more slowly in recent years (in both relative and absolute
terms), and the acceleration times appear to be asymptoting. Extrapolating the
trends suggests that reductions of a further 1 second (about 10%) in 0–97 km/h
acceleration times may be plausible in the coming years.
Vehicle weight is another important characteristic, as greater weight causes in-
creased fuel consumption. Weight per se is therefore is a source of disutility in a
vehicle, but many other desirable vehicle attributes, such as greater size and feature
content, tend to increase weight. I have explored the contributions of various weight-
saving technologies, and the contributions of changes in size and feature content, to
the overall changes in weight of the average new car in the U.S. since 1975. Growth
in the prevalence of front-wheel drive and unibody construction, and increased use
of high-strength steel, aluminum, and plastics, have all contributed substantially to
reducing the weight of new cars since 1975. A shift from 6- and 8-cylinder engines to
4- and 6-cylinder engines, facilitated by markedly improved specific power in newer
engines, has also contributed to weight reduction. All told, I estimate that weight-
saving technologies have taken about 790 kg (about 40%) out of the average new car
since 1975, while increases in size and feature content have added approximately 250
kg over the same period.
Viewing technological improvements in automobiles from a top-down, system func-
tionality perspective — focusing on the reduction in fuel needed to deliver a certain
level of size, comfort, features, and acceleration performance to the consumer — re-
veals vast improvements in the efficiency of new U.S. cars since 1975. New cars today
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burn only about half as much fuel as did a new car with the same weight and power in
1975. But this is only half of the story. Even with the same weight and power, today’s
cars deliver 20–30% faster acceleration times than did cars in 1975. Moreover, a car
with the same safety, comfort and convenience features weighs about 40% less today
than it would have in 1975. Integrating key results from the first several chapters of
the dissertation, I conclude that if acceleration performance, size, and feature content
had remained at their 1975 levels, the average new car today would be burning 70%
less fuel per mile than in 1975. The actual reduction in per-mile fuel consumption
between 1975 and 2009 was 50%.
Improvements in automotive efficiency technology have not been uniform over
time. The potential reduction in per-mile fuel consumption of new U.S. cars aver-
aged 5% annually between 1975 and 1990, and 80% of this potential was realized
as actual reductions in fuel consumption. Between 1990 and 2009, however, poten-
tial fuel consumption reductions were just 2% per year, and actual fuel consumption
reductions were just 34% of this potential. So, the pre-1990 and post-1990 periods
are distinguished not only by the overall rate of technology improvement, but by the
degree to which those improvements were dedicated to actually reducing fuel con-
sumption. In both of these periods, modest amounts of new efficiency technologies
— enough to decrease fuel consumption by roughly 1% per year — were needed in
order to offset the fuel consumption penalties associated with decreasing acceleration
times, increasing car size, and increasing feature content.
New federal corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards require sustained
reductions in per-mile fuel consumption of approximately 4% each year through 2025.
Meeting the standards will require either much faster technology improvements than
have recently occurred, or some sacrifice in the functionality (acceleration perfor-
mance, comfort, safety, or convenience features) of today’s cars. Meeting these
standards without sacrificing functionality (in fact, while improving other aspects
of functionality) would be possible if technology could be improved at 5% per year,
as occurred between 1975 and 1990.
The technological feasibility and economic practicability of meeting the 2025
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CAFE standards is uncertain due to technical, policy, and market factors. First,
it is unclear whether the automotive industry can return to the rates of technology
change observed before 1990. Many of the new technologies adopted in the 1970s and
1980s were “low-hanging fruit” which has now been “picked.” Most new cars today
are already front-wheel drive, and an overwhelming majority already use unibody
construction. As shown in Chapter 3, these architectural changes were important
sources of weight reduction in the past, but they have saturated the market and so
their potential to deliver further reductions is largely exhausted. The same holds true
for technologies like lockup automatic transmissions, fuel injection, and computerized
engine controls. Similarly, each additional transmission speed or valve per cylinder
can be expected to offer diminishing marginal returns. Finally, while the acceleration
performance for a vehicle with a given power and weight is faster than in the past,
most of these improvements occurred in the 1980s, with more modest changes since
1990.
While the potential of many big-ticket technologies has already been saturated,
opportunities do remain. Technologies like spaceframe construction, and advanced
composite materials such as carbon-fiber reinforced polymer, offer the potential for
large-scale weight reductions in the future. While these technologies present manu-
facturing challenges and are currently seen as suitable only for limited-volume appli-
cations, the same might have been said of front-wheel drive or unibody construction
in the past. Similarly, hybrid electric vehicles are currently seen as having high po-
tential for fuel consumption reduction, but limited potential for rapid, widespread
adoption. However, we may yet be surprised and in 30 years’ time look back on such
technologies — in hindsight — as today’s low-hanging fruit.
From a policy standpoint, a critical question is whether the stricter CAFE stan-
dards themselves might increase the rate of technology adoption. In Chapter 5 I
explored this question by testing the hypotheses that fuel efficiency technologies im-
prove more rapidly when gasoline prices are higher, and when firms are more tightly
constrained by CAFE standards. Using data from the CAFE program’s initiation
in 1978 through 2008, I found little to no evidence of a significant effect of binding
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CAFE standards on the rate of technology change in a firm’s fleet of cars. However,
I did find evidence that higher gasoline prices led to faster rates of innovation. These
results suggest that meeting the 2025 CAFE standards without sacrificing current
functionality may be more feasible if fuel prices remain at $3.50-$4.00 per gallon or
above, but could be more difficult if fuel prices fall back below $2.00 per gallon, where
they were between 1986 and 2003 (in 2012 dollars).
From a market standpoint, consumer preferences for different vehicle attributes are
critical to the economic practicability of the CAFE standards. If consumers continue
to demand attributes that detract from fuel consumption improvements, such as faster
acceleration and weight-adding features, then meeting fuel economy standards will be
less economically practical. Consumers will not necessarily continue to demand these
changes, however. As shown in Chapter 2, U.S. consumers’ thirst for acceleration
performance appears to have been slowing in recent years, and may be on track to level
off over the next 1–2 decades. Such an outcome could lead to “virtual performance”
(DeCicco, 2010) becoming much more important as a key measure of utility. Virtual
performance refers to a philosophy of shifting design efforts to vehicle characteristics
that do not trade off against fuel consumption, such as richer connectivity and media
capabilities. If such features — which are basically software — become the main profit
center for new automobiles, then improvements in acceleration performance, and even
weight-increasing hardware features, may become less critical to the profitability of
vehicles, making way for greater fuel consumption reductions.
Finally, I have presented an alternative perspective on the establishment of fuel
economy and GHG standards for automobiles. Much of the work in this dissertation
focused on rates of efficiency technology adoption, the feasibility of different levels of
standards, and the effect of the standards on the rate of technology change. However,
recent rulemakings establishing stricter federal CAFE and GHG emissions standards
have been determined at least as much by the political actions and interactions of a
bloc of states led by California, the automotive industry, and multiple federal agen-
cies. To understand how such outcomes emerge, it is helpful to consider the costs
to automobile manufacturers of building to stricter standards versus the benefits of
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having only a single standard to consider. I have presented a simple quantitative
model that illustrates three potential sets of incentives facing manufacturers in the
context of “nested” state and federal standards, where one region of a broader mar-
ket imposes a stricter standard than is required across the market as a whole. This
model offers an explanation for why the automobile industry so stridently opposed
California’s authority to set automotive GHG standards, only to embrace those same
standards nationwide once California’s authority was upheld.
A simple implementation of this model using parameter values characteristic of
the midsize car market illustrates the three possible outcomes. First, if the state
standards are not too strict, manufacturers may simply choose to build to the tighter
(adopting state) standard everywhere. Second, if the adopting state standards are
more strict, manufacturers may find it more profitable to build separate variants of
their product for the adopting and non-adopting states than to build to the stricter
standard everywhere. However, depending on the cost of developing separate variants,
it may be more profitable still for them to lobby for nationwide adoption of the
stricter standard. In this case, all firms may be better off building a single version of
their product nationwide, as long as their competitors are compelled to do the same.
Finally, if the nested standards are very strict, then it may be most profitable for all
firms to build separate variants of their products for the two regions. In this case,
the incentive for nationwide adoption of the more stringent standard is undercut, and
adopting states alone end up bearing the costs of the stricter standards. Worst of all,
if the manufacturers were already constrained in the non-adopting states, then the
sale of lower-emitting vehicles in the adopting states may enable the sale of higher-
emitting vehicles in the non-adopting states, partially or completely offsetting the
emission reductions expected in the adopting states. These results suggest that the
stringency of California’s GHG standards was in the second category — though a
more complete model, accounting in particular for heterogeneous consumer tastes
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